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I. INTRODUCTION
L ET the polluter pay. Such was the intent of Congress2 when it
passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")3 in 1980 and the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA").4 Unlike
the other environmental statutes that now constitute the canon of
American environmental law,' CERCLA is a remedial statute rather
than a regulatory one.6 Its primary goal is to foster the clean-up of
1. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926), quoted in Annette T.
Crawley, Note, Environmental Auditing and the "Good Samaritan" Doctrine: Impli-
cations for Parent Corporations, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 223, 223 (1993).
2. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-253 (III), at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038 ("CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for clean-up if a
hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened,
and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups.").
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
4. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). These amendments became effective on October 17, 1986.
5. For purposes of this Article, the environmental statutes considered to be in
this regulatory category include, but are not limited to: The Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); The Federal Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); The
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); and The
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
6. This remedial focus is due, in part, to the fact that CERCLA was passed in
direct response to a number of highly publicized hazardous waste problems in the
1970s. During the 1970s, many environmental statutes were promulgated to achieve
regulatory ends. Incidents such as Love Canal demonstrated the need to deal with
past environmental harms and not just prospective ones. CERCLA met this need.
See David S. Bakst, Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the
United States and the European Union: The Case for the Proposed Civil Liability Di-
rective, 19 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 323, 349 (1996) ("Environmental disasters have
provided the main impetus for environmental legislation on both continents. The late
1970's marked the beginning of the period of significant environmental legislation in
the United States. The Love Canal disaster ... spurred the movement toward strict
liability for environmental torts." (footnotes omitted)); see also Lynda J. Oswald,
Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L. Rev. 579, 585 (1993) ("At the time of CERCLA's enactment in 1980, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that the United
States produced 57 million metric tons of hazardous waste per year-about 600
pounds per citizen-and that this amount would grow at an annual rate of 3.5 per-
cent." (footnotes omitted)).
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past problems rather than to regulate current or ongoing conduct.' A
major difficulty with advancing CERCLA's professed goal of having
the "polluter pay" is the difficulty in defining who "polluters" are in a
way that is clear and does not undermine the goals and policies under-
lying the rest of environmental protection law. The amount of litiga-
tion' since the passage of CERCLA-"the most notable wellspring of
environmental liability" 9 -demonstrates that defining "polluter" is
not a straightforward task. This ambiguity is particularly problematic
when one considers that the clean up of uncontrolled hazardous
wastes remains a significant problem. The EPA "reports that 73 mil-
lion Americans live within four miles of a site that is contaminated
with hazardous substances."'" Yet, site clean-ups remain slow and
litigious."
7. This is a broad generalization since there are provisions in CERCLA that are
regulatory, and there are provisions in the so-called regulatory statutes that are reme-
dial. For a discussion of CERCLA's potential to serve a quasi-regulatory role, see
infra notes 347-55 and accompanying text.
8. Indeed, the frequency with which CERCLA has found its way into the courts
and the accompanying costs have been the subject of frequent criticism of the Act.
However, this is symptomatic of a bigger problem. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Heidt, Liabil-
ity of Shareholders Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 52 Ohio St. LJ. 133, 134 (1991) ("Litigation regarding
liability under [CERCLA] for the cleanup of sites contaminated with hazardous sub-
stances is booming." (footnote omitted)); Kurt A. Strasser & Denise Rodosevich, See-
ing the Forest for the Trees in CERCLA Liability, 10 Yale J. On Reg. 493, 496 (1993)
(observing that under CERCLA "the assignment of liability reportedly consumes as
much, if not more, time and resources as the actual cleanups themselves"); Erika
Clarke Birg, Comment, Redefining "Owner or Operator" Under CERCLA to Preserve
Traditional Notions of Corporate Law, 43 Emory LJ. 771, 774 n.9 (1994) ("The
number of lawsuits filed in 1992 under CERCLA exceeded the total number filed
under all other remedial environmental statutes."); Michael Harrold, Brownfields:
Superfuid's Economic Toxic Shock, Issue Analysis, Dec. 8, 1995, at 1, 3 (describing
Superfund's "excessive litigation costs that consume 36 cents of every dollar spent on
cleanup."). The remedial goal of CERCLA still appears sound, and some blame for
this avalanche of litigation must rest with the litigants as well as with the legislation.
Nevertheless, deep problems plague the statute.
9. Peter S. Menell, Legal Advising on Corporate Structure in the New Era of En-
vironmental Liability, 1990 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 399, 399 (footnote omitted).
10. Marc D. Poston, Comment, Redefining CERCLA Arranger Liability: Making
the Responsible Party Pay, 3 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 216, 216 (1996) (footnote
omitted).
11. For an assessment of the current status of environmental cleanups and the
times involved in cleanups, see United States General Accounting Office, Report to
the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Repre-
sentatives: Superfund, Times to Complete the Assessment and Cleanup of Hazardous
Waste Sites (1997). Among the disturbing facts compiled in this Report, its authors
noted:
Cleanup completion times have also lengthened. Nonfederal [i.e. state and
local] cleanup projects completed from 1986 through 1989 were finished, on
average, 3.9 years after sites were placed on the National Priorities List. By
1996, however, non-federal cleanup completions were averaging 10.6 years.
Id. at 2. Naturally, not all of these delays are caused by legal uncertainty. There may
well be scientific and practical problems as well. Nevertheless, the parental liability
uncertainty unnecessarily compounds this problem.
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In the corporate context, determining who is a "polluter" is further
complicated because CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator"
must be interpreted. 2 Here, it is often the case that the owner or
operator potentially liable for a contaminated site is a corporation
that is the subsidiary of another corporation. 13 That the named sub-
sidiary can be liable under CERCLA is beyond debate. What has not
been so clear, however, is the extent to which the parent corporation
shares this liability. While corporate law operates on the principle
that corporate subsidiaries are separate legal entities, 14 courts repeat-
edly face plaintiffs' 5 seeking to hold parent corporations liable for the
CERCLA responsibilities of their subsidiaries. This has been justified
primarily as an effort to cast a wide net for responsible parties and
achieve CERCLA's oft-touted broad remedial purposes.' 6
Until December, 1997, the United States Supreme Court declined
to review this question. As a result, the circuits devised various and
inconsistent tests for parental liability.17 The circuit courts had articu-
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
13. See Make Them Liable, Fin. Times, Jan. 5, 1995, at 19 ("Most businesses of any
size or substance in the late 20th century conduct their operations through subsidiar-
ies which are owned and controlled by a parent company."). This is a relatively new
problem, however, since it has only been in the past century that corporations were
allowed to own shares in other corporations and have subsidiaries. See Louis K. Lig-
gett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 562 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In Liggett, Justice
Brandeis traced the history of corporate growth in the United States and reported
that:
There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations
of capital, particularly when held by corporations.... The powers which the
corporation might exercise in carrying out its purposes were sparingly con-
ferred and strictly construed. Severe limitations were imposed on the
amount of indebtedness, bonded or otherwise. The power to hold stock in
other corporations was not conferred or implied. The holding company was
impossible.
Id. at 549-56 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
14. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
15. This class of plaintiffs has included both the United States seeking to bring
actions against parent companies as well as private parties seeking contribution from
the parent companies of subsidiaries who are potentially responsible parties for their
sites.
16. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text; see also Thomas R. Mounteer &
Michael J. Myers, CERCLA Does Not Articulate Whether Shareholders and Parent
Corporations Can Be Liable Under Superfund; as a Result Federal Circuit Courts are
in Conflict, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at B4 ("The lack of a clear statutory standard-
coupled with a desire to spread liability among as many potentially responsible parties
as possible-has spawned a substantial amount of litigation.").
17. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue several times prior to its
landmark 1997 decision to grant review in United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876
(1998). See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 498 U.S. 1108 (1991) (denying certio-
rari); Kayser-Roth Corp. v. United States, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991) (denying certiorari).
Because the issue brewed for years without resolution, interest in it increased. See
Harry W. Wellford, The Sixth Circuit Year in Review: Leading Cases of 1995,26 Mem.
St. U. L.J. 399, 421 (1996). Wellford notes that:
Tie importance of the environmental dispute in Cordova Chemical Co. is
illustrated by the massive number of lawyers involved in the original appeal.
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lated at least four major liability theories through which parent corpo-
rations could be held liable for their subsidiaries."8 The minority
views followed a traditional "piercing the corporate veil" approach by
holding parents liable as "owners." This severely limited the circum-
stances in which a court could disregard the corporate form and hold a
parent derivatively liable for the mischief of its subsidiary. The Fifth 19
and Sixth 0 Circuits followed this narrow view. Courts taking the nar-
row view allowed the assessment of liability against parents only if
traditional veil-piercing standards were met. One line of the minority-
view cases held that veil-piercing should be accomplished via state
law; the other line advocated the use of a federal standard. 1
In contrast, the majority liability theory espoused a direct approach
that did not require piercing the corporate veil, but instead imposed
direct liability on parents by classifying them as "operators" of the
facilities owned by their subsidiaries. The two variations on the ma-
jority theory were that one advocated liability based upon the parent's
actual control of the subsidiary's operations, while the other was pri-
marily concerned with the parent's capacity to control. 2 The rulings
More than 10 attorneys, representing various departments and agencies of
the United States, filed briefs or appeared at oral argument, and three others
represented the State of Michigan. Additionally, seven attorneys appeared
on behalf of the defendants and an amicus curiae, bringing the total number
of lawyers to approximately 20.
Id. An extensive discussion exploring the circumstances surrounding the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Joslyn and Kayser-Roth may be found in Christopher B.
Hood, Comment, Metaphors of Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA, 10 J. Envtl. L
& Litig. 85, 119-27 (1995).
18. Naturally, any attempt to classify a large body of case law is, by definition,
imprecise and involves a level of artificiality as the distinctions among these classifica-
tions may not lend themselves to precise, scientific classification. See Thomas J. Hei-
den, The New Limits of Linited Liability: Differing Standards & Theories for
Measuring a Parent/Shareholder's Responsibility for the Operations of its Subsidiary,
in Protecting the Corporate Parent 1993: Avoiding Liability for Acts of the Subsidi-
ary 7, 16 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 823, 1993)
("Many legal scholars and commentators believe the area to be hopelessly mud-
dled."). Indeed, as will become obvious in the discussion that follows, the fact-specific
nature of many corporate environment liability cases has often required courts to add
qualifications and clarifications to these four broad categories. However, these broad
classifications provide a helpful framework for discussion of the issue.
19. See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Without an express Congressional directive to the contrary, common-law principles
of corporation law, such as limited liability, govern our court's analysis.").
20. See, e.g., United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir.
1997) (en banc) ("[T]raditional veil piercing is the only standard under which this
scenario for liability can be assessed reliably."), vacated and remanded sub nora.
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
21. It should be noted, and will be explained later, that this latter group of cases
do not stand for the view that federal veil-piercing is the only avenue for parental
liability. Many of the cases provide for direct liability as well, but posit that if veil-
piercing is to be used then it should be federal.
22. See John M. Brown, Comment, Parent Corporation's [sic] Liability Under
CERCLA Section 107 for the Environmental Violations of Their Subsidiaries, 31 Tulsa
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of the First, 3 Second, 4 Third,' Fourth, 6 Seventh, 7 Eighth,28 Ninth, 9
and Eleventh30 Circuits adopted one of these two direct liability
theories.31
The differences among these liability tests involved more than much
semantic ado about nothing. Until the Supreme Court intervened,
these differing standards worked substantial differences in the scope
of parental liability.32 This lack of uniformity made it extremely diffi-
cult for the regulated community to assess risks, plan financial alloca-
tions, and generate realistic policies and practices.3 3 Without a clear
rule in place, it was exceedingly difficult to plan a corporate structure
that took into account the reasonable allocation of risk.34 There were
also important practical consequences that flowed from the nature of
L.J. 819, 824 (1996) (describing way in which "[slome courts hold that a parent's ca-
pacity to control the subsidiary's activities is enough while others hold that the parent
must exercise actual control over the subsidiary").
23. See, e.g., John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993)
(adopting actual control theory).
24. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 90
F.3d 671 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting actual control theory); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d
248 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
25. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. United States, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(adopting actual control theory); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli
Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993) (same).
26. See, e.g., Nurad Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.)
(adopting capacity to control theory).
27. See, e.g., Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417 (7th
Cir. 1994) (adopting actual control theory).
28. See, e.g., United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995) (adopt-
ing actual control theory), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 50 (1996).
29. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting actual control theory).
30. See, e.g., Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir.
1993) (adopting actual control theory).
31. It is important to note that the opinions advocating direct liability do not disre-
gard or abandon the assessment of liability via indirect veil-piercing. Rather, they
generally advocate for the retention of the two theories.
32. See infra Part III (exploring various pre-Bestfoods theories of parental
liability).
33. This is particularly true in the common circumstance in which one entity has
subsidiary organizations in a number of different jurisdictions and must plan its opera-
tion in light of inconsistent rules. See, e.g., Second Circuit Adopts Expansive Test for
Corporate Parent CERCLA Liability, BNA Daily Env't Rep., Mar. 18, 1996, at D2
(quoting Adam Cramer, Esq., who explains that "conflict in the federal appeal courts
between those that recognize the Superfund liability of parent corporations without
veil-piercing ... and those that do not, creates serious problems for companies with
subsidiaries in circuits that follow different rules of law").
34. This problem will also make it more difficult to assess the financial risk in-
volved in the acquisition and management of subsidiaries. See Edward Jason Dennis,
Court Applies Successor in Interest Liability Under CERCLA, 6 S.C. Envtl. L.J. 258,
266 (1997) ("Corporate relationships involving a parent holding company and a sub-
sidiary should also take great measures to ensure that they retain corporate formali-
ties, subject the relationships to independent scrutiny, and document the motives for
their particular structure. Otherwise, those companies may find themselves inadver-
tently creating alter-egos or joint ventures.").
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the liability theory chosen.35 Any ambiguity made it difficult for the
government to calculate the risk of pursuing alternate liability theories
in its enforcement efforts. Hence, the development of a clear and pre-
cise rule was needed for legal predictability.
Compounding this lack of uniform judicial guidance has been the
ongoing silence of Congress on this important question. Proposed
amendments to CERCLA have been languishing for several years
without resolution. 6 As Congress evaluates its options for fixing the
defects in CERCLA, it has the opportunity to clarify this question-
an opportunity that, to date, it has ignored. 7
However, in December 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.,' a Sixth Circuit case
35. Heidt, supra note 8, states:
[T]he government may have to share the assets of the shareholder with all or
some of the other creditors. By piercing the corporate veil, the government
paves the way for other creditors to pierce the corporate veil. If other credi-
tors are successful in piercing the corporate veil (following the government's
lead) and the shareholder has insufficient assets to pay all of these claims the
government will recover less because it must share with other creditors. Had
the government pursued its claim directly under CERCLA, liability would
have been imposed on the shareholder for the government's claim only.
Id. at 145-46 (footnote omitted).
36. See Superfund Revisions: Hearings on H.R. 3000 Before the Subcomm. on Fi-
nance and Hazardous Materials, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R.
3000] (statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Env't Protection Agency)
("The Administration remains concerned over the expiration of the authority to re-
plenish the Superfund Trust Fund. It has been two years since the taxing authority
expired, resulting [in] a steady erosion of the Trust Fund."), available in 1998 WL
11516062; Deborah A. Hottel & Michael R. Jeffcoat, Caught in the Web: CERCLA
Owner or Operator Liability of Lenders, Shareholders, Parent Corporations, and At-
torneys, 6 S.C. Envt. L. J. 161, 178 (1997) ("Members of Congress have recently spon-
sored several pieces of legislation to amend and reauthorize CERCLA. However,
none of these bills provide any significant clarification of the circumstances in which a
parent... can be deemed liable."); Allen Freedman, Congress Prepares New Assault
on Troubled Superfund Sites, Cong. Q., June 28, 1997, at 1502 ("For nearly five years,
Congress has tried and failed to revamp a program dogged by inefficiencies, costly
snail's-pace cleanups, endless litigation and round after round of partisan sniping.").
For a fuller discussion of Congressional wrangling over Superfund reauthorization
and CERCLA reform, see Peter K. Johnson, Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington:
1997 Superfund Amendments: Will it Solve the Liability Problem and How Will this
Affect Massachusetts?, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 1269 (1997).
37. See Daniel Riesel & Lemuel M. Srolovic, The Search for Deep Pockets: The
Developing Law of Corporate Officer, Shareholder & Successor Liability Under CER-
CLA, in ALI-ABA Course of Study: Environmental Law 67, 97 (1996) ("Congress
should be urged to formulate clear standards for corporate officer, shareholder, and
successor liability as part of CERCLA's reauthorization.... A consistent approach
would reduce the vagaries attendant with the current law and provide a much-needed
benchmark to guide corporate conduct."); see also Birg, supra note 8, at 812
("[Courts have implemented conflicting and confusing standards in imposing liability
on parent corporations; therefore, either Congress or the EPA needs to clarify the
intent of the statute, if that intent is to impose direct liability on parent corpora-
tions."). For a fuller legislative discussion, see infra Part VI.
38. 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nonrt United
States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
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that rejected all theories for parental liability except for indirect
"owner" liability under state veil-piercing law.39 In June 1998, the
Court ruled on the issue in this case, now known as United States v.
Bestfoods.4 ° This decision vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit's
narrow reading of parental liability and held that while a parent could
still be liable under the restrictive veil-piercing theory employed by
the Sixth Circuit, a parent could now also be liable under a direct
"operator" standard if it acted as the operator of a facility owned or
operated by its subsidiary.41 This differed from lower court rulings
that had previously assessed direct liability by looking at the parent's
legal relationship to the subsidiary rather than to the facility.
The Supreme Court's new functional standard for direct liability has
done much to promote judicial predictability and provide much
needed direction and unity to the inconsistent voices of the lower
courts. While Bestfoods narrowed the scope of the debate, however, it
has left open three significant issues that now require Congressional
guidance and clarification: (1) whether state or federal law should
govern indirect liability via veil-piercing; (2) how "operator" should
be defined for purposes of assessing direct liability; and (3) how the
definition of "operator" may best be applied. This Article explores
the legal intricacies of parent corporations' CERCLA liability in light
of Bestfoods, with an eye toward creating a workable legislative solu-
tion to the dilemmas that the Supreme Court did not resolve.
The Article begins by introducing the scope of the parental liability
problem and exploring the development, merits, and demerits of the
pre-Bestfoods theories of parent liability under CERCLA.42 After
39. Id. at 580.
40. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998), vacating and remanding United States v. Cordova
Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
41. See id. at 1890.
42. Many commentators have reviewed the legal parameters of the judicial solu-
tions created by courts prior to Bestfoods. Hence, weighing past judicial alternatives
is not the primary focus of this Article. For background discussion on the earlier
development of these alternatives by the lower courts prior to Bestfoods, see Gary
Allen, Refining the Scope of CERCLA's Corporate Veil-Piercing Remedy, 6 Stan.
Envtl. L.J. 43 (1986-87); Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent
Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. Rev.
421 (1990); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in
Determining Parent & Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 295 (1996);
Norman J. Fry, Liability of Shareholders and Corporate Directors, Officers, and Em-
ployees for CERCLA Response Costs, 1 Envtl. Law. 253 (1994); Elizabeth Ann Glass
Geltman, Shareholder Liability for Improper Disposal of Hazardous Waste, 95 Com.
L.J. 385 (1990); David J. Hayes & J. Drew Page, CERCLA Rights and Liabilities, in
ALI-ABA Course of Study: The Impact of Environmental Law on Real Estate and
Other Commercial Transactions 1 (1996); Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Haz-
ardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 65 (1992); Heidt, supra note 8; Allen Kezsbom et al., "Successor" and
"Parent" Liability for Superfund Cleanup Costs: The Evolving State of the Law, 10 Va.
Envtl. L.J. 45 (1990); James A. King, Kayser-Roth, Joslyn, and the Problem of Parent
Corporation Liability Under CERCLA, 25 Akron L. Rev. 123 (1991); John J. Little,
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offering this background, it will then analyze the Bestfoods decision
and explore the specific ways in which it represents a step forward in
resolving this complex issue and, yet, leaves open three key questions
for Congress to answer.
First, Bestfoods continued to allow an indirect assessment of owner
liability against parent corporations via traditional veil-piercing theo-
ries. Unfortunately, in its decision, the Court declined to state
whether that assessment should be done under federal or state law.
While recognizing the merits of both views, this Article will argue that
Congress should establish that veil-piercing be governed by state law.
The second and third questions addressed in this Article involve di-
rect assessment of operator liability. Congress must establish a defini-
tion of what it means to "operate" a facility for purposes of
determining parental liability. The Article will offer a definition based
on previous Congressional definitions in the lender liability context.
Ideally, this definition will offer clear guidance to parent corporations
upon which they can base their conduct, and to environmental en-
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bility, 44 Sw. L.J. 1499 (1991); Gene A. Lucero & J. Drew Page, CERCLA Rights &
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Corporate Parent: Avoiding Liability for Acts of the Subsidiary 241 (PLI Corporate
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 823, 1993) [hereinafter Oswald, Cor-
porate Parent Liability]; Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the
"Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L Rev. 259 (1992);
Strasser & Rodosevich, supra note 8; Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Liability of Corporations
and Corporate Officers, Directors, and Shareholders Under Superfund: Should Corpo-
rate and Agency Law Concepts Apply?, 14 J. Corp. L. 839 (1989); John S.G. Worden,
CERCLA Liability of Parent Corporations for the Acts of Their Subsidiaries, 30 Idaho
L. Rev. 73 (1993-94); Birg, supra note 8; Brown, supra note 22; Constance S. Chandler
& Rebecca J. Grosser, Comment, An Issue Ripe for Supreme Court Review. Whether
Congress Intended to Alter the Common Law Principles of Corporate Limited Liabil-
ity When Enacting CERCLA, 4 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 14 (1996); Charles E.
Dadswell, Jr., Comment, The Corporate Entity" Is There Life After CERCLA?, 7
Cooley L. Rev. 463 (1990); Richard S. Farmer, Note, Parent Corporation Responsibil-
ity for the Environmental Liabilities of The Subsidiary: A Search for the Appropriate
Standard, 19 J. Corp. L. 769 (1994); Hood, supra note 17; Evelyn F. Heidelberg, Com-
ment, Parent Corporation Liability Under CERCLA: Toward a Uniform Federal Rule
of Decision, 22 Pac. L.J. 854 (1991); Lance A. Lawson, Note, Direct Liability as an
Arranger Under CERCLA § 107(a)(3): The Efficacy of Adhering to the Tenets of
Traditional Corporate Law, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 731 (1996); Note, Liability of
Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
986 (1986) (hereinafter "Hazardous Waste"); Mark E. McKane, Comment, Operator
Liability for Parent Corporations Under CERCLA: A Return to Basics, 91 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1642 (1997); Elizabeth A. Noonan, Note, To Pierce or Not to Pierce? When is
the Question. Developing a Federal Rule of Decision for Piercing the Corporate Veil
Under CERCLA, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 733 (1990); Cindy A. Wolfer, Comment, Piercing
the Corporate Veil Under CERCLA: To Control or Not to Control-Which is the An-
swer?, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 975 (1991); Mark F. Rosenberg, Parent, Successor, and Alter
Ego Liability Concerns in te Transactional Setting, Brief, Summer 1996, at 29.
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forcement agencies, who will face less uncertainty in identifying re-
sponsible and liable parties. Although the Bestfoods decision
attempted to do this, it failed to provide the detailed guidance that
would be given by a clear legislative pronouncement.43
The last and most vexing question is how to apply this new defini-
tion in such a way that it provides parents an incentive to assist their
subsidiaries in environmental compliance rather than offering them a
disincentive to become involved. Because CERCLA's backward-
looking remedial purpose differs from the forward-reaching prevent-
ative goal of most other environmental statutes,44 it is difficult to ap-
ply the standard in an effective way. Unfortunately, the allocation of
parental liability under CERCLA after Bestfoods may give parent
corporations disincentives to intervene in the affairs of their
subsidiaries.
This Article proposes a way to allocate that responsibility and help
reduce the disincentives. The proposal is presented as a legislative
initiative rather than as a judicial remedy.45 Unfettered by the re-
straints that bind courts-including the Supreme Court-in weighing
this issue, Congress is free to take a broader view, to look at CER-
CLA in the context of environmental regulation generally, and to
adopt a rule that will provide clear guidance to both the courts and the
regulated community as to when and how the actions of subsidiaries
should come back to haunt their parents. As the legislature, the busi-
ness community, the lower courts, and the environmental regulators
prepare to respond to Bestfoods, this Article will offer guidance to
achieve clarity beyond the mists of metaphor.
II. THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF CERCLA's PARENT
LIABILITY PROBLEM
When CERCLA was enacted, its primary goal was not to regulate
current or future environmental activity.46 Rather, CERCLA is "by
its very nature backward looking. '47 While there are elements of
CERCLA that influence on-going conduct, and while the specter of
future liability for current carelessness may have a deterrent effect on
wrongful conduct, the premise of CERCLA was and remains
remedial.4 8
43. This gives rise to two interrelated problems to be addressed later-the lack of
detail in the guidance provided, and the poor suitability of the judiciary to articulate
such standards. See infra Part V.
44. See infra note 350-55 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's remedial
function).
45. The benefit of a legislative solution rather than a judicial one is discussed more
fully infra notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
46. A backward-looking statute will have side-effects that may impact current and
future behavior. See infra notes 351-54 and accompanying text.
47. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985).
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 67
1998] CERCLA LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES 125
At the time it passed CERCLA, Congress was aware that past haz-
ardous waste practices had left in their wake a host of contaminated
sites containing waste that threatened human health, the environment,
or both.49 Thus, CERCLA's primary goal was to establish a compre-
hensive scheme through which these contaminated sites could be rem-
edied in one of three ways:50 (1) the government could order the
responsible parties to clean up the site themselves;5' (2) the govern-
ment could execute the cleanup at public expense, and then seek re-
imbursement for its costs from the responsible party or parties;52 or
(3) where no solvent responsible party could be found, a $1.6 billion
dollar Superfund created by CERCLA and funded by taxes on the
petroleum and chemical industries would be available to finance
needed clean-ups.
5 3
Naturally, the money in the public Superfund is finite. Due to this
fiscal limitation as well as the desire to have clean-up costs borne by
the parties who have some relationship to the contamination rather
than the public at large,54 CERCLA cast a wide net for "covered per-
sons" who might be called upon to pay for the CERCLA clean up.55
Such persons are identified as those who are:
49. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Judicial Review of CERCLA Cleanup Procedures:
Striking a Balance to Prevent Irreparable Harm, 20 Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 339, 339-40
(1996) ("CERCLA was intended to provide an effective mechanism for cleaning up
such dangers as quickly as possible, with as little expense as ... possible borne by the
responsible parties, rather than by the taxpayers.").
50. This variety of options leads, of course, to differences in the procedural pos-
tures in which CERCLA cases are decided. Some are enforcement actions brought
by the government, and others are contribution actions among the joint and severally
liable responsible parties. Interestingly, parent corporations arguing for a narrow
view of parent liability may be helped by such a rule if they are targeted as PRP's, but
harmed by it if they, in turn, seek contribution from other parents.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994).
52. See id. § 9607(a).
53. See id. § 9611(a).
54. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 425 (arguing that "fiscal necessity
demands that the government find new, more effective strategies for identifying and
collecting cleanup costs from responsible, financially viable parties"); Oswald, Corpo-
rate Parent Liability, supra note 42, at 243 ("Because the costs of cleanup may well
exceed the assets of a subsidiary, the EPA has an incentive to seek to hold the parent
liable as well."); Duncan John McCampbell, Note, The Triumph of Substance Over
Waste Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA) of 1980: A Case Analysis of United States v. Aceto Agricultural
Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989), 13 Hamline L Rev. 407, 408 (1990)
("[A]t the very heart of CERCLA is the authority it confers upon the EPA to replen-
ish the Superfund by suing persons or companies responsible for the cost of cleaning
up the hazardous waste sites.").
55. The costs that the responsible parties must bear include:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
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(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances ....
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
-56stances for transport ....
Within these broad categories, "person" is further defined to en-
compass "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Govern-
ment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State,
or any interstate body."57 Furthermore, the statute further qualifies
"owner or operator" as excluding "a person who, without participat-
ing in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility."58
There is nothing in the language of CERCLA that refers specifically
to the liability of a parent company for the acts of its subsidiary.59
Equally unhelpful is the legislative history which, due to the rushed
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, includ-
ing the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
56. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
57. Id. § 9601(21).
58. Id. § 9601(20)(A).
59. See Kezsbom et al., supra note 42, at 45 ("CERCLA does not mention either
'successor' or 'parent' corporations in its listing of persons who are liable for response
costs. In fashioning a body of precedent for this area, therefore, the courts have re-
lied on the sparse legislative history of the statute, including the perceived intent of
Congress to make those who have 'benefitted' from the pollution-rather than the
taxpayers-bear the burden for its consequences."); John Copland Nagle, CERCLA's
Mistakes, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1405, 1427 (1997) ("[T]he scope of the term 'opera-
tor,'-defined less than helpfully as 'any person owning or operating,'-has proved
especially uncertain. When does a parent corporation become the operator of its sub-
sidiary corporation's facilities?"); Brown, supra note 22, at 820 ("CERCLA never ex-
pressly refers to parent or subsidiary corporations."); Hood, supra note 17, at 114
("CERCLA is silent on whether shareholders' participation in management consti-
tutes grounds for liability."); Lawson, supra note 42, at 732 (observing that CERCLA
"neither defines 'arranged for,' nor expressly provides direct liability for nonpartici-
pating.., shareholders"); Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading
the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1469, 1498 (1989) ("CERCLA does
not address parent company liability explicitly."); see also Oswald & Schipani, supra
note 42, at 261-62 (criticizing CERCLA for being "unequivocal in its insistence that
those responsible for environmental contamination bear the costs of cleanup [yet]
disturbingly reticent ... as to who is ultimately 'responsible' for improper disposal");
Wolfer, supra note 42, at 978 ("While the determination of who is an owner or opera-
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passage of CERCLA, ° offers relatively little guidance in defining lia-
ble parties.6 ' Indeed, it has been aptly observed that "CERCLA is an
tor is critical in finding that party to be responsible, the CERCLA statute does not
clearly define owner or operator.").
60. Courts and commentators frequently lament the hasty passage of CERCLA,
and the sparse legislative history and minimal Congressional guidance that resulted
from this haste. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("CERCLA is in fact a hastily drawn piece of
compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions."), aff'd
in par4 rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Environmental Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances 514 (1992) (-Vagueness, con-
tradiction, and dissembling are familiar features of environmental statutes, but CER-
CLA is secure in its reputation as the worst drafted of the lot."); Aronovsky & Fuller,
supra note 42, at 427 (calling CERCLA "hastily drafted and silent on many points");
Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfintd") Act of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 1
(1982) (describing CERCLA as "hurriedly put together .... It was considered on
December 3, 1980, in the closing days of a lame duck session of an outgoing Congress.
It was considered and passed, after very limited debate, under a suspension of the
rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments."); Nagle, supra note 59, at
1407 ("'CERCLA is now viewed nearly universally as a failure."') (quoting United
States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 229, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1994));
id. at 1419 ("[P]ost hoc speculation drives much of the interpretation of the statute in
the absence of any direct signals about congressional intent."); Donald M. Carley,
Comment, Personal Liability of Officers Under CERCLA: How Wide a Net Has Been
Cast?, 13 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 235, 235 (1994) ("The 96th Congress that hastily
enacted CERCLA as an eleventh hour compromise is to blame, at least in part, for
the confusion and litigation that has arisen in this area. The statute itself is not a
model of clarity and precision."); Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 854-55 (calling CER-
CLA "a last minute, hastily drawn compromise [with] little definitive legislative his-
tory to aid courts in interpreting its ambiguous liability provisions"); McCampbell,
supra note 54, at 414-15 ("Congress left very few footprints in the sand in its rush to
pass a major hazardous substances bill before the onset of the Reagan presidency and
a newly elected Republican majority in the Senate."); Noonan, supra note 42, at 736
("Hastily and broadly drafted, CERCLA is an ambiguous statute. Moreover, because
Congress passed the bill in such limited time, the legislative history provides little
guidance to clarify its open-ended provisions. Thus, the courts are left to fill in the
gaps."); Clay M. Stevens, Note, Corporate Officer Liability as an "Operator" Under
CERCLA: The Kelley v. 7Tscornia Analysis, 9 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl L 553, 556
(1994) ("CERCLA's legislative history has not aided in interpreting Congressional
intent as to whether traditional corporate law is to be followed or abandoned in CER-
CLA's enforcement.").
61. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that "CERCLA's legislative history is shrouded with mys-
tery"); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md.
1986) ("The structure of section 107(a), like so much of this hastily patched together
compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clarity."); Aronovsky & Fuller, supra
note 42, at 436 ("[T]he language of CERCLA does not expressly authorize parent
corporation or individual shareholder liability for the acts of subsidiary corpora-
tions."); George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 Wake For-
est L. Rev. 151, 155 (1991) ("Although CERCLA's provisions are elaborate, they
contain many drafting gaps. Congress intended the federal courts to fill these gaps
through federal common law."); Oswald, supra note 6, at 580 ("One conclusion that
all can agree upon, however, is that the statute is poorly drafted and analytically in-
complete."); Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 863 ("The liability provisions in CERCLA
are among the most sketchy and ambiguous in an act roundly criticized for its
vagueness.").
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unusual law because its liability provisions are simultaneously draco-
nian and nebulous. ' 62 Thus, whether or not a parent company should
be liable for the CERCLA responsibilities of its subsidiary turns
solely on how broadly courts, with insufficient statutory guidance,
choose to read the list of "covered persons."
In most contexts, courts have broadly interpreted CERCLA's liabil-
ity provisions. This is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that liability
under CERCLA is now widely acknowledged to be joint, several,63
strict, 64 and retroactive despite the fact that this was not entirely ex-
plicit in the language of the statute itself. As courts steadily widened
the net of CERCLA liability in this and other contexts, they often
justified their actions by incanting CERCLA's broad remedial goal.65
62. Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under CER-
CLA?, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 299, 313 (1994).
63. See, e.g. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 3071(a)(1)(D) (1980) (stating that, with very
limited defenses, "any person who caused or contributed to the release or threatened
release shall be... joint and several[ly] [liable] with any other person who caused or
contributed to such releases"). H.R. 7020 was one of three bills that ultimately led to
CERCLA. See Anthony J. Fejfar, Landowner-Lessor Liability Under CERCLA, 53
Md. L. Rev. 157, 162-90 (1994) (discussing CERCLA's legislative history).
64. The classic and oft-cited case of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1985) makes this point clear. Although Shore Realty acknowledges that the
legislative history of CERCLA is inconclusive, id. at 1039-40, the case firmly estab-
lishes the principle of strict liability:
Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even
though an explicit provision for strict liability was not included in the com-
promise. Section 9601(32) provides that 'liability' under CERCLA 'shall be
construed to be the standard of liability' under section 311 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, which courts have held to be strict liability.
Id. at 1042; see also United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th
Cir. 1996) (noting that "if the tortured history of CERCLA litigation has taught us
one lesson, it is that CERCLA is a strict liability statute").
65. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp.
283, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("Courts that have addressed the question of the scope of
CERCLA have erred on the side of giving a broad reading to the Act."); Northeastern
Pharm., 579 F. Supp. at 848 ("CERCLA promotes the timely cleanup of inactive haz-
ardous waste sites. It was designed to insure, so far as possible, that the parties re-
sponsible for the creation of hazardous waste sites be liable for the response costs in
cleaning them up."); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction.
The statute should not be narrowly interpreted ... to limit the liability of those re-
sponsible for cleanup costs beyond the limits expressly provided."); see also Aronov-
sky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 427 (calling the federal judiciary CERCLA's "powerful
ally" and observing that there is "overwhelming judicial support for CERCLA and its
objectives"); id. at 429 ("[Tjhe trend in judicial decisions on this issue is to ... give
great deference to the statute's objectives and to impose liability on parent corpora-
tions and shareholders where appropriate to advance those objectives."); id. at 439
("Overwhelmingly, courts have reached decisions that further the congressional
objectives underlying CERCLA, even at the expense of significant equitable interests
of private responsible parties."); King, supra note 42, at 141 ("Courts holding parent
corporations liable under section 107 of CERCLA have done so by relying almost
exclusively on the statute's remedial nature. Through the ... statutory construction
that remedial legislation should be interpreted liberally, the courts have turned to the
generic federal interests embodied in CERCLA's text and history . . . ." (footnote
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This goal urges that liability attach to any party having a relationship
to the hazardous waste site, a relationship with the person or entity
who left the waste at the site, or a relationship with the person or
entity who owned or operated the site at the time the wastes were left.
On the surface, this would appear to be a net into which parents of
liable subsidiaries would easily stumble.
The difficulty in blithely holding parents liable for the misadven-
tures of their subsidiaries lies in the well-established principle of
American66 corporate law that shareholders-individuals or corpora-
omitted)); Barnett M. Lawrence, Liability of Corporate Officers Under CERCLA: An
Ounce of Prevention May be the Cure, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,377 (Sept.
1990) ("With the pace and cost of the cleanups accelerating, governmental and private
plaintiffs have sought to expand the pool of responsible parties to conduct the clean-
ups or to reimburse plaintiffs for their cleanup costs. The courts have generally com-
plied by interpreting CERCLA broadly."); Gregory C. Sisk & Jerry L Anderson, The
Sun Sets on Federal Common Law: Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA
After O'Melveney & Meyers, 16 Va. Envtl. LJ. 505, 506 (1997) ("[n an unceasing
eagerness to further augment the pool of parties potentially liable for a hazardous
waste site, several courts reached beyond the language of the statute to formulate new
judge-made rules when they deemed established legal principles insufficiently gener-
ous."); Wallace, Jr., supra note 42, at 840-41 ("[T]he courts and the [E.P.A.] ... have
interpreted CERCLA expansively in favor of significant governmental control over
industry." (footnote omitted)); Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 488 ("CERCLA's pur-
poses are to clean up our most precious natural resource, the environment, and to
force the individuals responsible for its contamination to finance the clean-up or face
additional punitive damages. A court which interprets CERCLA based on its pur-
pose.. . will hold that potential liability should be extremely far-reaching."); Heidel-
berg, supra note 42, at 864 ("The statutory definitions of each category of potentially
responsible parties are very broad, and the courts have generally construed the defini-
tions expansively." (footnote omitted)). An extensive, well-reasoned critique of this
expansive reading of "remedial purpose" may be found in Blake A. Watson, Liberal
Construction of CERCLA Under tie Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower
Courts Taken a Good Tiring Too Far?, 20 Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 199 (1996) (evaluating
and criticizing expansion of "remedial purpose" in many CERCLA contexts). In his
analysis, Watson focuses on three key questions, all crucial for understanding the
scope of "remedial purpose": "Why is the canon utilized so often by the lower courts
when interpreting CERCLA? Did Congress actually intend for courts to liberally
construe the statute in order to effectuate its remedial purposes? Is CERCLA some-
how 'more remedial' than other environmental statutes?" Id. at 204. Indeed, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that, among selected areas of law, there is "a higher piercing
percentage in environmental cases." Robert B. Thompson, Piercing tile Corporate
VeiL An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036, 1061-62 n.134 (1991). This high
piercing percentage represents one specific example of the willingness of the courts to
read CERCLA broadly for purposes of assessing liability.
66. This is a view not limited solely to the United States. See Bakst, supra note 6,
at 323-24. Bakst notes:
[T]he European Union (EU) has traditionally recognized the corporation as
a separate legal entity from its shareholders. European Company Law gen-
erally limits shareholder liability to the amount of investment in the corpora-
tion. The rule of limited liability applies not only when the shareholders are
individuals but also when they are other corporations.... [A] parent corpo-
ration could not be reached to satisfy obligations of a subsidiary corporation.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The problems raised by limited liability in the British envi-
ronmental scheme are discussed more fully in Incorporation, Envtl. Liab. Rep., Jan. 1,
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tions-enjoy limited liability for the obligations of the corporation in
which they own shares.67 Indeed, as stated in the Model Business
1995, at 1, 1 (describing problem as raising critical issues for environmental liability
law and public policy.).
67. The authority for this point is quite consistent and requires little explanation
or elaboration. See, e.g., Joel R. Burcat & Craig P. Wilson, Post-Dissolution Liability
of Corporations and Their Shareholders Under CERCLA, 50 Bus. Law. 1273, 1275-76
(1995) ("Generally, corporations and their shareholders are separate in the eyes of
the law, and courts will not disregard this formal separation absent a sufficient show-
ing that the two are not truly independent." (footnote omitted)); Dent, Jr., supra note
61, at 158 ("The traditional rule of American law is that, with some important excep-
tions, shareholders, officers and creditors of a corporation are not liable for corporate
debts."); Geltman, supra note 42, at 387 ("A corporation is generally regarded as an
entity separate and distinct from its shareholders or subsidiaries; and those independ-
ent identities will not be disregarded absent a showing of special circumstances.");
Heidt, supra note 8, at 136 ("Limited liability has been a standard part of the statutory
corporate form since the mid 1800s and remains a fundamental part of corporate
law."); King, supra note 42, at 126 ("Generally, stockholders are not personally liable
for debts of corporations in which they hold an equity interest. The axiom has its
origins in the English common law and has been carried over to the United States as
part of state corporation law."); Oswald, supra note 6, at 622 ("Limited liability is the
keystone of American corporate law; according to traditional analysis, shareholders
invest in corporations precisely because their liability for the corporation's debts is
limited to their contribution to capital."); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 42, at 294
("[O]ne of the basic tenets of corporate law is limited liability."); Strasser &
Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 500 ("Protection of shareholders, including parent com-
pany shareholders, from liability is a fundamental principle of the legal system and, in
the customary jargon of the common law, parent liability is to be imposed only in
exceptional cases."); Thompson, supra note 65, at 1036 ("As a general principle, cor-
porations are recognized as legal entities separate from their shareholders, officers,
and directors."); id. at 1039 ("[S]hareholders in a corporation are not liable for the
obligations of the enterprise beyond the capital that they contribute in exchange for
their shares. A corollary of this principle is that the corporation is an entity separate
from its shareholders, directors, or officers."); Bakst, supra note 6, at 323 ("One of the
most basic doctrines of corporate law in the United States is that the corporation is a
separate legal entity from its shareholders ... [and] the shareholders of the corpora-
tion are only liable for corporate obligations to the extent of their investment.");
Chandler & Grosser, supra note 42, at 14 ("[A] parent corporation is typically re-
garded as an entity distinct from its subsidiaries. A parent is protected from the liabil-
ities of its subsidiary by the corporate veil unless circumstances require that the veil
be pierced."); Crawley, supra note 1, at 262 ("[T]he law generally recognizes the sepa-
rate corporate identities of subsidiaries and affiliated companies and grants their par-
ent corporations limited liability absent special circumstances."); Lawson, supra note
42, at 739 ("A fundamental tenet of corporate law is the limited liability provided to
corporate officers, directors, and shareholders. The common law recognizes the cor-
poration and its shareholders as separate legal entities .... Most states adopted the
limited liability rule for corporations by the late 1830s."); Tom McMahon & Katie
Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrines in Environmental Cases,
Nat. Resources & Env't, Fall 1988, at 29, 29 ("The traditional 'corporate veil' may be
'pierced' only under relatively narrow circumstances where the shareholder exhibits
excessive control over the corporation and commits a wrong through use of the corpo-
rate form which results in an unjust loss or injury."). For a full analysis of the legal
and economic justifications for limited liability, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985). For
historical perspectives on this limited liability, see Henry W. Ballantine, Separate En-
tity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Cal. L. Rev. 12 (1925); William 0.
Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corpora-
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Corporation Act: "Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incor-
poration, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the
acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally
liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.""' 8
Although not universally popular,69 this basic principle is supported
by the familiar and long-standing70 justifications that such a limit on
liability is economically and socially useful because it encourages in-
vestors to take risks they otherwise might shun;7 it protects personal
assets of investors from the unpredictability of the business world;' it
allocates risk among a wide group of individuals;"3 it promotes eco-
nomic efficiency in various ways;74 it satisfies the expectations of in-
vestors who currently rely on limited liability as a central feature of
tions, 30 Yale L.J. 193 (1929); I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate
Entity, 12 Colum. L. Rev. 496 (1912). The use and background of limited liability in
the environmental context is explored more fully in Cindy A. Schipani, Infiltration of
Enterprise Theory into Environmental Jurisprudence, 22 J. Corp. L 599 (1997).
68. Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 6.22(b) (1984) (emphasis added).
69. See infra Part III.
70. See Blumberg, supra note 42, at 297 (asserting that American corporate law
has "misty medieval roots").
71. See, eg., Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 436 ("[l]mposing unlimited
liability on parents and individual shareholders presents serious economic policy con-
cerns. The risk of unlimited liability could have a chilling effect on investment on
corporations that generate, transport or dispose of hazardous wastes."); Heidelberg,
supra note 42, at 871 ("Limited liability is based on the economic policy that share-
holders should be encouraged to commit limited amounts of capital to an endeavor
which might be too risky for direct individual involvement.").
72. This unpredictability may be particularly problematic for investors in the
CERCLA context. See, e.g., Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 172-73 (observing that "risks
of waste disposal are notoriously unpredictable .... The uncertainty of environmen-
tal liability is compounded by the fear that Congress vill not only change the rules but
change them retroactively.").
73. See, eg., id. at 165 ("[L]imited liability spreads risks among risk-averse partici-
pants: Shareholders risk their investment while creditors shoulder the remaining
risk."); Menell, supra note 9, at 408 ("The doctrine of limited liability has been de-
fended on three economic grounds: (1) it fosters economic growth by encouraging
investors to take risks; (2) it facilitates the efficient spreading of risk among corpora-
tions and their voluntary creditors; and (3) it avoids the enormous litigation costs that
would be required to resolve suits between a corporation's creditors and its many
shareholders.").
74. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 67, at 94 ("[Llimited liability decreases
the need to monitor. All investors risk losing wealth because of the actions of agents.
They could monitor these agents more closely.... But beyond a point more monitor-
ing is not worth the cost."); id. at 96 ("With unlimited liability, shares would not be
homogeneous commodities, so they would no longer have one market price."); id.
("[L]imited liability allovs more efficient diversification."); id. at 97 (-[L]imited liabil-
ity facilitates optimal investment decisions."); Dale A. Oesterle, ieiving CERCLA as
Creating an Option on the Marginal Firnn: Does it Encourage Irresponsible Environ-
mental Behavior?, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 39, 51 (1991) ("It is possible, given any
established standard of environmental behavior, to instill too much environmental
caution into the operation of a firm."); McKane, supra note 42, at 1646 ("Limited
liability also reduces the costs for parent corporations to monitor the managers of the
subsidiary.... Because it bears less risk, a parent corporation is not motivated to
monitor excessively ....").
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the corporate form;75 and it allows investors to take advantage of the
many legitimate business reasons for operating through subsidiaries.76
Thus, as a general rule 77 parents and subsidiaries live legally separate
lives. 78
Critics argue that limited liability encourages irresponsible con-
duct;79 unwisely leads to externalization of costs which invites ineffi-
75. See, e.g., Sisk & Anderson, supra note 65, at 508 ("Fabrication of a new fedeial
common law regime regarding a matter grounded in corporation law would disrupt
existing commercial relationships and prove unfair to those who had legitimately re-
lied upon long-standing state law principles.").
76. Birg, supra note 8, states:
Business entities utilize the corporate structure of a parent corporation with
one or more subsidiaries for many reasons. The advantages of this enter-
prise structure include (1) diversification of a company's product-line, (2)
restriction of jurisdictional forums upon which suit may be brought against
the company, (3) favorable tax treatment of parent and subsidiary enter-
prises, (4) efficient management structures, (5) possible financing advan-
tages, (6) retention of goodwill of an established business unit, (7)
movement of businesses to avoid highly regulated areas and antitrust impli-
cations, and (8) limited liability.
Id. at 776; see also Todd W. Rallison, Comment, The Threat to Investment in the Haz-
ardous Waste Industry: An Analysis of Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability
Under CERCLA, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 585, 614. Rallison states:
Corporations may also be shareholders in other corporations. Corporations
invest in other corporations for a variety of reasons: to gain the organiza-
tional or marketing benefits of diversity, to receive potentially large invest-
ment returns, to assure quality control of product components, to create
price stability in a volatile market, and to insure against sudden, unexpected
product shortages or embargoes.
Id.
77. For a discussion of veil-piercing, the exception to this rule, see infra notes 172-
79 and accompanying text.
78. Interestingly, at least one commentator has suggested that this protection ap-
plies to other forms of business organizations. See Anthony M. Sabino, Litigation Is-
sues for the Limited Liability Company, N.Y. St. B.J., Feb. 1997, at 30. Sabino states:
There is no good reason not to apply a piercing the veil doctrine to the LLC,
primarily because the theory itself exists to prevent injustice. Notwithstand-
ing all the good intentions of prevailing LLC law to protect the members of
the LLC, it is highly unlikely that a piercing doctrine would be unavailable
to litigants, if the members were utilizing the LLC form to commit fraud or
otherwise act unjustifiably.
Id. at 34. If this assessment proves to be accurate, then it becomes even more neces-
sary to have clear standards to frame the discussion.
79. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 463 ("A parent or individual share-
holder enjoying both the profits generated by a subsidiary corporation and the protec-
tion of limited liability has no incentive to urge the subsidiary corporation to handle
hazardous substances in a more prudent but less profitable manner."); Dent, Jr., supra
note 61, at 165 ("[L]iability deters negligence. Those who are not liable for injuries
they cause have no economic incentive to be prudent and may inflict serious avoida-
ble injuries. If liable for the injuries they inflict, rational people exercise reasonable
care to avoid causing harm."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 67, at 104
("[S]hareholders of a firm reap all of the benefits of risky activities but do not bear all
of the costs. These are borne in part by creditors. Critics of limited liability have
focused on this moral hazard-the incentive created by limited liability to transfer the
cost of risky activities to creditors-as a justification for substantial modification of
the doctrine."); McKane, supra note 42, at 1648 ("Because a parent corporation risks
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cient investment;8' and works a particular unfairness on involuntary
creditors, 8' particularly tort victims.' In their view, limited liability
makes it too easy for liable parties to avoid financial responsibilities
through skillful selection of business form.
Regardless of the legal and economic debate surrounding limited
liability for shareholders, the fact remains that such limited liability is
not only well-established law, but it is also the general expectation of
most who incorporate. A full discussion of whether or not limited
liability should be the law is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather,
it is assumed that this essential attribute of corporate law will remain
unchanged. Therefore, the issue is how limited liability can be recon-
ciled with the competing policies of environmental law. Interestingly,
only its investment in the subsidiary, these corporations may encourage their subsidi-
aries to engage in excessive risk-taking."); Incorporation, supra note 66, at 1
("[Plolicy-makers in every country will feel a need to legislate against intentional
avoidance of liability by parties who, for example, place the ownership of contami-
nated, or potentially contaminated, assets in the hands of under-capitalised shell com-
panies."); see also Oesterle, supra note 74, at 39-40 ("Limited liability and
environmental obligations create an option on the firm. If the environmental liabili-
ties exceed the [firm's] value, the firm's owners can declare bankruptcy and the firm's
assets will escheat to the government .... [I]f the value of the firm exceeds the ...
liabilities, the... owners can pay the liabilities and keep the firm.").
80. See, e.g., Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 165 ("[I]mposing liability for injuries one
causes promotes allocative efficiency. If such liability is not imposed, activities will
not bear their costs and will be overutilized."); Oesterle, supra note 74. at 53
("[E]nvironmental legislation creates a significant distortion in incentives for margin-
ally solvent firms.... [M]arginally solvent firms have an incentive to maximize the
value of their option at the expense of the government.... [T]he option holder gets
the benefit of all expected increases in upside potential without incurring any addi-
tional risks from the expected increases in downside potential.").
81. See, e.g., Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 165 ("Most potential tort victims, includ-
ing victims of toxic spills, have no opportunity to negotiate with potential
tortfeasors."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 67, at 112 ("Contract creditors ...
are compensated ex ante for the increased risk of default ex post. Tort creditors, by
contrast, are not compensated."); King, supra note 42, at 128 (-IT]he case for disre-
garding limited liability is even stronger when there are involuntary creditors-typi-
caly, persons who have incurred an injury in tort. In the context of hazardous waste
disposal, involuntary creditors include governmental agencies, private parties harmed
directly as a result of the disposal, and those indirectly harmed."); Oswald, supra note
6, at 624 n.160 ("Liability under CERCLA is more akin to the tort situation, where
the injured party is involuntarily forced into an unwanted relationship .... Society
does not contract voluntarily with a defendant for environmental contamination, and
is not able to negotiate for a better position .... "); Crawley, supra note 1, at 261-62
("Some legal commentators have questioned whether legislatures, in statutorily au-
thorizing corporations, intended to allow corporations to insulate themselves with
one or more subsidiaries which serve as 'shock absorbers' in risky aspects of busi-
ness."); Farmer, supra note 42, at 795 ("Involuntary creditors, including tort and
CERCLA plaintiffs, do not choose their association with the corporation, while a con-
tract creditor has the opportunity to evaluate the risks of doing business with the
corporation and voluntarily assumes the risks involved.").
82. Ironically, in spite of consistent sentiment sympathizing with the plight of the
tort victim, empirical evidence suggests that it is not, in fact, the tort victim for whom
the corporate veil is pierced most often. See Thompson, supra note 65, at 1038("[Glourts pierce less often in tort than in contract contexts.").
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
although obvious differences exist between small corporations and
large corporations,83 limited liability often appears to be essentially
the same whether the controlling shareholder is an individual or a par-
ent corporation.' There may be, however, sound policy reasons for
treating individual shareholders differently from or more gently than
corporate shareholders.85 Nevertheless, this generally has not been
83. See, e.g., Oswald & Schipani, supra note 42, at 298-99 ("[C]ourts apparently
have never pierced the veil of a publicly traded corporation to reach the individual
shareholders. Experience suggests, therefore, that individuals who own stock in large
corporations ... are in little danger of being held individually liable for CERCLA
violations." (footnotes omitted)); Strasser & Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 519 ("The
cases that have articulated a broad liability rule involved relatively small companies
managed by individuals who directly oversaw all business operations and could rea-
sonably be charged with checking on hazardous substance management."); Robert D.
Snook, The Liability of Shareholders of Closely Held Corporations Under CERCLA,
68 Conn. B.J. 422 (1994); Lawson, supra note 42, at 741 ("[Cjourts are much more
likely to pierce the corporate veil of a closely held corporation than of a publicly held
corporation.").
84. See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
("[Ilf an individual stockholder can be liable under CERCLA for his corporation's
disposal, a corporation which holds stock in another corporation . . . and actively
participates in its management can be held liable . . . ."); Aronovsky & Fuller, supra
note 42, at 446 ("In cases considering the liability of individual shareholders for haz-
ardous waste releases, courts have taken a similar approach to the cases involving
parent corporations."); Lauri A. Newton, The Prevention Test: Promoting High-Level
Management, Shareholder, and Lender Participation in Environmental Decision Mak-
ing Under CERCLA, 20 Ecology L.Q. 313, 320 n.40 (1993) ("Courts generally do not
distinguish between the liability of individual shareholders and parent corporation
shareholders."); Brown, supra note 22, at 823 ("In the parent/subsidiary context, the
parent is treated similarly to the shareholder. The parent corporation, like the share-
holder, ordinarily is not liable for its subsidiary's debts beyond the amount it invested
in the subsidiary."). But see Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 880-81 ("Considerations of
policy and fairness are reflected in the courts' greater willingness to abrogate corpo-
rate limited liability in favor of a plaintiff seeking to hold a parent corporation, as
distinguished from an individual controlling shareholder, liable for an obligation.");
Rallison, supra note 76, at 617 ("[C]ourts are more willing to impose liability on cor-
porate shareholders than individual shareholders. This leniency towards individuals
may be because courts view corporate shareholder liability as less distasteful or per-
sonallv devastating than individual shareholder liability. Whatever the reasons, it is
clear that corporate shareholders have less protection from liability than do individual
shareholders." (footnote omitted)). The conflict over and ambivalence about the sta-
tus of the corporate shareholder versus the individual shareholder is discussed in
Dent, supra note 61, at 166-67 (describing the view of various commentators on this
issue). For a discussion of this issue in light of Bestfoods see infra notes 211-38 and
accompanying text.
85. For a fuller discussion of these reasons, see Allen, supra note 42, at 48 ("The
common law raises the corporate veil primarily to promote risk-taking by individual
investors .... However, parent corporations do not require this protection to take
risks. Therefore, the law should not allow a parent corporation to raise the corporate
veil between itself and a subsidiary." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 64-65 ("The consider-
ations that mandate a stronger piercing remedy for parent corporations do not war-
rant the same conclusion for individual shareholders." (footnote omitted));
Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 881 ("Courts may recognize that there is less economic
or other policy justification for providing multiple-limited liability insulation to a cor-
poration that wishes to segregate high-risk activities in a subsidiary than there would
be for an individual shareholder or a group of individuals. . . ."). Professor George
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the case and corporate parents such as those discussed in this Article
enjoy much the same limited liability as they would if they were
individuals.86
Obviously, the dichotomy between CERCLA's search-draconian
or otherwiseT-rfor a solvent responsible party and corporate law's
limited shareholder liability inevitably leads to conflict.ss Certain
facts exacerbate this conflict:
* A parent corporation may be viewed as an attractive and easily
"targetable" deep pocket.8 9
Dent, Jr., however, provides an interesting perspective on the way in which a system
unlimiting liability may actually work to the detriment of the corporate shareholder
rather than the individual one:
Even if [individual] shareholders are liable, their risk is limited by insol-
vency. They still can escape liability by declaring bankruptcy. This creates
an incentive to vest chemical firms in less wealthy hands....
A large company considering the same opportunity could not disregard
CERCLA liability so easily. It must weigh that liability to the point of its
own bankruptcy; that is, up to its net worth. Further, because of joint and
several liability and the EPA's practice of pursuing deep pockets, the large
firm must anticipate that it will probably have to bear more than its share of
a major spill while the impecunious firm may reasonably expect that it will
have to pay little or not be sued at all.
Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 174-75 (footnote omitted).
86. Indeed, it appears that individual shareholders rather than their corporate
counterparts have the most to fear vis-A-vis veil-piercing. See Thompson, supra note
65, at 1038 ("[A] piercing decision is not less but more likely when the shareholder
behind the veil is an individual rather than another corporation."). Further, the
number of shareholders also makes a difference-with piercing significantly more
likely to happen in the small corporation rather than in the large corporation. See id.
at 1054-55. Professor Thompson explains:
The number of shareholders makes a difference in the propensity of courts
to pierce the veil of corporations. Among close corporations, those with
only one shareholder were pierced in almost 50% of the cases; for two or
three shareholder corporations, the percentage dropped to just over 46%,
and for close corporations with more than three shareholders, the percent-
age dropped to about 35%.
Id- However, "[tihe identity of the plaintiff as either an individual or a corporation
leads to no difference in results." Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
87. See eg., Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living
Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994 ) ("CERCLA liability has been described as 'a
black hole that indiscriminately devours all who come near it."') (citation omitted).
88. As aptly explained by Professor Nagle, "[A]lthough CERCLA's [broadly re-
medial] goals rarely conflict, they often conflict with other statutes or common law
assumptions." Nagle, supra note 59, at 1441.
89. See Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 30. Professor Rosenberg states:
[R]eported decisions in this area often tend to be rationalizations of results
reached for other reasons, such as the perceived need to find a deep pocket
to pay for remediation ... [and] to assure the availability of solvent defend-
ants who are able to pay judgements to plaintiffs with whom a court
sympathizes.
Id (footnote omitted). Indeed, this aspect of the CERCLA liability scheme subjected
the statute to criticism from its earliest development. For a stinging critique, see John
J. Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfitnd Liability Be Abolished?, 6
Stan. Envtl. LJ. 271, 272-74 (1986-87) (arguing that inequities in the CERCLA liabil-
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* The liability of the parent will often not merely be a "supplement"
to that of the subsidiary but, in the case of an insolvent or defunct
subsidiary,90 it may be the sole pocket into which CERCLA's ea-
ger hand may reach.9'
* The joint and several liability scheme means that if a parent is lia-
ble, its responsibility is not in proportion to the damage caused by
its subsidiary but may include response costs for the entire site.92
* The strict liability scheme of CERCLA sharply limits the defenses
available to a parent found liable for its subsidiary's misdeeds.93
ity scheme support abandoning the scheme and funding clean-ups solely through
taxes).
90. See Noonan, supra note 42, at 749 ("Due to the nature of the targeted sites,
the corporation which caused the actual contamination often no longer exists.");
Weber, supra note 59, at 1469-70 ("The typical case arising under... CERCLA in-
volves hazardous waste generation and disposal spanning several decades by compa-
nies no longer in existence." (footnotes omitted)). This problem was noted in
Idylwoods Associates v. Mader Capital, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 410, 418 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
("'[CERCLA] envisions that sometimes the cleanup must be paid for by those least
responsible because those who are most responsible lack funds or cannot be found."'
(quoting Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1537 (E.D. Cal.
1992))).
91. For a full discussion of the particular problems associated with owning a cul-
pable yet insolvent subsidiary, see Dent, Jr., supra note 61. See also Aronovsky &
Fuller, supra note 42, at 422 ("In many cases, the assets of the corporation immedi-
ately responsible for the hazardous waste problems have proven inadequate to pay
for the necessary clean-up at the site."); Burcat & Wilson, supra note 67, at 1273 ("A
related question, which has not been directly addressed ... relates to the potential
liability of shareholders of dissolved corporations .... A company faced with this
situation generally should not rush to dissolve the subsidiary under the belief that its
potential liability will disappear along with the corporate entity."); McMahon &
Moertl, supra note 67, at 29 ("In situations where the liable corporation is insolvent or
defunct, recent court decisions construing CERCLA and RCRA have sliced through
the corporate entity and have imposed both derivative ...and direct liability on
officers and shareholders of corporations.").
92. This problem has been observed by many. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note
42, at 435 (stating that a subsidiary may have the capital to avoid alter ego exposure
for the parent, "but not [be] solvent enough to participate meaningfully in remedia-
tion efforts .... Alternatively, a subsidiary may have sufficient resources to pay its
fair share of clean-up costs, but not enough to cover either the shares of other parties
or... the costs resulting from joint and several liability."); Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at
169 ("One who contributes only a fraction of a release may have to pay a much larger
share, or even the entire cost, of a cleanup.... CERCLA defendants can also incur
substantial litigation costs, even if the defendant is exonerated." (footnotes omitted));
Alison Watts, Insolvency and Division of Cleanup Costs, 18 Int'l Rev. of L. & Econ.
61, 62 (1998) ("[A] small dumper with deep pockets (a company whose overall wealth
is significant compared to potential liability from a waste site) could be asked to pay
for all cleanup costs"); Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 911 ("CERCLA's weak causa-
tion requirements, combined with its permitted imposition of joint and several liabil-
ity on a broad range of parties, can expose parties having only a tangential relation to
acts which caused harm to the full financial burden of site response costs totaling
millions of dollars." (footnote omitted)). The legal intricacies and policy considera-
tions underlying CERCLA's joint and several liability scheme are explored fully in
Oswald, supra note 62.
93. Indeed, the defenses provided for in the statute are extremely limited in their
applicability, making the pervasive strict liability scheme underlying CERCLA partic-
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* CERCLA's retroactivity may impose liability on a parent for er-
rors of subsidiaries that occurred long before CERCLA was
passed.94
" The high cost of the average CERCLA remedy means that a find-
ing of liability for a parent corporation could have a significant
financial impact on the parent's overall economic health.9"
Given the "high stakes" nature of CERCLA liability, courts and
commentators have struggled to determine when, where, how, or if
parent corporations should bear the blame for the actions of their sub-
sidiaries.96 In so doing, they have amassed a confusing array of com-
peting theories.
ularly frightening. See Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 153 ("To prove liability the plaintiff
need not show fault on the part of the defendant, and proof of the defendant's care or
lack of fault is often not a defense. One can even incur liability without knowing that
one was handling hazardous wastes." (footnote omitted)); Bakst, supra note 6, at 324
(observing that "once the veil of a subsidiary is pierced for an environmental tort, the
parent is strictly liable for damages under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation, and Liability Act"); id. at 348 ("Under CERCLA, parent cor-
porations face sudden and unexpected costs for environmental torts of their
subsidiaries, even where they were not at fault.").
94. For a fuller discussion of the retroactivity provisions of CERCLA and their
impact on CERCLA's liability schemes see infra notes 343-54 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Gregory P. O'Hara, Minimizing Exposure to Environmental Liabili-
ties for Corporate Officers, Directors, Shareholders and Successors, 6 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1, 2 (1990) ("Because environmental liabilities can be so
expansive and extensive, it is imperative that every high technology company remain
constantly vigilant against transgressions within its organization, and implement pro-
phylactic measures to avoid succeeding to the environmental liabilities of another cor-
poration it subsequently acquires."); Oswald, supra note 62, at 303 n.8 ("The EPA
estimated the average costs (in 1988 dollars) associated with a Remedial Investigation
and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) and design and implementation of a remedy at a Na-
tional Priority List (NPL) site to be $1.3 million for the RI/FS, $1.5 million for reme-
dial design, $25 million for remedial action, and $3.77 million for the present value of
operation and management of the site remedy over 30 years.") (citing 57 Fed. Reg.
4824, 4829 (1992)); Ram Sundar & Bea Grossman, The Importance of Due Diligence
in Commercial Transactions: Avoiding CERCLA Liability, 7 Fordham Envtl. Li. 351,
355-56 (1996) ("Since the cost of cleaning up Superfund sites under CERCLA has, in
some instances, exceeded $30 million, falling within CERCLA's broad PRP category
can be very expensive."); Carley, supra note 60, at 258 ("Given the enormity of the
cost of an environmental cleanup, a finding of corporate liability can result in finan-
cial ruin for even stable and financially sound companies."); see also Lawrence, supra
note 65 ("Estimates of hazardous waste cleanup costs now reach $500 billion nation-
wide, or $2,000 for every man, woman, and child in the United States.").
96. Interestingly, this is a problem not only in federal cases interpreting CERCLA
but also in cases involving the state counterparts of CERCLA. See, e.g., David L. Yas,
"Uninvolved" Corporation Can Avoid 21E Costs: No Cleanup Liability Unless "Ac-
tual" Power, Mass. Law. Wkly., June 30, 1997, at I (discussing complexities of parent/
subsidiary liability under Massachusetts environmental laws).
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III. PRE-BESTFOODS THEORIES FOR PINNING THE BLAME &
PIERCING THE VEIL
Although parent corporations were never explicitly mentioned in
CERCLA, courts have not completely insulated them from liability
for the actions of their subsidiaries.7 Rather, courts have disagreed
over what theory should give rise to such liability and, relatedly, what
the scope of that liability should be. Prior to Bestfood's clarification,
courts approached this issue by adopting one of four basic ap-
proaches:98 (1) direct "operator" liability for "actual control"; (2) di-
97. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the issue of parent liability is closely
related to many of the issues that arise when discussing the liability of other entities in
positions similar to parent corporations, such as successor companies and creditors.
For analysis of these issues, see Merritt B. Fox, Corporate Successors Under Strict
Liability: A General Economic Theory and the Case of CERCLA, 26 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 183 (1991) (providing economic analysis of successor liability theories); Michael
I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw, To Lend or Not to Lend-That Should Not be the
Question: The Uncertainties of Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 41 Duke L.J. 1211
(1992) (discussing legal ambiguities in determining CERCLA liability of lenders);
Hottel & Jeffcoat, supra note 36 (addressing various scenarios giving rise to CERCLA
liability); Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity of Enterprise" Theories of
Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 11 Miss. C. L. Rev. 63 (1990) (review-
ing alternative viewpoints on successor liability); James B. Lowery, Don't Get In-
volved!-How Unsuspecting Secured Creditors May Incur Liability Under CERCLA
by "Participating in the Management" of a Debtor's "Facility," 56 Mo. L. Rev. 295
(1991) (analyzing the permissible scope of lenders' activities); Newton, supra note 84,
at 324-32 (discussing lender liability under CERCLA); Oswald & Schipani, supra note
42, at 272-91 (discussing corporate officer liability under CERCLA); id. at 315-29 (dis-
cussing corporate successor liability under CERCLA); Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating
Corporate Law Principles with CERCLA Liability for Environmental Hazards, 18
Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (1993) (discussing various forms of liability imposed on individuals
within corporations); Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnette, Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 1990 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 527 (reviewing liability of lenders for
CERCLA obligations of their debtors); Daniel H. Squire et al., Corporate Successor
Liability Under CERCLA: Who's Next?, 43 Sw. L.J. 887 (1990) (analyzing legal liabil-
ity of corporate successors to responsible parties under CERCLA); Strasser &
Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 520-29 (discussing CERCLA liability of lenders); G. Van
Velsor Wolf, Jr., Lender Environmental Liability Under the Federal Superflind Pro-
gram, 23 Ariz. St. L.J. 531 (1991) (discussing lender liability issues); William Scott
Biel, Comment, Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers' Personal Liabil-
ity for Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage, 140 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 241 (1991) (discussing intersection of liability and insurance issues in con-
text of officer and director liability); Harold J. Cronk & Pat Huddleston II, Comment.
Corporate Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What Are the Conse-
quences?, 38 Mercer L. Rev. 677 (1987) (discussing corporate officer liability under
broad interpretations of CERCLA); W. Scott Laseter & Cheryl A. Long, Comment,
CERCLA Liability for Successor Corporations Revisited, 41 Mercer L. Rev. 1027
(1990) (reviewing CERCLA liability for successor corporations); Roslyn Tom, Note,
Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under Section
101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 Yale L.J. 925 (1989) (describing the chilling effect of
broad CERCLA liability on management activities of lending institutions).
98. This differs from analysis of the behavior of individuals within corporations
that may lead to responsibility for violations of CERCLA. There, it has been sug-
gested that there are three theories of liability predicated on either the individual's
"authority... to control the waste disposal activities of the business," or "the individ-
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rect "operator" liability for "capacity to control"; (3) indirect "owner"
liability for piercing the veil under state law; or (4) indirect "owner"
liability for piercing the veil under federal common law. 9 While dis-
cussion of the prevailing liability theories is not the major thrust of
this Article,1"m some background is necessary to understand the state
of law at the time the court decided Bestfoods 01 These brief descrip-
tions of the primary lines of thought and the presentation of several
representative cases will illustrate the contours of the four pre-
Bestfoods theories for pinning the blame and piercing the veil.
ual's personal involvement with waste-handling and disposal management" or "an
individual's ability to prevent harm from improper waste activities." Strasser &
Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 511.
99. Some commentators have reached the conclusion that the outcome of most, if
not all, of the relevant cases would be quite similar regardless of which standard the
courts adopt. See, e.g., Oswald & Schipani, supra note 42, at 263 ("A close reading of
the burgeoning case law on CERCLA violations reveals ... that courts have not
interpreted the language of CERCLA in such a broad manner. Rather, careful analy-
sis of the fact patterns of these cases discloses that courts have simply held liable
parties that could have been held liable under traditional corporate law doctrine.");
Strasser & Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 495 (dismissing view that CERCLA liability
cases are inconsistent and arguing that "[while] many perceive Superfund liability to
constitute a mindless search for deep pockets .... [T]his perception arises from a
tendency by courts and counsel to separate cases into rigid, poorly chosen categories,
and ... this perception is incorrect upon a studied examination of the case law."). In
addition, several commentators have argued quite persuasively that despite all the
concern, the case law suggests no real departure from traditional corporate law princi-
pals. For example, Riesel and Srolovic have argued that:
CERCLA liability has generally been placed on shareholders in factual cir-
cumstances where the corporate veils could be pierced under traditional al-
ter ego doctrines. . . . [C]ommentators who analyzed the cases placing
CERCLA liability on ... shareholders found that, based on the facts, tradi-
tional doctrines have not been abrogated and perhaps best explain the re-
sults reached by the courts. This adherence to common law principles under
the rubric of CERCLA may be described as old common law wine in new
federal bottles.
Riesel & Srolovic, supra note 37, at 72-73. But see Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 475-
82 (noting how some courts and commentators argue that liability may be found
outside of traditional corporate standards); McMahon & Moerti, supra note 67, at 29
(noting that courts have used CERCLA to avoid traditional corporate law doctrines).
100. See infra Part III.
101. The cases described in this section are not an exhaustive list of CERCLA
cases. Rather, they provide examples of commonly cited cases in the field, including
some of those relied on by various parties in Bestfoods. For a more comprehensive
listing of relevant cases, see William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Individual
Shareholder, or Director of Corporation that Owned Contaminating Facility in Action
Pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9601-9675), 122 A.LR. Fed. 321 (1994) (listing cases
involving individual liability issues); William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Par-
ent or Successor Corporation, or Corporate Shareholders, in Action Pursuant to Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42
U.S.C.S. §§ 9601-9675), 121 A.L.R. Fed. 173 (1994) (noting cases concerned with cor-
porate liability issues).
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A. Direct "Operator" Liability for "Actual Control"
The majority liability theory" 2 held that a parent corporation
should be held accountable under CERCLA when the parent exer-
cised such a degree of control over the subsidiary's conduct and deci-
sion-making that the parent satisfied the definition of "owner" or
"operator" and, thus, could be held directly liable. This was the "ma-
jority view" in that direct liability theories were favored over indirect
veil-piercing theories, and also in that this more restrictive require-
ment of direct liability was more often accepted than the "capacity to
control" test. CERCLA itself imposed liability on those who were
"owner[s] and operator[s] of a vessel or a facility,"' 3 or who "owned
or operated any facility at which ... hazardous substances were dis-
posed of."'" Thus, cases adopting this majority view accepted the no-
tion that by dominating a subsidiary, 10 5 the parent itself could be
directly transformed into an owner or operator, thereby avoiding the
need to pierce the corporate veil. 10 6
Not surprisingly, a form of direct liability was advocated by the
EPA. In a 1984 Enforcement Memorandum, 07 the EPA established
that a parent corporation could be held liable through traditional veil-
piercing. 108 However, the EPA also advocated use of direct operator
liability "when the shareholder controlled or directed the activities of
102. See Brown, supra note 22, at 829 ("A majority of the cases examining a parent
corporation's liability under the direct liability theory have adopted the narrower ac-
tual exercise of control test."); Chandler & Grosser, supra note 42, at 23 ("The major-
ity of federal circuit courts have ruled that if the corporate owner exercises sufficient
control over the corporation it may be liable under CERCLA for environmental con-
tamination caused by the corporation.").
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994).
104. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
105. A common criticism of this approach is that it is difficult to determine what
types of activities will result in courts classifying a parent as an operator. See, e.g.,
Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 159-60 ("Although this standard seems more restrained
than the capacity-to-control test, its scope is even more vague. It is unclear, for exam-
ple, whether 'active control' includes the routine activities of parents, such as electing
directors, consulting with managers, and monitoring performance, or whether greater
involvement is required."). This remains a problem even in the wake of Bestfoods.
106. This theory of direct liability for operators is discussed more fully in Brown,
supra note 22, at 821 ("Under the 'direct liability' theory, courts determine whether
the parent corporation can be directly liable under the plain language of CERCLA.
This requires that courts determine whether the parent has exercised sufficient con-
trol over its subsidiary to classify the parent as an 'operator' under CERCLA section
107."); Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 437 ("At a certain point, investors who
control the hazardous waste activities of their corporate investments themselves be-
come 'operators."').
107. Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for Enforce-
ment and Compliance Monitoring, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
to Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Associate En-
forcement Counsel for Waste, Regional Administrators, and Regional Counsels (June
13, 1984) (on file with the author).
108. See id. at 5-10.
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a corporate hazardous waste generator, transporter, or facility."' "°l
The EPA's adoption of a broad view is not surprising.' 10 What is more
important is the manner in which courts adopted this view as well.
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp."' has often been perceived as
the landmark case advocating direct liability for actual control." The
direct liability rule, as taken from Kayser-Roth, was that when a par-
ent dominates a subsidiary through its involvement in the subsidiary's
affairs-particularly environmental matters-the parent could be held
directly liable. Kayser-Roth held that there was, at least in the view of
the First Circuit, no legal bar to such direct liability. Kayser-Roth and
its progeny failed to make clear, however, any bright-line description
of parental involvement that was likely to lead to direct liability.
The Kayser-Roth court relied, to some extent, on United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.,11 3 New York v. Shore
Realty Corp.,"4 and Riverside Market Development Corp. v. Interna-
tional Building Products, Inc."' Those three cases did not deal with
the direct liability of parent corporations for the actions of their sub-
sidiaries but rather with the liability of individual owners for the ac-
tions of the corporations which they controlled. By analogy, the
Kayser-Roth court used these cases to demonstrate the ways in which
those who own corporations could exercise a level of control high
enough to have brought them within the realm of "owner" liability." 6
109. Id. at 3.
110. But see McKane, supra note 42, at 1680-81 (arguing against assigning any legal
weight to the E.P.A. enforcement memorandum).
111. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
112. For fuller discussions of Kayser-Roth, see Heidt, supra note 8, at 161-63; Hottel
& Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 173-74; Kezsbom et al., supra note 42, at 62-74; King,
supra note 42, at 132-37; Mitchell, Jr., supra note 42, at 71-75; Oswald & Schipani,
supra note 42, at 313-15; Strasser & Rodosevich, supra note 8. at 502; Birg, supra note
8, at 801-02; Brown, supra note 22, at 830; Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 478-79;
Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 892-94; McKane, supra note 42, at 1662-64; Wolfer,
supra note 42, at 990-92; Lawrence A. Levy, Parent Companies Face Increased Risk of
Liability, Nat'l L.J., June 17, 1998, at D2.
113. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986). For additional discussion of Northeastern Pharmaceutical, see Aro-
novsky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 439-48; Charles E. Davidson, Corporate Ownership
of Real Estate: The Impact of Environmental Legislation on Shareholder Liability, 17
Real Est. L.J. 291, 304-06 (1989); Heidt, supra note 8, at 163-69; Carley, supra note 60,
at 241-45; McKane, supra note 42, at 1654-56; Rallison, supra note 76, at 603-06.
114. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
115. No. CIV.A. 88-5317, 1990 WL 72249, at *1 (E.D. La. May 23, 1990), affd, 931
F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1991).
116. Shore Realty dealt with the personal liability of an individual under CERCLA
for the actions of a corporation in which he was an officer and shareholder. 759 F.2d
at 1037. The court held that "an owning stockholder who manages the corporation
... is liable under CERCLA as an 'owner or operator."' Id. at 1052. The court found
it unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil to impose this liability because the individ-
ual defendant could be directly liable. Id. As in Kayser-Roth, however, Shore Realty
did not articulate a clear standard as to what specific conduct lead to its imposition of
liability.
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Certainly, there were important distinctions that arose between corpo-
rations as owners and individuals as owners. However, the central
premise of these cases-that a corporate owner who played an active
role in managing that corporation could be directly liable-was at the
heart of Kayser-Roth and its progeny. Unfortunately, Kayser-Roth
lacked a clear-cut test for such liability.
Through the years, other cases also dealt with direct liability in the
parent-subsidiary corporate context. These cases, like Kayser-Roth,
established that one need not pierce the corporate veil to find liability.
In Schiavone v. Pearce,"a7 for example, although the primary issue for
the Second Circuit to consider required interpretation of indemnifica-
tion agreements," 8 the decision turned on an analysis of parental lia-
bility. Noting the "perceived tension between direct liability and
liability based on veil-piercing,"' 19 the court endorsed the direct liabil-
ity rule and stated that an "interpretation of CERCLA that imposes
operator liability directly on parent corporations whose own acts vio-
late the statute is consistent with the general thrust and purpose of the
legislation.' 1
20
In Northeastern Pharmaceutical, the court again found two individual shareholders
liable as owners and operators. 810 F.2d at 745. Those shareholders, however, were
also employees and officers of the defendant corporation. Id. at 743-44. Thus, it is
unclear whether it was truly their capacity as shareholders that resulted in their direct
liability. This lack of clarity underscores the need to establish which "hat" defendants
wear before liability will be assessed. It is unclear in Northeastern, for example,
whether the individual defendants would have been liable if they were not also of-
ficers and directors. The helpful contribution that Northeastern makes, however, is its
statement that "personal liability is distinct from the derivative liability that results
from 'piercing the corporate veil."' Id. at 744. Hence, although this case does not
clarify what type of individual conduct will result in direct liability, it does establish
that direct liability is a possibility.
Finally, Riverside Market Development Corp. dealt with the liability of an individual
defendant who was a majority shareholder and officer of the liable corporation. 931
F.2d at 328. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the individual defend-
ant did not meet the definition of "operator." Id. at 329-30. The court explained that
he "spent very little time at the [facility], and no evidence [indicates] that such visits
would have provided [him] with the opportunity to direct or personally participate in
the improper disposal .... [H]is participation in plant operations were limited to
reviewing financial statements and attending meetings... ." Id. at 330. The court was
clear in its view that this conduct was insufficient to lead to direct liability. While this
court established the validity of the direct liability theory, it did, like the previous two
cases, leave open two essential questions:
(1) What type of conduct would have led to a different outcome under the direct
liability test; and
(2) Was the individual a defendant because of his role as a shareholder or because
of his capacity as an officer?
117. 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996). For further discussion of Schiavone, see Hottel &
Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 174-75.
118. Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 251.
119. Id. at 253.
120. Id. The court recognized that finding the parent corporation liable "may not
be consistent with traditional rules of corporate liability." Id. at 253-54 (citing United
States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995)). In the view of the court, how-
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Similarly, John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co. 2' dealt, in part, with
a parent corporation's responsibility for its subsidiary's CERCLA lia-
bilities. The First Circuit followed the Kayser-Roth theory that a par-
ent corporation could be directly liable as an "operator" based on the
trial court's inquiry into "the relationship between the parent and sub-
sidiary, in order to reveal the requisite level of corporate involve-
ment."'" Although the court found that the level of parental
involvement justified the trial court's imposition of direct liability,'13
no easily understood rule was articulated.
Likewise, the direct liability standard was employed by the Third
Circuit in Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp.1 24
There, the court provided one of the better discussions of the direct
liability theory. First, it drew a clear distinction between direct liabil-
ity for a parent as an "operator" of a subsidiary and indirect liability
as an "owner."" The court, justifying its use of the "actual control"
test and commending the lower court's use of that standard, explained
that under this standard, "while the longstanding rule of limited liabil-
ever, this was outweighed by the way in which "direct liability [is] compatible with
CERCLA's expansive goals." Id. at 254 (citations omitted). In reconciling these op-
posite views, the court reasoned that "a departure from common law principles of
corporate insulation can be explained by the uniqueness of CERCLA's legislative
scheme ... ." Id As the court concluded, "[a] recognition of direct operator liability
for parent corporations is both compatible with the statutory language and consistent
with CERCLA's broad remedial scheme." Id. at 255.
121. 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993).
122. Id at 408.
123. Id. In part, the facts that justified that conclusion were that the parent corpo-
ration, NEES, and the subsidiary, Lynn Gas, had a number of interactions:
NEES continually maintained a presence among the officers and directors of
Lynn Gas. The president of Lynn Gas was also the president of NEES' gas
division; he was appointed by the chairman of NEES and reported directly
to NEES officials. NEES selected the directors of Lynn Gas, and a senior
officer of NEES approved Lynn Gas's budget. Lynn Gas needed approval
for all expenditures over $5,000. NEPSCO provided extensive services to
Lynn Gas, such as controlling the checking account, handling the purchase of
the oil used in peak shaving, and maintaining Lynn Gas property. NEPSCO
employees were also well represented among Lynn's officers and directors.
Id.
124. 4 F.3d 1209 (3rd Cir. 1993). For a fuller discussion of this case, see Hottel &
Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 175; Levy, supra note 112; Third Circuit Adopts 'Operator'
Standard, Mealey's Litig. Reps.: Lead, Oct. 6, 1993, at 11.
125. See Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1220, in which the court stated:
There is general agreement that under CERCLA, "owner" liability and -op-
erator" liability denote two separate concepts and hence require two sepa-
rate standards for determining whether they apply. Under CERCLA, a
corporation may be held liable as an owner for the actions of its subsidiary
corporation in situations in which it is determined that piercing the corpo-
rate veil is warranted. Operator liability, in contrast, is generally reserved
for those situations in which a parent or sister corporation is deemed, due to
the specifics of its relationship with its affiliated corporation, to have had
substantial control over the facility in question.
Id. (citations omitted). The court in Lansford-Coaldale explicitly rejected any direct
liability based on veil piercing theories. Id. at 1225.
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ity in the corporate context remains the background norm, a corpora-
tion cannot hide behind the corporate form to escape liability in those
instances in which it played an active role in the management of a
corporation responsible for environmental wrongdoing.' 2 6
These distinctions were useful. The court, however, still had to con-
front the practical question of whether the relationship between par-
ent and subsidiary was one that would allow imposition of direct
liability. The court grappled with this issue 127 and concluded by vacat-
ing the lower court's opinion and remanding the case for a fuller anal-
ysis of the factual basis for liability, vel non.28
Jacksonville Electric Authority v. Bernuth Corp.'29 also addressed
the issue of imposing direct liability on a parent corporation. The
Eleventh Circuit, like the Third Circuit, found that the direct liability
theory was the appropriate standard. Although the court ultimately
agreed with the lower court that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that the parent was the operator, 30 the opinion provided
some valuable insight into the factors that courts should consider
when determining whether a parent should be liable for the acts of its
subsidiary. Adopting guidance from Levin Metals, Corp. v. Parr-Rich-
mond Terminal Co.,' 3 ' the court reaffirmed that a parent "must play
an active role in the actual management of the enterprise. '1 32
Although the court reviewed a fairly extensive list of ways in which
the parent was involved with its subsidiary, 133 it declined to find pa-
126. Id. at 1221. The court contrasted the advantages of this view with what it
perceived to be the disadvantages of the "authority-to-control" test. In the court's
view, the latter test "may unduly penalize the corporation for a decision by that cor-
poration to benefit from one of the well-recognized and salutary purposes of the cor-
porate form: specialization of management." Id.
127. Id. at 1222-24 (providing information relating to the relationship between the
parent and the subsidiary).
128. Id. at 1212-13.
129. 996 F. 2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993). For further discussion of Jacksonville and its
reasoning, see Mitchell, Jr., supra note 42, at 78-80; Worden, supra note 42, at 78-86.
130. Jacksonville, 996 F.2d at 1110-11.
131. 781 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The test required that the shareholder:
(1) "actually participated in the operations of the facility ... [ojr in the activities
which resulted in disposal" or (2) "actually exercised control over, or was otherwise
intimately involved in the operations of, the corporation immediately responsible for
the operation of the facility." Id. at 1456 (citations omitted).
132. Jacksonville, 996 F.2d at 1110.
133. The court described the relationship between Tufts, the parent, and Eppinger,
the subsidiary, as:
(1) Tufts owned all or almost all the stock in Eppinger; (2) Tufts dictated the
terms of employment of Eppinger's President ... and other executive of-
ficers; (3) Tufts' creation of a profit sharing plan for the Eppinger officers;
(4) Eppinger's distribution of dividends in excess of net earnings during
Tufts' period of ownership, which allegedly contributed to a situation where
the equipment at the wood preserving facility was not properly upgraded
and replaced; (5) Tufts' receipt of reports at Trustee meetings on the status
of Eppinger's operations; (6) Tufts' alleged hiring of William Cook as Direc-
tor, Vice-President, and General Manager of Eppinger; (7) statements by
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rental liability. 3 4 The court focused its concern on ensuring that it did
not use the mere "indicia of a parent-subsidiary relationship" 1 35 as a
basis for a finding of liability.'36 Beyond that, however, the court de-
clined to say why it believed that the facts offered were merely such
indicia and nothing more.
City of New York v. Exxon Corp.,'137 a pre-Schiavone case in the
Southern District of New York, also sided with the view that favored
direct liability.' 38 The Exxon court focused on "the degree of control
over and actual participation by the corporate officer or shareholder
in the affairs of the corporation.' 1 39 The court also found that there
was sufficient control to justify direct liability'40 and that the parent's
control over the subsidiary's affairs "was pervasive."'' What the
court found particularly troubling and, therefore, conducive to finding
direct liability was the fact that the subsidiary's "business consisted
solely of reprocessing and disposing of wastes."' 4  Unlike other sce-
narios in which waste disposal might have been a minor and unde-
tected portion of the subsidiary's operations, here "it [was]
Trustees to the effect that Tufts carried on a business at the Eppinger facility;
(8) during Thfts' period of ownership, the method of wood treatment was
changed from the use of arsenic salt to the use of another unspecified
chemical.
Id. at 1110-11 (quoting Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Eppinger and Russell Co., 776 F.
Supp. 1542, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
134. See id at 1111.
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. In some respects, this perspective more closely mirrors the functional, facili-
ties-based approach which the Bestfoods Court later adopted.
137. 112 B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd in part, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991). Er-
xon is discussed more fully in Strasser & Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 502-03.
138. Exxon, 112 B.R. at 546 (citing several cases finding a parent directly liable).
139. Id. at 547.
140. Id. at 549-50. Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that Refinement, the
parent, and Newtown, the subsidiary, had a relationship that included the following:
1) Newtown was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Refinement; 2) Refinement
had the power to appoint Newtown's officers and directors, to replace them
as it saw fit, and to augment them with its own personnel; 3) Newtown and
Refinement had certain directors and officers in common... ; 4) Refine-
ment funded [the salary of the director of Refinement and president of New-
town]; 5) Refinement had ultimate authority over all of Newtown's major
expenditures; 6) Refinement negotiated the purchase of fifteen trucks by
Newtown, arranged financing for the purchase, and guaranteed the loan for
the purchase; 7) Refinement guaranteed another of Newtown's loans, for
$200,000; 8) Refinement contributed $3 million in cash to Newtown's opera-
tions in eighteen months, because Newtown was losing several million dol-
lars per year; 9) Refinement occasionally had direct contacts with Newtown
customers regarding their accounts; and 10) Refinement paid for Newtovn's
insurance coverage.
Id.
141. Id at 550.
142. Id.
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inconceivable that [the parent] was unaware that [the subsidiary] was
dumping hazardous waste.' '1 43
Interestingly, the Exxon court went one step beyond many of the
direct liability cases and created an explicit affirmative duty for par-
ents to be aware of and prevent their subsidiaries' environmental mis-
adventures.1 4 4 The obvious advantage of this approach was that it
eliminated any incentives for willful blindness. 45 However, its disad-
vantage was, again, its lack of clear guidance as to what factors should
be considered in judging parental liability.'46
As these opinions and other lower court opinions illustrate, 147 such
a rule gave a great deal of discretion to the courts and resulted in a
143. Id.; see also id. at 552 (finding that parent's "characterization of itself as a
detached, unaware parent holding company concerned with no more than its subsidi-
ary's financial condition, until faced with concrete evidence of its illegal dumping ac-
tivities ... is simply untenable").
144. See id. at 552 (finding that parent "had an affirmative duty to ensure that its
subsidiary was properly protecting the public from the environmental health and
safety hazards inherent in reprocessing ... and disposing of... wastes. [The parent]
cannot escape direct liability under CERCLA by invoking the protection of the cor-
porate veil and by professing ignorance of the illegality of [the subsidiary's] activi-
ties." (footnote omitted)).
145. As discussed below, infra Part V.C., the core of this Article's dissatisfaction
with much of the current law regarding assessment of liability against parent corpora-
tions is the danger of encouraging willful blindness and detachment
146. For example, although General Electric Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962
F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992), dealt with the liability of oil companies for the environmental
problems of their service station tenants rather than the classic parent/subsidiary is-
sue, the court similarly analyzed when control over the activities of another entity can
result in liability. The court reiterated the broad remedial goals of CERCLA, id. at
285, and then went on to state that even with the broad remedial goals of CERCLA:
Congress employed traditional notions of duty and obligation in deciding
which entities would be liable under CERCLA as arrangers for the disposal
of hazardous substances. Accordingly, . . . it is the obligation to exercise
control over hazardous waste disposal, and not the mere ability or opportu-
nity to control the disposal of hazardous substances that makes an entity an
arranger under CERCLA's liability provision.
Almost all of the courts that have held defendants liable as arrangers have
found that the defendant had some actual involvement in the decision to
dispose of waste. ...
The few courts that have held an entity responsible as an arranger in the
absence of actual involvement have found that nexus between the poten-
tially liable party and the disposal of hazardous substances to be some obli-
gation to arrange for or direct their disposal.
Id. at 286 (citations omitted). Thus, the court strongly endorsed a view of direct liabil-
ity. Under the facts of this particular case, the court declined to find liability because
"the undisputed facts demonstrate that the oil companies had no obligation to exer-
cise control over the manner in which their dealers disposed of waste motor oil." Id.
at 287. However, defining precise standards is a difficult task for a court to do. Thus,
the court declined or was unable to articulate such standards.
147. A number of district court opinions employed some version of a direct liability
for actual control theory. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 1:90:CV:851, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19082, at *20-22 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 1993); CBS, Inc. v. Henkin, 803 F.
Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Ind. 1992); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532,
1543 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154, 156-
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level of ambiguity that made it difficult to predict when the courts
would depart from traditional corporate principles of limited liability
and find direct liability for a parent.148 This expansive reading, how-
ever, was in accord with CERCLA's broad remedial goal of placing
the burden of clean-up on parent corporations who were arguably
more responsible for the contamination than the public at large.1 49
58 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1388-90
(N.D. M1. 1988); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 830-32 (D. Vt. 1988), vacated
in part, Civ. 86-190, 1989 WL 225428 (D. Vt. Apr. 20, 1989).
148. At least one commentator has criticized the judiciary's steps in this direction.
See, eg., Brown, supra note 22, at 825 (arguing that "Congress, not the courts, should
authorize holding parent corporations liable for the hazardous waste violations of
their subsidiaries").
149. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985)
(refusing to "interpret section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the stat-
ute's goals, in the absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise"); United
States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988) (explaining that CERCLA's
goal is to ensure "that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chem-
ical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions
they created[,]" and noting that "[t]his goal would be frustrated if the mere act of
incorporation were allowed to impede the recovery of response costs"); see also Al-
len, supra note 42, at 55 ("A scheme that imposes categorical liability on parent cor-
porations helps meet the goal of preventing depletion of the Superfund. Parent
corporations offer an additional deep pocket to help fund cleanups."); Aronovsky &
Fuller, supra note 42, at 422-23 ("The leading objective of CERCLA is decisive action
to begin the process of remediating the nation's leaking hazardous waste sites. One of
the fundamental policies underlying CERCLA is to accomplish this goal, to the maxi-
mum extent possible, at the expense of private responsible parties rather than the
taxpayers." (footnotes omitted)); Newton, supra note 84, at 319 ("Most courts that
interpret CERCLA look to the statute's remedial goals and impose an expansive di-
rect liability scheme to ensure that those parties benefitting from improper waste dis-
posal practices pay to clean up resulting hazardous waste sites."); Strasser &
Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 498 ("Emphasizing the remedial nature of the statutory
cleanup scheme, courts have willingly extended liability well into the periphery of
debatable statutory coverage, leaving individuals and businesses with wholly unantici-
pated liability."); Brown, supra note 22, at 825 ("Congress intended that CERCLA be
given broad interpretation, and CERCLA does not preclude a parent corporation's
liability for the environmental waste violations of their subsidiary .... [Tihe entities
best suited to prevent the harm should be burdened with the costs of clean-up instead
of other sources, such as other PRPs, taxpayers and insurance companies, who can
have little or no control over the subsidiary corporation's waste management activi-
ties." (footnotes omitted)); Chandler & Grosser, supra note 42, at 23 ("CERCLA is a
remedial statute and should be construed broadly to include all culpable parties.");
Farmer, supra note 42, at 780 ("Courts have indicated that because CERCLA is reme-
dial in nature, its liability provisions must be liberally construed."); Heidelberg, supra
note 42, at 917-18 ("Courts have consistently rejected constitutional arguments
against CERCLA's broad imposition of liability, reasoning that the need to control
the hazardous waste problem justifies an essentially ad hoc imposition of liability on
solvent parties with some connection to disposal sites." (footnote omitted)); Lawson,
supra note 42, at 733 ("[C]ourts reason that the statute's goals and remedial nature
warrant ignoring the corporate form."); Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 29 ("[Cjourts
often support the sweeping interpretations urged by environmental agencies and
place more emphasis upon CERCLA's broad remedial purposes than traditional limi-
tations on corporate liability.").
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B. Direct "Operator" Liability for "Capacity to Control"
This liability theory was, perhaps, the most frightening prospect for
parent corporations. 150 This permutation of direct liability would hold
a parent company liable not merely when it actually controlled the
environmental activities of its subsidiary, but also when it had the au-
thority or capacity to control the subsidiary's actions-whether it did
so or not.151 This test was more popular among district courts than
appellate courts,152 and it imposed something akin to strict liability 53
on parent corporations. It is clear, therefore, that this was an ap-
proach favored by the government.154 It not only broadened the circle
of potentially responsible parties available to fund a cleanup, but it
also provided no easy excuses for those parents who remained will-
fully blind.
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.,155 one of the earlier liability cases, was a
leading "capacity to control" case from the District of Idaho. 1 6
150. The theory is frightening primarily because of the difficulty in delineating the
end of or limit to the liability it might impose. Farmer, supra note 42, states:
The capacity to control test, if taken to its logical conclusion, would place
liability on all parent corporations because the parent corporation always
may control the affairs of its subsidiary should it so choose. However, there
is reason to doubt whether the courts advocating a capacity to control stan-
dard are seriously suggesting a per se rule of liability for the corporate
parent.
Id. at 790; see also Kamie Frischknecht Brown, Note, Parent Corporation Liability for
Subsidiary Violations Under 107 of CERCLA: Responding to United States v. Cor-
dova Chemical Co., 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 282 ("[T~he authority to control test...
is too broad.... [O]perator liability is imposed so long as the parent corporation had
the capability to control its subsidiary, even if it was never utilized.").
151. This may be a difficult test to apply because it requires very subjective analysis
of shareholder conduct. See Wallace, supra note 42, at 855 ("It is when liability assign-
ments under CERCLA are not based on the active, personal participation of a corpo-
rate manager or shareholder that the truly difficult questions arise."). On the other
hand, it bears some resemblance to strict liability which makes it easier to apply.
152. See Brown, supra note 22, at 826 ("Numerous federal district courts have rec-
ognized the capacity to control test as the requisite level of involvement; however, no
federal appellate courts have recognized the capacity to control test in the parent/
subsidiary context.").
153. See, e.g., Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 159 (observing that liability for parents'
capacity to control "would nearly always lead to liability because, by definition, a
parent can control its subsidiary"); Hood, supra note 17, at 128 ("Strict liability for
parent shareholders is the de facto position of the EPA.... ."). But see Dent, Jr., supra
note 61, at 181 ("Strict liability extends only to owners and operators. It does not
extend to controlling persons.").
154. See McMahon & Moertl, supra note 67, at 31 ("The EPA and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) have strongly argued for imposition of direct liability based upon the
individual's power and capacity to control, rather than the individual's actual
involvement.").
155. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
156. For additional discussion of the Bunker Hill decision, see Heidt, supra note 8,
at 166; Brown, supra note 22, at 827-28; Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 475-77;
Farmer, supra note 42, at 781-82; Hood, supra note 17, at 127-28; Rallison, supra note
76, at 614-17; Wolfer, supra note 42, at 987-89.
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Although the case has been criticized for its vagueness as to whether it
was following an owner or an operator theory,"s it defined the rough
contours of a capacity to control standard:
Defendant... was in a position to be, and was, intimately familiar
with hazardous waste disposal and releases at the ... facility; had
the capacity to control such disposal and releases; and had the capac-
ity, if not total reserved authority, to make decisions and implement
actions and mechanisms to prevent and abate the damage caused by
the disposal and releases of hazardous wastes at the facility.158
In its decision, the Bunker Hill court was mindful of the danger that
"'normal' activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not
automatically warrant finding the parent an owner or operator."' 9
The court, however, did not clarify where the line should be drawn in
capacity to control cases, thus creating a potentially expansive theory
of liability without clearly defined limitations. The Bunker Hill court
relied on United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co. 60 Although that case dealt with an individual shareholder rather
than a corporate one, the Bunker Hill court adopted the Northeastern
Pharmaceutical view that the remedial goal of CERCLA required a
more expansive view of liability.'61 Bunker Hill then used this reme-
dial goal as justification for an expanded liability rule.
157. See Brown, supra note 22, at 828. Brown states:
[T]he court merely stated that it was holding the parent liable as an owner or
operator, in essence using the terms interchangeably. However ...
[o]perator liability is direct liability, and owner liability is indirect liabil-
ity .... The... court's failure to articulate whether it was holding the parent
liable as an owner or as an operator when it clearly had to be holding the
parent liable as an operator illustrates the confusion among the courts.
Id
158. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672 (emphasis added).
159. Id
160. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986). For a fuller discussion of this case and its implications, see Carroll E.
Dubuc & William D. Evans, Jr., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co., Inc.: The Eighth Circuit Unleashes a CERCLA Dragnet on Corporate
Officials, 24 Tort & Ins. LiJ. 168 (1988); McMahon & Moertl, supra note 67, at 29-31;
Wallace, Jr., supra note 42, at 851-55; Worden, supra note 42, at 75-76.
161. See Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 671-72. Quoting Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal, 579 F. Supp. at 848, the Bunker Hill court stated:
The statute literally reads that a person who owns interest in a facility and is
actively participating in its management can be held liable for the disposal of
hazardous waste. Such a construction appears to be supported by the intent
of Congress. CERCLA promotes the timely cleanup of inactive hazardous
waste sites. It was designed to insure, so far as possible, that the parties
responsible for the creation of the hazardous waste sites be liable for the
response costs in cleaning them up. Congress has determined that the per-
sons who bore the fruits of hazardous waste disposal also bear the costs of
cleaning it up.
Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 671-72.
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In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 6 ' the Fourth Cir-
cuit employed the capacity to control test in assessing the liability of
previous owners and tenants of a contaminated facility. In discussing
the liability of the tenants, the court stated unequivocally that "the
tenant defendants need not have exercised actual control in order to
qualify as operators... so long as the authority to control the facility
was present.' 1 63 Actual conduct was relevant as "evidence of the au-
thority to control,"'" 6 but actual control was not required. As the
Nurad court held, if the goals of CERCLA were to be achieved, and if
parents were to behave in an environmentally responsible way that
did not allow unexercised corporate power to be an excuse for non-
liability, then a corporation that did not exercise its authority to con-
trol should be held responsible.
The Ninth Circuit, in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catel-
lus Development Corp.,165 followed the reasoning of Nurad and
adopted a similar view in dicta. Without much discussion, the court
held that operator liability "attaches if the defendant had authority to
control the cause of the contamination at the time the hazardous sub-
stances were released into the environment.' 66 Again, the Kaiser
court, like those before and after it, did not specify how to measure
the "capacity" of which it spoke. All that was clear was that the ca-
pacity to control did not have to be exercised before the parent should
have feared liability as an operator.
The capacity test may be found, in various forms, in other cases
including, Quadion Corp. v. Mache,'67 United States v. Carolina Trans-
former Co.,168 and Robertshaw Controls v. Watts Regulatory Co. 169
These cases are examples of decisions in which courts were persuaded
that the parent corporation's "capacity" or "authority" to control was
sufficient to impose liability despite the absence of evidence that such
162. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting "capacity" in the lessor-lessee context).
For further discussion of Nurad, see Hottell & Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 175-76; Car-
ley, supra note 60, at 249-50.
163. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842.
164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
166. Id. at 1341 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
167. 738 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (applying capacity to prevent test to
close corporation context and stating that court may inquire into "evidence of an
individual's authority to control, among other things, waste handling practices ....
Weighed along with the power factor will be evidence of responsibility undertaken for
waste disposal practices, including evidence of responsibility undertaken and ne-
glected, as well as affirmative attempts to prevent unlawful hazardous waste dispo-
sal." (quoting Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1543-44 (W.D. Mich.
1989))). Indeed, the Quadion case borders on adopting the "prevention" test, a test
that equates authority to control with the capacity to prevent harm.
168. 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1992) (relying on Nurad to rule that individual
shareholders and corporate principals could be liable because they had the authority
to control).
169. 807 F. Supp. 144 (D. Me. 1992).
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capacity or authority was ever actually asserted. Unfortunately, be-
cause there is a degree of capacity to control that is "normally equated
with parental oversight,"'170 drawing distinctions in this realm was
quite difficult. In addition, because the courts adopting the "capacity"
test often looked to actual control as evidence of capacity to control,
the definition ran the risk of becoming circular.' 7 Thus, it is not diffi-
cult to see why the regulated community viewed this test with consid-
erable misgivings, and why it posed significant practical difficulties for
enforcement officials.
C. Indirect "Owner" Liability for Piercing the Veil Under State
Common Law
The third pre-Bestfoods manner in which courts attached liability to
parent companies was via traditional veil-piercing."' In the view of
courts adopting a veil-piercing theory, this conservative approach pro-
vided a mechanism for liability when warranted, but it did not require
reading any additional elements into CERCLA, nor did it change ex-
pectations regarding the nature of the corporate form.1 "3 The more
170. Brown, supra note 22, at 827. This difficulty has been emphasized by those
who argue that the liability standard should not be applied this way. See Aronovsky &
Fuller, supra note 42, at 442 ("[S]everal courts have taken care to note that normal
parent-subsidiary corporate relationships will not give rise to CERCLA liability on
the part of the parent.").
171. United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995), demon-
strates this circular reasoning. The Eighth Circuit noted that "a parent corporation
need only have the authority to control, and exercise actual or substantial control,
over the operations of its subsidiary to incur direct operator liability for the subsidi-
ary's on-site disposal practices ...." Id. at 1091 (footnote omitted). This weaves
together both the "actual control" and "capacity to control" tests and blurs the factual
distinctions between them. For further discussion of TIC Investnent, see Lawson,
supra note 42, at 733-34; id. at 748-64; Poston, supra note 10, passim.
172. See Brown, supra note 22, at 821 (explaining that under this theory, "courts
determine whether the subsidiary is merely a 'sham' corporation, meaning that the
subsidiary is the 'instrumentality' or 'alter ego' of the parent corporation").
173. See Fry, supra note 42, at 275 ("In a traditionally-governed, existing, and sol-
vent corporation, state law should be applied to determine whether an individual,
acting solely as a shareholder, should share CERCLA liability. This approach is ap-
propriate because state law governs internal corporation matters unless Congress spe-
cifically enacts a statute to the contrary, and CERCLA contains no provision which
modifies this rule." (footnotes omitted)); Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 482 (describ-
ing line of cases "holding that CERCLA does not preempt traditional corporate stan-
dards. According to those courts, to place liability on parent companies ...the
common law standards of corporation law must be obeyed: the corporate veil must
first be pierced." (footnotes omitted)). It has also been suggested, however, that per-
haps the veil-piercing standard should be a bit different in the CERCLA context than
it is elsewhere. See Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 151 ("The social importance and im-
mense costs of pollution make environmental law an ideal arena for reconsidering
theories of limited liability for tort."); McMahon & Moertl, supra note 67, at 29
("Federal courts, on the other hand, are willing to pierce the corporate veil more
easily to implement federal environmental policies."); Menell, supra note 9, at 407
("[Tihe federal government continues to assert the view that the purposes behind
CERCLA require a lower threshold for piercing the corporate veil." (footnote omit-
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popular and traditional branch of veil-piercing advocates the use of
state law. Traditional veil-piercing 174 is based on the reluctance of
ted)); Newton, supra note 84, at 314 ("Corporate shareholders.., encounter a threat
of personal liability under CERCLA which they would not face under tort law or
traditional corporate law doctrine." (footnote omitted)); Chandler & Grosser, supra
note 42, at 23 ("The proposition that direct liability for a corporation owner under
CERCLA section 107 (a) violates traditional notions of limited liability is correct.
However, the enactment of CERCLA was a reaction to an emergency situation,
which did not exist at the time traditional notions of corporate law were developed.");
Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 61 n.15 ("Even decisions purporting to apply alter ego
standards sometimes apply them less strictly in the CERCLA context."). But see
Worden, supra note 42, at 88 ("With regard to the imposition of parental CERCLA
liability based on a piercing of the corporate veil theory, the analysis does not differ
dramatically from that present in any non-CERCLA corporate case where an attempt
to pierce the corporate shell of the subsidiary is present."). For a discussion of the
dangers in the over-eagerness to expand traditional corporate principles to advance
CERCLA's goals, see Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 157 ("[Q]uestions of CERCLA's
reach cannot be resolved simply by resorting to the language and legislative history of
the Act, or by incanting that CERCLA should be given the broadest possible
interpretation.").
174. Although veil-piercing requires a very fact-specific analysis, many commenta-
tors have, quite correctly, observed that there are certain factors that will often be
common to veil-piercing analysis. See, e.g., Bakst, supra note 6, at 326 ("The most
common reasons for piercing the corporate veil are: (1) the finding that the corpora-
tion is merely an 'alter ego' of the shareholders; (2) fraud and misrepresentation; and
(3) undercapitalization." (footnotes omitted)). Heidelberg, supra note 42, states:
Under the more general formulation of the rule, two basic requirements
must be satisfied to disregard the corporate entity. First, there must be such
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corpo-
ration and the shareholders no longer exist, and second, observance of the
corporate form under the circumstances of the case would permit fraud or
injustice....
The other common formulation of the veil-piercing doctrine is a three-part
test which requires a showing of: (1) Control by the shareholders of the
corporation, amounting to complete domination... ; and (2) such control
was used to commit a fraud or wrong which (3) proximately caused plain-
tiff's injury.
Id. at 874-75 (footnotes omitted); see also Lawson, supra note 42, at 740-41 (describ-
ing, generally, requirements for piercing corporate veil). Much of the jurisprudence
on this issue-both on the part of courts and by commentators-draws heavily on a
classic 1931 formulation of veil-piercing criteria. This list of factors includes elements
that are common to most traditional veil-piercing cases. See Frederick J. Powell, Par-
ent & Subsidiary Corporations § 6 (1931). Powell identifies the following as factors in
piercing the veil between parents and subsidiaries:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock ....
(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or
officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidi-
ary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of
the subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent cor-
poration or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent
corporation.
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having too low a liability standard for parent corporations, especially
as, by definition, "every parent corporation, by virtue of its controlling
interest in the subsidiary, has the right to exercise a certain level of
control over the subsidiary." 175 Rather, the veil-piercing test strives to
eliminate abuse of the corporate form.
In Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co.,'76 the Fifth Cir-
cuit first established that a parent corporation could be held liable
under CERCLA for its subsidiary's activities only if the corporate veil
was pierced."7 According to Joslyn, which one commentator has Ia-
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation ... the subsidiary is described as
a department or division ... or its business or financial responsibility is
referred to as the parent corporation's own.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own.
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act
independently....
(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.
Id. In his empirical study, Professor Thompson ranked the factors most likely to lead
to veil-piercing and found that:
The group of factors most associated with successful piercing ... included
several of the traditional conclusory factors: "instrumentality" (9733%), al-
ter ego" (95.58%), and "dummy" (89.74%). Also in this most successful cat-
egory were cases involving misrepresentation, present in 169 cases and
leading to a piercing result 159 times (94%). If a court found intertwining or
lack of substantive separation, it pierced the veil more than 85% of the time.
Factors leading less often to a piercing result were undercapitalization (73%)
and failure to follow corporate formalities (67%). Still further down the suc-
cess ladder were judicial citations to domination and control (57%) and
overlap of various sorts between the corporation and the shareholder (57%).
Thompson, supra note 65, at 1064 (footnotes omitted).
175. Bakst, supra note 6, at 334 (footnote omitted).
176. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). Joslyn, by virtue of its being the first and, for a
long time, the only significant case espousing this minority view, has been the subject
of much scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Geltman, supra note 42, at 404-06; Heidt,
supra note 8, at 157-61; Kezsbom et al., supra note 42, at 61-62; King, supra note 42, at
137-40; Oswald & Schipani, supra note 42, at 306-08; Strasser & Rodosevich, supra
note 8, at 504-05; Worden, supra note 42, at 79-80; Bakst, supra note 6, at 336-37;
Brown, supra note 22, at 831-32. Joslyn is also discussed fully throughout Mitchell,
supra note 42.
177. The district court opinion fully discusses the facts at issue in Joslyn. Joslyn
Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 227-30 (W.D. La. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1990). Briefly, Lincoln Creosoting Company, Inc. was created and incor-
porated in Louisiana in 1935. Id. at 227.
The idea to form Lincoln came from Messrs. Tooke and Hayes, who ap-
proached Mr. T.L. James. Mr. James [bought] 120 shares of voting common
stock of Lincoln and 200 shares of non-voting preferred stock. C.A. Tooke
and J.R. Hayes received 40 shares each of the voting common stock of Lin-
coin for a total of 40 per cent of the Lincoln stock.
Id. at 227-28. The problem arose, however, because
[a]ll outstanding stock certificates... were accompanied by endorsements
back to James Company. . . 'where it shall remain until such time as their
earnings from dividends on the stock shall have repaid the par value of the
stock.' Since Lincoln never paid any common stock dividends, James Com-
pany had control over 100 per cent of Lincoln's stock.
Id. at 228. The same month that Lincoln was incorporated, it also purchased the piece
of property at issue in the litigation. Id. After a lengthy period of operation, marked
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beled "one of the most pro-parent decisions ever authored,"' 78 the
mere creation of a subsidiary would not shield the parent from all
liability. That liability, however, would arise derivatively and not di-
rectly, implicating the parent corporation only if the traditional stan-
dard for piercing the corporate veil had been met. As articulated by
the Joslyn court, this required a finding that "the corporate entity is
used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal liability."''
As discussed below, the Sixth Circuit followed Joslyn in United
States v. Cordova Chemical8 ' and selected state veil-piercing as the
only basis for parental liability under CERCLA. 8' In Bestfoods, the
Supreme Court reversed the narrow view of liability expressed in Cor-
dova Chemical.
There are several arguments to support the minority rule requiring
that the veil be pierced before a parent can be liable. 18 2 This ap-
proach was compatible with Congress' silence as to its desire, vel non,
to create a new principle of corporate liability. Hence, a pierced veil
requirement was a way to extend liability to parents without grafting
court-created theories of liability onto CERCLA when nothing in the
statutory language did so.'83 It was clear that "[tihe 'normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that
intent specific."' A veil-piercing requirement respected this rule.
A rule requiring veil-piercing for liability also respected the expecta-
by close association between the Lincoln Company and the James Company, Joslyn
Manufacturing Company entered the scene in 1950 when Joslyn proposed the
purchase of Lincoln's principal assets. Id. at 229-30. Thus, Joslyn's claim was that the
James Company should be held liable and that the court should "read CERCLA's
definition of 'owner or operator' liberally and broadly to reach parent corporations
whose subsidiaries are found liable under the statute." Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 82.
178. Worden, supra note 42, at 79.
179. Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 83. The Joslyn court adopted the standard set in Krivo
Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th
Cir. 1973) ("[Cjontrol required for liability under the 'instrumentality' rule amounts
to total domination of the subservient corporation, to the extent that the subservient
corporation manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely
to achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation.").
180. 113 F.3d 572, vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 118
S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
181. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. A discussion of Cordova Chem-
ical and its place in CERCLA jurisprudence may also be found in Hottel & Jeffcoat,
supra note 36, at 176-78.
182. For an argument in favor of veil-piercing as an integral part of the appropriate
standard, see Hood, supra note 17, at 141-44.
183. See Brown, supra note 22, at 831 ("[If Congress intended parent corporations
to be liable as owners or operators under CERCLA section 107, Congress would have
included parent corporations in the section defining owner or operator.").
184. Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 82-83 (quoting Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey,
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)); see also Cordova Chem., 113 F.3d at 579 ("We are not
persuaded that, in enacting CERCLA, Congress contemplated the abandonment of
traditional concepts of limited liability associated with the corporate form in favor of
an undefined 'new, middle ground."'); Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 83 ("Without an ex-
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tions of those who set up their business in the corporate form-a form
which has as its cornerstone the concept of limited liability. It has
long been a fundamental precept of corporate law that "[o]rganization
of a corporation for the avowed purpose of avoiding personal respon-
sibility does not in itself constitute fraud or reprehensible conduct jus-
tifying a disregard of the corporate form.""la
The requirement that the veil be pierced supports the traditional
view that barring a clear justification for a different approach the state
of incorporation is responsible for the internal regulation of corporate
affairs. The creation of a new corporate liability theory by the federal
courts would have contradicted the traditional corporate law making
process. 186
Yet, despite the justifications behind it, there were several serious
flaws with requiring veil-piercing before a parent was held liable.
First, under most state standards it has been extraordinarily difficult to
pierce the corporate veil. This respected the traditional view that the
corporate form should be one of limited liability. This could conflict,
however, with CERCLA's remedial policies-the policies that sought
to make polluters pay. In fact, both Joslyn and Cordova declined to
find parental liability, illustrating that courts supporting the traditional
view found it difficult to hold parents liable. While such caution was
in keeping with the tradition of respecting the corporate form, it con-
tradicted CERCLA's broad remedial goals."s This strict reading and
finding of non-liability also ignored Congress's decision to allow for a
finding of liability based on one's status as an "operator," as well as an
"owner." Instead, it focused solely on "owner" liability.
In addition, CERCLA is a federal statute whose uniform applica-
tion may be undermined by variations among state laws. 11 Although
there were-and remain-many similarities among the various state
standards,18 9 there were-and remain-some significant differences
press Congressional directive to the contrary, common-law principles of corporation
law, such as limited liability, govern our court's analysis.").
185. Cordova Cem., 113 F.3d at 580 (citing Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 262 N.W. 371
(Mich. 1935)).
186. See Brown, supra note 22, at 831-32 ("Imposing direct liability on parent cor-
porations would alter the limited liability protection parent corporations receive.").
187. ld. at 845 (speculating that the adoption of a strict veil-piercing standard
would likely mean "resistance by the EPA and other sources.., such as other PRPs,
taxpayers, and insurance companies, who can have little or no control over the subsid-
iary corporation's waste management activities ... ."); see also Heidelberg, supra note
42, at 930 ("[R]equiring complete domination and control under the traditional pierc-
ing doctrine is not consistent with the minimal emphasis CERCLA places on the cor-
porate form, nor with the Act's preeminent objective of rapid cleanup of
contaminated sites financed by those with some connection to the site.").
188. Empirical evidence seems to offer a rationale for this fear. See Thompson,
supra note 65, at 1050 ("The percentage of cases in which courts pierce the veil varies
depending on which state's lav is being applied.").
189. See King, supra note 42, at 144 ("Fifty separate rules of limited liability could
undermine CERCLA's remedial objectives, rendering consistency of application of
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among the state standards that should not have been underesti-
mated. 190 For example, in certain cases, whether a state required
fraudulent intent may have had a major impact on liability.191 More-
over. the fact that veil-piercing tended to be a common law doctrine
rather than a statutory one may have added to the potential for incon-
sistency. 192 Courts that adopted this liability theory had to be pre-
pared to grapple with these shortcomings.
D. Indirect "Owner" Liability for Piercing the Veil Under Federal
Common Law
This final theory of parental liability attempted to combine the ben-
efits of traditional veil-piercing with the virtues of consistency. The
essential premise of this doctrine was that traditional veil-piercing was
a wise basis for parental liability. Yet, to avoid the inconsistencies
inherent in having over fifty variations on this theme, this theory ad-
vocated the application of a veil-piercing standard developed by fed-
the statute impossible. This conclusion, however, is overbroad. There are nuances
attributable to particular state versions of the rule, but there are general principles of
limited liability that can be extrapolated and applied fairly consistently . . .);
Strasser & Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 507 ("[C]ourts in the vast majority of parent
liability cases have expressed a preference for a uniform federal common law. Never-
theless, the difference may be more one of analytic rather than practical signifi-
cance."); Birg, supra note 8, at 795 ("Although the rules between the state and among
the federal courts are not exactly the same, they are similar and employ essentially the
same guidelines. Consequently, whether a court imposes a state standard or federal
standard should not materially affect the outcome of a piercing the veil question.
Nevertheless, a federal standard would encourage consistent guidelines. ... );
Brown, supra note 22, at 834 ("As a practical matter, it should make little difference
which veil piercing standard is applied, since both [state and federal] contain essen-
tially the same factors.").
190. See, e.g., Wallace, Jr., supra note 42, at 876 ("The substantial federal interest in
Superfund enforcement, the need for uniformity in a national program, and the exten-
sive financial and administrative involvement of the federal government are classic
considerations that also provide support for the adoption of the federal approach.");
Brown, supra note 22, at 835 ("[C]ourts should articulate one federal test setting forth
the factors to be applied when disregarding the parent corporation's limited liability
by piercing the corporate veil. One federal test is recommend because the require-
ments for veil piercing vary from state to state.").
191. For a fuller discussion of the fraud requirement in the CERCLA context, see
Hood, supra note 17, at 105-09. As Hood argues, fraud is more likely to be an ele-
ment required for veil-piercing in the context of a voluntary creditor. Further, CER-
CLA plaintiffs are involuntary creditors, thus diminishing the appropriateness of a
fraud requirement in CERCLA veil-piercing cases. Id.
192. Thompson, supra note 65, states:
The continuing reliance on case instead of statutory law, and a parallel judi-
cial reliance on case-by-case resolution in lieu of far-reaching standards, re-
flects the nature of the conduct being regulated. As with insider trading and
much of the law of directors' fiduciary duties, additional specification may
not be possible without inviting greater abuse ....
Id. at 1043.
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eral common law rather than one borrowed from state
jurisprudence. 193
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 194 the Supreme Court, in a
non-environmental context, ruled that federal common law should ap-
ply to "federal programs that 'by their nature are and must be uniform
in character throughout the Nation... .' 11195 There was a good argu-
ment that CERCLA met this standard.196 Indeed, in its staunch advo-
cacy for federal veil-piercing, a Massachusetts district court, in In Re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings97 explained:
One can hardly imagine a federal program more demanding of na-
tional uniformity than environmental protection. Congress did not
intend that the ability of the executive to fund the cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites should depend on the attitudes of the several
states toward parent-subsidiary liability in general, or CERCLA in
particular. The need for a uniform federal rule is especially great
for questions of piercing the corporate veil, since liability under the
statute must not depend on the particular state in which a defendant
happens to reside. 98
193. See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 455 ("CERCLA is a national pro-
gram of compelling national importance. Uniform interpretation of its liability provi-
sions is important to further its objectives. CERCLA enforcement should not be
hampered by subordination of its goals to varying state law rules .... ); Brown, supra
note 22, at 838 ("A single set of federal factors would minimize the confusion found in
the case law by providing uniformity."); Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 905-06 (observ-
ing that courts "have generally concluded that CERCLA is a federal program that
must be uniform in character throughout the nation, that application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program, and that a federal rule
would not significantly disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.").
Although the court found that the circumstances did not warrant veil-piercing-under
either state or federal law-the Third Circuit in Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Au-
thority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993), employed a federal veil-piercing
standard, stating "given the federal interest in uniformity in the application of CER-
CLA, it is federal common law, and not state law, which governs when corporate veil
piercing is justified under CERCLA." Id. at 1225.
194. 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (discussing uniformity in laws governing federal loan
programs).
195. Id. at 728 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)).
196. For a fuller discussion of the complexities of federal common law in this con-
text and others, see Martha A. Field, Sources of the Law The Scope of Federal Com-
mon Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1986); Patricia J. Hartman, Piercing the Corporate
Veil in Federal Courts: Is Circwnvention of a Statute Enough?, 13 Pac. LJ. 1245
(1982); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersection of State Corporation
Law and Employee Compensation Programs: Is it Curtains for Veil Piercing?, 1996 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1059; Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine
Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 853 (1982).
197. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987). This case is discussed more fully in Bakst,
supra note 6, at 337-38; Davidson, supra note 113, at 306-09; Heidt, supra note 8, at
140-41; Oswald & Schipani, supra note 42, at 305-6; Worden, supra note 42, at 82-84;
Wolfer, supra note 42, at 992-93.
198. Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31.
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This sentiment was echoed in United States v. Mottolo, 199 a decision
that stated that state corporate entity law "may not be employed to
avoid overriding federal legislative policies, and federal courts will dis-
regard it if the interests of public convenience, fairness, and equity so
demand."20 Similarly, in United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,20l the court
declined to follow Pennsylvania veil-piercing law and opted, instead,
for a federal rule.2"2 Although the court conceded that "there would
likely be no practical effect whether this Court looks to federal law or
Pennsylvania law to decide the alter ego issue,"203 it found sufficient
justification for a federal common law rule. This was based on the
court's view that there was a strong federal interest in uniformity,20 4
and "the application of federal laws would not disrupt commercial re-
lationships predicated on state law."' 20 5 To the extent that this may
have intruded on an area of state prerogative, the court was not overly
concerned since it observed that "this emerging federal common law
draws upon state law for guidance ... 206 Thus, in its view, the state
traditions would still have been incorporated-albeit indirectly-into
the federal jurisprudence on this question.20 7
Using federal common law would have increased consistency and
eliminated forum shopping208 in which plaintiffs sought to have their
199. 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988). For further discussion of Mottolo, see Oswald
& Schipani, supra note 42, at 297-98; Wolfer, supra note 42, at 990.
200. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 624.
201. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989). For a fuller discussion of Nicolet, see Heidt,
supra note 8, at 142, 167-68; O'Hara, supra note 95, at 8-10; Oswald & Schipani, supra
note 42, at 304-05; Strasser & Rodosevich, supra note 8, at 503; Birg, supra note 8, at
806-07; Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 477-78; Wolfer, supra note 42, at 989-90.
202. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1201.
203. Id.
204. See id. ("[W]hen a federal statute is silent as to the choice of law to be applied,
but overriding federal interests exist, courts should fashion uniform federal rules of
decision.").
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1202.
207. For additional support for a federal common law standard, see Vermont v.
Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988), United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127 (E.D.
Mo. 1985), Weiner v. Syntex Agribusiness, 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1985), United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. I11. 1984), United States v.
Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20, 69 (D.S.C. 1984), and United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
208. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809 ("There is no good reason why the United
States' right to reimbursement should be subjected to the needless uncertainty and
subsequent delay occasioned by diversified local disposition when this matter is ap-
propriate for uniform national treatment."); Heidt, supra note 8, at 186 ("To assure
national uniformity, the courts must develop uniform federal rules of decision with
respect to CERCLA liability."); Brown, supra note 22, at 838 ("[A] uniform federal
standard would eliminate forum shopping because it would eliminate the benefit of
considering each forum's veil piercing standards before deciding where to file suit.");
Chandler & Grosser, supra note 42, at 25 ("[A] uniform federal standard would elimi-
nate forum shopping by eliminating the benefit of considering each state's veil pierc-
ing standards before deciding where to file suit."); Farmer, supra note 42, at 787-89
("[T]he alter ego doctrine is far from uniform across jurisdictions .... [A] conse-
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case adjudicated in a particular jurisdiction. Such interests motivated
courts to adopt this view of veil-piercing. The enthusiasm behind this
approach, however, had to be tempered by two factors: federal com-
mon law was not yet well developed on this issue;2' 9 and, the creation
of federal common law was still a relatively unusual move and not as
well established a source of corporate law as state common law.211
IV. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE IN UNITED STA TES
v. BEs-FoODS'
7
When the Supreme Court decided Bestfoods, it helped resolve some
of the ambiguities inherent in the lower courts' diverse rulings on this
issue. It also adopted a realistic, functional approach for assessing lia-
bility that is generally sound and quite fair to those with varied inter-
ests. Unfortunately, however, ambiguities in the Court's ruling
remain. They are likely to lead to new litigation, inefficient cleanups,
and continued debate unless and until they are resolved by legislative
initiative.
quence is forum shopping because plaintiffs will take each potential forum's veil
piercing standard into account before filing suit. The need to establish greater uni-
formity, therefore, is clearly apparent .... ."); Lawson, supra note 42, at 767
("[U]niform adoption of the proposal would discourage businesses from locating pri-
marily in jurisdictions with more lenient standards. Where each court of appeals has
its own standard of liability, businesses would be free to forum shop and locate in the
jurisdiction with the more lenient standard.").
209. See, eg., Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42, at 450-51 (-[Tihough federal
courts are endeavoring to develop common law standards for veil-piercing in CER-
CLA cases, no single standard can be distilled from the cases decided to date.");
Newton, supra note 84, at 318 ("[T]he federal courts have been unsuccessful in fash-
ioning a federal common law rule to govern shareholder liability under CERCLA.");
Sisk & Anderson, supra note 65, at 571-72 ("[I]nterposition of a new federal common-
law rule would upset settled expectations and unfairly deprive commercial actors of
their justified reliance on state law ...."); Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 883 ("The
federal common law formulation of the veil-piercing doctrine is at least as amorphous
as state law.").
210. See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 65, at 553 (describing a -presumption against
federal common law"). The authors state:
The incorporation of existing state law has an important advantage ....
State law, evolved over decades and frequently codified in state statutes, is
well developed. It can easily be discovered and applied. By contrast, the
creation of new federal common law is a difficult, open-ended, and long-
term task. Courts creating new federal common law would be faced with the
complicated, confusing, and continuing burden of fashioning the appropriate
rule ....
kd- at 565 (citations omitted).
211. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998), vacating United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d
572 (6th Cir. 1997). The change in the defendant's name reflects the fact that the
named defendant, CPC, changed its name to "Bestfoods" shortly before the case was
decided. The Supreme Court continued to use the names of the parties as used below
to ensure "[c]onsistent[cy] with the briefs and opinions below." Id. at 1882 n.3.
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The Supreme Court had long been reticent about ruling on CER-
CLA matters.21 2 Most of the controversies sparked by this statute
concern narrow questions of statutory interpretation rather than the
broader and more intricate questions with which the Supreme Court
generally concerns itself. In addition, many issues that arise under
CERCLA are far better suited for legislative clarification than judicial
tinkering. The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari on
many CERCLA questions-including the question of parent corpo-
rate liability.2 13 This silence has meant that "confusion and anxiety...
reigned for the last decade or so in the murky area of corporate parent
liability .... 14
This issue, however, became too fundamental for the Supreme
Court to ignore.215 Once the Sixth Circuit entered the fray in 1997 by
adopting the minority position in United States v. Cordova, the debate
explicitly or implicitly crystallized around a number of far-reaching
concerns,16 including:
* What is the proper relationship between remedial federal statutes
and long-standing principles of state corporate law?2 17
212. See Nagle, supra note 59, at 1459 (describing the Supreme Court as "unwilling
to tackle CERCLA.").
213. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
214. Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Corporate Parent Liability Under CER-
CLA, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 1998, at 3.
215. See Steven Brostoff, U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Superfund Liabilities of
Parent Firms, Nat'l Underwriter Prop. & Casualty-Risk & Ben. Mgmt., Dec. 22, 1997,
at 4, 4 ("[T]he case is important for all shareholders ...."); Joel Glass, Test Shows
When Firms Must Pay Price, Lloyd's List Int'l, June 17, 1998, at 9, (calling dispute a
"prickly parent-liability issue that for nearly two decades had been a source of contro-
versy"); Lois Kimbol et al., Parent, Successor CERCLA Issues Divide Courts, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at C3 ("This issue is of significance to corporations and others in
evaluating the risks of acquiring companies with environmental concerns, and in as-
sessing residual risks after these companies are sold."); Superfind Case Goes to High
Court, Grand Rapids Press, March 22, 1998, at A25 ("Because the Supreme Court
could establish a national standard for corporate liability in pollution cleanups, the
case is being watched closely. The nation's largest business groups and attorneys gen-
eral from 29 states have filed briefs in it."); id. ("This case is very significant in the
broadest sense. It's one of the few times the Supreme Court has weighed in on some
of the thorny liability issues under Superfund." (quoting Karl Bourdeau, Esq.));
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case Deciding Liability at Haz waste Sites, Hazardous
Waste News, Dec. 22, 1997 ("This is only the second case involving CERCLA ....
The scope of operator liability could change if the [Supreme] Court construes liability
broadly .... This is a significant issue for a lot of people in the business world."
(quoting Tom Jackson, Esq.)), available in 1997 WL 16679785.
216. See Brown, supra note 150, at 265 ("The issue of parent corporations' liability
for the environmental violations of their subsidiaries ... intensified as a result of...
United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.").
217. As expressed by one commentator, this ambiguity revolved around the fact
that "While Congress may have cast a wide net in defining who may be held liable as
a responsible person under Superfund, it is not at all clear that Congress intended to
jettison a well-established body of corporate law." Mounteer & Myers, supra note 16
(citation omitted).
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" How, if at all, should the federal interest in uniform rules of liabil-
ity bend to the states' traditional interest in regulating corporate
law matters?
* How should the benefit of having "the polluter pay" be reconciled
with the legal fiction that parents and subsidiaries are different
legal entities?
" How could the Court best and most fairly interpret a notoriously
ambiguous phrase in CERCLA so as to advance the goals of
CERCLA without creating incentives for environmentally harmful
management practices?
Hence, Cordova became the vehicle for the Supreme Court to ad-
dress the question it had long avoided.18 When the Court granted
certiorari,2 19 this generated a good deal of attention " in the environ-
mental and corporate communities because of the importance of the
questions presented. Not surprisingly, the parties in the case ex-
pressed different questions to be addressed. The Supreme Court iden-
tified the issue as "whether a parent corporation that actively
participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidi-
ary may, without more, be held liable as an operator of a polluting
facility owned or operated by the subsidiary." ' I In its brief, the
United States framed the issue quite similarly: "Whether a corpora-
tion that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the oper-
ations of a subsidiary may be held liable under CERCLA as an
operator of the subsidiary's facility."'  In contrast, Bestfoods framed
the issue more contentiously: "Whether Congress, in providing that a
218. The progression of Cordova through the district court and the Sixth Circuit is
chronicled in considerable detail in Amy C. Stovall, Note, Limiting Operator Liability
for Parent Corporations Under CERCLA: United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 43
Vill. L. Rev. 219 (1998).
219. The Court granted certiorari on December 12, 1997. United States v. CPC
Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 621, 621 (1998).
220. See, e.g., Brostoff, supra note 215, at 4 (reporting the Supreme Court's decision
to grant certiorari); Court to Assign Environmental Responsibility; Whose Cleanup
Cost Subsidiary or Parent?, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 1997, at A13 (discussing the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari); Marcia Coyle, SuperJitnd Liability Case on
Docket Supreme Court to Rule on When Parent is an 'Operator', Nat'l I-., Mar. 30,
1998, at B1 (previewing oral arguments in Bestfoods, calling it a "case with multimil-
lion-dollar stakes"); Edward Felsenthal, High Court Grants Relief to Firms in Cleanup
Lawsuits, Wall St. J., June 9, 1998, at B10 (calling the Bestfoods case a "closely
watched dispute"); Superfund Case Goes to High Court, supra note 215 (characteriz-
ing Bestfoods as a case in which "[a]t stake is government control of toxic sites and
billions of dollars in cleanup costs .... "); Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case Decid-
ing Liability at Hazwaste Sites, supra note 215 (reporting Supreme Court's decision to
grant certiorari); Supreme Court Weighs Debate in Case on Oversight of Corporate
Subsidiaries, Hazardous Waste News, Mar. 30, 1998 (describing oral arguments in
Bestfoods hearing), available in WL 10239757; U.S., Michigan Seek Reversal of 6th
Circuit Ruling on Parent Liability, Mealey's Litig. Reps.: Superfund, March 9, 1998, at
3 (summarizing arguments made by United States and Bestfoods in Supreme Court
briefs).
221. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1881 (1998).
222. Brief for Petitioner United States at i, Bestfoods, (No. 97-454).
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corporation may be held liable under CERCLA as an 'operator,' in-
tended to sweep aside longstanding principles governing the liability
of parent corporations for the actions of their subsidiaries and to li-
cense the federal courts to develop ad hoc rules of corporate parent
responsibility.'223
As the Court faced the conflict among the circuits, the disparity of
views was well represented by the two lower court opinions. 224 The
district court had taken the broad view of liability embraced by the
majority of circuits-direct liability for actual control. In contrast, the
Sixth Circuit had adopted the minority view-a parent could be liable
only where the state test for veil-piercing was met.
The factual scenario of Bestfoods was, in many ways, a typical "en-
vironmental horror story." 2" In brief, as described by the Supreme
Court,226 the trouble originated in 1957 when dumping of hazardous
substances began at a Michigan chemical plant originally owned by
Ott Chemical Company ("Ott 1,,).2 27 CPC International ("CPC") cre-
ated a wholly-owned subsidiary, Ott II, to buy the assets of Ott I in
1965-assets that, unfortunately for CPC, included the polluted
site.22 8 During the time that CPC owned Ott II, the pollution contin-
ued and CPC and Ott II shared several officers and directors who
served both corporations.229 After seven years, the Story Chemical
Company ("Story") bought Ott II from CPC-a sale which again in-
cluded the contaminated site. Story continued to operate a chemical
plant on the site until it went bankrupt in 1977.30 When the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources inspected the site and discovered
the scope of its contamination,"3 it faced the unenviable task of find-
ing a buyer for the site.232
Aerojet-General Corporation ("Aerojet") agreed to buy the site
from Story's bankruptcy trustees in 1977. Furthermore, Aerojet cre-
223. Brief for Respondent Bestfoods at i, Bestfoods, (No. 97-454).
224. See Chandler & Grosser, supra note 42, at 14 (describing lower court opinion
as one that "highlights the differing opinions on whether Congress intended to alter
the common law principles of corporate limited liability").
225. Kass & McCarroll, supra note 214, at 3.
226. A more detailed description of the underlying events can be found in the
lower courts' opinions. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549,
555-70 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (reporting detailed findings of fact); see also United States
v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 575-77 (6th Cir. 1997) (recapitulating the rele-
vant facts); Stovall, supra note 218, at 250-57 (describing the nature of environmental
harm): Kass & McCarroll, supra note 214 (describing contamination at the site).
227. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 (1998).
228. Id.
229. Id. Specifically, CPC "kept the managers of Ott I, including its founder, presi-
dent, and principal shareholder, Arnold Ott, on board as officers of Ott II." Id.
230. Id.
231. Specifically, the court noted that inspection "found the land littered with
thousands of leaking and even exploding drums of waste, and the soil and water satu-
rated with noxious chemicals." Id.
232. Id.
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ated Cordova Chemical Company ("Cordova/California"), a wholly-
owned subsidiary, which it created to purchase the property.Y3 Cor-
dova/California then created its own wholly-owned subsidiary, Cor-
dova Chemical Company of Michigan ("Cordova/Michigan"), which
manufactured chemicals on the site until 1986.2-3
Meanwhile, the site had attracted the attention of the EPA, which in
1981 "had undertaken to see the site cleaned up."- 5 The proposed
remedial plan for handling the contamination would cost "well into
the tens of millions of dollars."" 6 Four corporate defendants were
identified as responsible parties: CPC and Aerojet, the two parent
corporations, and Cordova/California and Cordova/Michigan, the two
subsidiaries2 37 Two questions were at issue. First, whether the parent
company, Aerojet, could be liable for the actions of its defunct subsid-
iaries, Ott I and Ott II. Second, whether the parent company, CPC,
could be liable for the actions of its still-existing subsidiaries, Cordova/
California and Cordova/Michigan. s Prior to reaching the Supreme
Court, the dispute wound its way through several lower court opinions
whose contrasting views represent the major camps in the dispute. 39
A. The District Court's Expanded View of Liability
The district court, in CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General
Corp.,2' followed the lead of the majority circuits by adopting a fairly
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. Indeed, "[t]he Dalton Township site was ranked 137th among the most
contaminated sites in the country." Stovall, supra note 218, at 256 n.123.
236. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
237. Id. In addition to the corporate defendants, one individual defendant, Arnold
Ott was originally named as a responsible party as well. However, he settled with the
government on the eve of the trial, so his role will not be discussed any further. In
addition, Ott I and Ott II were no longer in existence at the relevant times so they
were not involved in the litigation. Id.
238. Several other issues related to, but not directly relevant to, the discussion of
parental liability were addressed by the district court but not pursued here. These
tangential issues include successor liability, see CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General
Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 575-76 (W.D. Mich. 1991), the "innocent landowner de-
fense," see id. at 580-81, and the "arranger" liability of the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources, see id. at 576-77.
239. For discussion of the Cordova decision in its various incarnations, see J.
Ashley Cooper, Developments in Case Law: Sixth Circuit Adopts Conservative Stan-
dard for Liability of Parent Corporations Under CERCLA, 4 S.C. Envtl. L.J. 225
(1995); Welford, supra note 17, at 421-22; Brown, supra note 22, at 836-37; Chandler
& Grosser, supra note 42, at 19-20; Court Must Pierce Corporate Veil to Hold Parent
Liable for Subsidiary's Conduct, Mealey's Litig. Reps.: Superfund. May 27, 1997, at 3;
No Liability on Parent Company Unless Corporate Veil Can Be Pierced: United States
v. Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan, NAAG: National Environmental En-
forcement Journal, Oct. 1995, at 15; Paul A. Sarkis, Sith Circuit Rejects Control Stan-
dard, Says Veil-Piercing Governs Parent Liability, BNA Daily Env't Rep., May 19,
1997, at D5.
240. 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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broad standard for finding parental liability.2 4' Incanting CERCLA's
broad remedial goal,242 the district court found that there are two dis-
tinct avenues for parental liability under CERCLA. First, via a theory
of "direct" liability, the court held that "CERCLA liability may attach
to parent corporations that have acted in a manner that constitutes
operation of a facility .... ,"" Although the district court acknowl-
edged that it is difficult to determine what actions might constitute
such operation 244 and reasserted the general principle of limited liabil-
ity,2 45 it proceeded to adopt a "new, middle ground ' 246 in which liabil-
ity will be assessed against a parent corporation:
only when it has exerted power or influence over its subsidiary by
actively participating in and exercising control over the subsidiary's
business during a period of disposal of hazardous waste. A parent's
actual participation in and control over a subsidiary's functions and
decision-making creates "operator" liability under CERCLA; a
parent's mere oversight of a subsidiary's business in a manner ap-
propriate and consistent with the investment relationship between a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary does not.2 47
In attempting to offer guidance as to "whether a parent corporation
operated its subsidiary," '248 the court identified a number of factors,
including "the parent's participation in the subsidiary's board of direc-
tors, management, day-to-day operations, and specific policy matters,
including areas such as manufacturing, finances, personnel and waste
disposal." 249
Applying this test to the question of liability, the court concluded
that the parent, CPC, was liable because of its active involvement in
the affairs of its subsidiary, Ott II. After describing CPC's interac-
tions with Ott II, the court found that these interactions amounted to
a level of control beyond that of an ordinary parent-a level sufficient
to characterize CPC as an active participant and controller of Ott II
and, therefore, directly liable as an operator of Ott II's facility.2 0 The
court focused on the overlapping control by CPC officials and board
241. The district court's opinion dealt only with the issue of liability. Two other
issues-remedy and insurance coverage-were not addressed by the court. Under
the order of the district court, the latter two issues were separated from the liability
question and are to be dealt with in separate phases. See id. at 554 n.1.
242. See id. at 571 ("In light of CERCLA's remedial goals, the court is obligated to
construe the statute's liability provisions broadly to avoid frustrating its legislative
purpose.").
243. Id. at 572.
244. Id. (calling this definitional issue a "more difficult question").
245. Id. at 573 ("[The statute and its legislative history do not suggest that CER-
CLA rejects entirely the crucial limits to liability that are inherent to corporate law.").
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 574.
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members over Ott II, and the court found that such a sharing of gov-
ernance is sufficient to constitute grounds for direct liability. 5 1 In
particular, the court considered:
1) CPC's 100-percent ownership of Ott II; 2) CPC's active participa-
tion in, and at times majority control over, Ott II's board of direc-
tors... ; 3) CPC's involvement in major decision-making and day-
to-day operations through CPC officials who served within Ott II
management... ; 4) the conduct of CPC officials with respect to Ott
II affairs ... ; 5) the function of the CPC development company as
another source of policy-making for Ott II; 6) the active participa-
tion of and control by CPC officials in Ott II environmental matters
... ; 7) the active participation of CPC officials in Ott II labor
problems; and 8) the financial control exerted by CPC through its
approval of Ott II's budgets and major capital expenditures.' 2
The district court then applied this same test to the question of Aer-
ojet's direct liability as the operator of the two Cordova companies. It
concluded that Aerojet exercised the requisite level of "active partici-
pation and pervasive control over the businesses of" Cordova/Califor-
nia and Cordova/Michigan to justify a finding of such liability under
CERCLA section 107(a)(2)'s standards for operators . 5 3
In addition to adopting this "middle ground" approach for direct
liability, the court also ruled that a parent may be held liable indirectly
as an "owner" of a facility if it meets the traditional state law standard
for veil-piecing. 4 Under Michigan law, the veil-piercing standard re-
quires a "finding that the subsidiary has been a mere instrumentality
of the parent, that the separateness between the corporations has
been used to commit fraud or wrong, and that unjust loss or injury to
the plaintiff has occurred."" 5 The court further ruled that veil-pierc-
ing is appropriate when a parent is the sole owner, or when one corpo-
ration is merely the alter ego of another.2 6
Because the district court found the direct liability theory sufficient
to hold the parent responsible, it did not find it necessary to reach the
question of veil-piercing. 257 The court did, however, apply the veil-
251. Id. at 574-75.
252. Id. at 575.
253. Id. at 580. CERCLA section 107(a)(2) states that liability will attach to "any
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)
(1994).
254. See CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 574. The court relied on Anspec Co. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991), to support its use of state law to
determine veil-piercing.
255. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp at 574 (relying on Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architec-
tural Research Corp., 873 F.2d 109, 112 (6th Cir. 1989): Maki v. Copper Range Co.,
328 N.W.2d 430 (Mich. App. 1982)).
256. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 574.
257. Id. at 575, 580 (declining to pursue veil-piercing with regard to CPC's relation-
ship to Ott H, and declining to pierce the veil against Aerojet under CERCLA section
107(a)(2)).
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piercing standard to assess Aerojet's liability under CERCLA section
107(a)(1) as the parent of Cordova/Michigan-the "present owner" of
the contaminated facility. The court found that the veil should be
pierced in this case because "Aerojet totally dominated Cordova/
Michigan, creating a complete identity of interests between the parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary." '58
Thus, the district court offered two distinct theories of liability: one,
a traditional veil-piercing theory; and, two, a direct brand of "opera-
tor" liability. The case was then appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
B. The Sixth Circuit's Traditional Approach259
In an en banc decision, United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.,26
the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision to allow direct
liability. The court adopted the less expansive view that liability will
only be visited upon a parent if the requirements to pierce the corpo-
rate veil are met.26' In so doing, the Sixth Circuit provided a ringing
endorsement of what was clearly the minority view.2 62
The Sixth Circuit had several rationales for its narrow reading.
Skeptical of the overuse of "remedial purpose" as a grounds for ex-
panding CERCLA's scope, the court feared that this standard would
"snare those who are either innocently or tangentially tied to the facil-
ity . . ,263 In addition, the court remained unconvinced that either
the text or the legislative history of CERCLA warranted abandoning
258. Id. at 578. The court went on to state that "Cordova/Michigan was a mere
instrumentality of Aerojet, lacking any structural or actual independence .... The
creation of Cordova/Michigan ... only served as an attempt to shield Aerojet from
liabilities . . . ." Id.
259. For additional analysis of the Sixth Circuit decision, see Stovall, supra note
218, passim.
260. 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997). Prior to this en banc hearing, the Sixth Circuit
issued a decision in United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
1995). However, this 1995 opinion was vacated when the rehearing en banc was
granted. 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, this Article analyzes only the en banc
opinion.
261. The court stated:
[W]e reject the district court's 'new, middle ground' as the basis for fixing
operator liability and hold that where a parent corporation is sought to be
held liable as an operator ... based upon the extent of its control of its
subsidiary which owns the facility, the parent will be liable only when the
requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are met.
Cordova Chem., 113 F.3d at 580.
262. See Sarkis, supra note 239, at D5 (asserting that Cordova Chemical "rejected
the 'weight of authority as well as the trend of the law' by ruling that a parent cannot
be held directly liable as a CERCLA operator unless 'the parent's name is on the
smokestack' or it is so involved ... as to warrant veil-piercing.. . . 'This decision ...
one might have expected to see in the early 1980s but not after 17 years of CERCLA
jurisprudence."' (quoting Lawrence P. Schnapf, Esq.)).
263. Cordova Chem., 113 F.3d at 578.
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the limited liability tradition so central to corporate law.21 Further,
the Sixth Circuit feared that the district court blurred the distinction
between "actual operation of the subsidiary's business" and "exertion
of power or influence through active participation in the subsidiary's
business."265 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit's view, there was an important
distinction between the parent who "operates" a facility and the par-
ent who "operates" the subsidiary who operates the facility. Because
of the difficulties in distinguishing these two scenarios, the Sixth Cir-
cuit was reluctant to expand liability in a way it believed to be indis-
criminate. 66  This concern was not insurmountable, but it
foreshadowed the precise issue that became the focus of the Supreme
Court's attention when it confronted the issue. 67
Beyond these legal reasons, the Sixth Circuit also expressed
broader concerns that the nebulous nature of a new doctrine might
lead to confusion. 68 In addition, it feared that the "threat of unlim-
ited liability will likely deter private sector participation in the cleanup
of existing sites. 2 69 The court found, therefore, that only if the corpo-
rate veil could be pierced under Michigan law27 0 could a parent corpo-
ration be vicariously liable for the misdeeds of its subsidiary."l
Applying this standard, the court declined to pierce the veil against
either CPC or Aerojet,2 72 and it found that their relationships with the
264. Id. at 579 (finding that "nothing in the statute or its legislative history warrants
the invocation by courts of vague, expansive oncepts ... which threaten the efficacy
of time-honored limited liability protections afforded by the corporate form").
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. See infra notes 285-96 and accompanying text.
268. See Cordova ChenL, 113 F.3d at 580.
269. Id.
270. The court stated:
Michigan appears to follow the general rule that requires demonstration of
patent abuse of the corporate form in order to pierce the corporate veil.
There must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate per-
sonalities of the corporation and its owner cease to exist ... [and] adherence
to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or pro-
mote injustice.
Id. (citations omitted).
271. In an attempt to clarify the application of the veil-piercing doctrine, the court
went on to state that "[o]rganization of a corporation for the avowed purpose of
avoiding personal responsibility does not in itself constitute fraud or reprehensible
conduct justifying a disregard of the corporate form." Id. (footnote omitted). Such a
view would continue to allow the use of the corporation as a liability-shielding device
without mandatory veil-piercing.
272. The court's analysis confirms the view of those commentators who have ar-
gued that liability is less likely to be assessed in circumstances involving veil-piercing
than direct liability. See, eg., Worden, supra note 42, at 82 ("Imposing liability under a
piercing of the corporate veil theory is much more difficult than imposing operator
liability."); Hood, supra note 17, at 89 ("Fewer shareholders would bear unlimited
liability under CERCLA if courts used a veil piercing analysis instead of direct liabil-
ity."). This counters the assessment of those who have argued that the selection of the
test to be used is irrelevant to the outcome.
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subsidiaries did not cross the line separating a legitimate parent-sub-
sidiary relationship from one that abused the corporate form.
Specifically, with regards to CPC, the court found that while the
factors relied on by the district court showed that CPC
took an active interest in the affairs of its subsidiary, they did not
indicate such a degree of control that the separate personalities of
the two corporations ceased to exist and that CPC utilized the cor-
porate form to perpetuate the kind of fraud or other culpable con-
duct required before a court can pierce the veil. 73
Similarly, with regard to Aerojet, the court ruled that the facts
do not establish that Cordova/Michigan was a mere instrumentality
of Aerojet in the sense that the separate corporate personalities of
the parent and subsidiary ceased to exist .... [T]hey do not reveal
activity ... that approaches the level of culpable conduct contem-
plated by Michigan law as a predicate to disregarding the separate
corporate form.... [T]here is nothing to suggest that the company
acted to subvert justice or with fraudulent intent .... 74
Thus, the Sixth Circuit's opinion left state veil-piercing as the only
standard under which a parent corporation need fear liability for its
subsidiary's activities. 5 It was in light of this restrictive ruling that
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 76
C. The Supreme Court's Resolution of BESrFooDs
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion2 77 by
Justice Souter, ruled that there are now two theories under which a
parent corporation could be found liable for the CERCLA misadven-
273. Cordova Chem., 113 F.3d at 581.
274. Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
275. A vigorous dissenting opinion by Judge Ryan sharply criticized the majority's
departure from the prevailing legal rule and argued that it overly limited the basis for
parental liability. See id. at 586-95 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
276. One commentator has taken a particularly critical view of the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning. See Stovall, supra note 218, at 263. Her criticisms are:
First, the court premised its decision on a misinterpretation that CERCLA
imposes liability only on culpable parties. Second, the piercing the corporate
veil standard severely hinders accomplishment of the statute's remedial pur-
pose. Third, the Sixth Circuit's holding does not comport with the plain stat-
utory language of CERCLA. Fourth,... imposing direct liability on parent
corporations will not deter private sector cleanups. Fifth and finally, . .. the
standard adopted by the district court and a majority of the other circuits
will not result in confused interpretation of CERCLA liability law.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Stovall's observations point to additional rationales that the
Supreme Court may have considered in its decision to review the Sixth Circuit's
opinion.
277. The fact that the opinion was unanimous should, perhaps, not be surprising
since the opinion came in a year in which "[o]f the term's 91 decisions ... nearly half,
43, were decided by 9-to-O votes, unanimous in result although not always in reason-
ing." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Weaves Legal Principles from a Tangle of
Litigation, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1998, at A20.
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tures of its subsidiaries. Predictably, the Court's decision began with a
strong reiteration of the "bedrock principle""7 8 that, as a general rule,
a parent corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its
subsidiaries. Thus, the parent generally enjoys insulation from its sub-
sidiaries' legal liabilities.27 9 Because this principle is so firmly in-
grained in state law, and because CERCLA did not explicitly reject it,
the Court was confident that Congress could not have intended to un-
dermine the principle through mere silence.2 ° The Court, therefore,
correctly approached the CERCLA liability question against the
backdrop of this rule.
The Court went on to reason, however, that the doctrine of corpo-
rate veil-piercing is equally fundamental as an exception to limited
liability." 1 Thus, the first of the two circumstances in which the
Supreme Court found that a parent could be held liable is the highly
unoriginal, though predictable, scenario in which the corporate veil
may be pierced under traditional veil-piercing doctrines.282 In such
circumstances, the "parent corporation [may] be charged with deriva-
tive CERCLA liability for its subsidiary's actions."' Unfortunately,
the Court did not resolve whether this veil-piercing should be accom-
plished via application of state law or through developing federal
common law. 4 Once the applicable veil-piercing standard is met,8
however, the parent bears the subsidiary's liability-whether the sub-
sidiary is liable as an "owner" of a contaminated facility or as the "op-
erator" of a facility that it operates but does not own.286
278. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (1998).
279. See id. ("The Government has indeed made no claim that a corporate parent is
liable as an owner or an operator under § 107 simply because its subsidiary is subject
to liability for owning or operating a polluting facility.").
280. See id. The court relied, in part, on Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transat-
lantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979) ("[Slilence is most eloquent, for such reticence
while contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law is
unlikely.").
281. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 1885-86.
284. See id. at 1885-86 n.9. The Court declined to do so because this issue was not
raised by the parties. This silence on such a significant issue is a major shortcoming of
the opinion because the differences among the states and between the states and the
federal common law are problematic. The Court recognized that "significant disa-
greement" exists on this issue, but declined to resolve that disagreement. Id. The
legislative proposal presented in this Article suggests that the state standard should
apply.
285. The Court described veil-piercing as appropriate in those circumstances where
"the corporate form would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful pur-
poses, most notably fraud, on the shareholder's behalf." Id. at 1885 (citations
omitted).
286. The Court recognized that this position is not without controversy. See id. at
1886 n.10. The Court reasoned:
Some courts and commentators have suggested that this indirect, veil-pierc-
ing approach can subject a parent corporation to liability only as an owner,
and not as an operator.... We think it is otherwise, however. If a subsidiary
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This first ground for parental liability is a predictable one. To rule
differently and hold that a parent corporation is not derivatively liable
via veil-piercing would require either a finding that Congress intended
to change this basic premise of state law or that there is something
about CERCLA liability that requires freeing parents from such vica-
rious liability. There is no evidence of such Congressional intent, and
the notion of privileging liability for hazardous waste pollution lacks
logic and precedent. Thus, the Court had little choice but to rule that
parents may be liable under traditional standards for veil-piercing.
The more interesting aspect of the Court's opinion is that it chose
not to stop here and side with the minority view that veil-piercing is
the only theory to support parental liability. Rather, the Court next
focused on the fact that CERCLA section 107(a)(2) allows liability
based on status as an "operator" of a facility in addition to status as an
"owner." From this perspective, the Supreme Court delineated a sec-
ond, direct avenue for parental liability as an "operator. 2 87 This stan-
dard of liability does not center on the relationship between the
parent and the subsidiary per se, as had the rulings of many of the
lower courts that had adopted direct liability. As the Court remarked,
"the existence of the parent-subsidiary relationship.., is simply irrel-
evant to the issue of direct liability. 12 8 8 Instead, the second source of
liability, as delineated by the Supreme Court, asserts that a parent
corporation may be liable for the hazardous waste at a facility owned
by its subsidiary if the parent corporation itself, or in connection with
its subsidiary, acted as the operator of the facility. In that set of cir-
cumstances, the parent will be liable not derivatively but directly for
its own actions in operating the facility.289
This second basis for liability clarified several questions. It estab-
lished that direct liability will not turn on the parent's legal control of
the subsidiary29 but on its control of the physical facility from which
the liability arose. Thus, it is possible for a scenario to arise in which a
parent and subsidiary diligently observe corporate formalities to avoid
veil-piercing and, nevertheless, the parent may be liable because of its
involvement in operating a facility.291 In the view of the Court, this
approach places the inquiry's focus in the proper place-on the physi-
that operates, but does not own, a facility is so pervasively controlled by its
parent for a sufficiently improper purpose to warrant veil-piercing, the par-
ent may be held derivatively liable for the subsidiary's acts as an operator.
Id.
287. See id. at 1886.
288. See id. (citations omitted).
289. See id.
290. Indeed, in clarifying this, the Supreme Court criticized the approach of the
district court which focused on the parent's actions vis-A-vis the subsidiary rather than
the facility. See id. at 1887.
291. See id. at 1886-87 n.12.
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cal control and management of the contaminated facility and not on
the paperwork separating legal creations from each other.' g
The Court also established that in the common circumstance in
which the parent and the subsidiary share common directors and of-
ficers, the actions of those officers and directors may not be automati-
cally attributed to the parent.2 93 Because it broadened the potential
scope of liability from the narrow view of the Sixth Circuit,' the
Court vacated and remanded the case back to the district court to
review the relationship between the parent company and the facility
in question and not on the less relevant interaction between the par-
ent company and the subsidiary. 95
This functional test is well supported.2 96 It struck a balance be-
tween competing interests, a balance reflected by the fact that the de-
cision has been called a "mixed blessing." 297 Some commentators
characterized the decision as favorable to the government,2 9 3 while
292. Indeed, this approach bears some similarity to the position advocated by Mc-
Kane, supra note 42, at 1673-77, who suggests that a focus on the day-to-day opera-
tion of facilities "provides the specificity necessary to ensure that a finding of operator
liability will encourage environmental responsibility and economic efficiency while
adhering to CERCLA's language." Id. at 1673. This emphasis on facilities was noted
in North Shore Gas Co., v. Salomon, Inc., No. 97-2485, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 17857,
at *14 n.4 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 1998) ("Of course, Bestfoods emphasizes that participation
in the activities of the polluting facility, not mere control of the subsidiary, is what
results in direct CERCLA liability.").
293. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1888.
294. Interestingly, this had the effect of broadening CERCLA's reach from that
chosen by the Sixth Circuit. This is a departure from the traditional scenario in which
the Supreme Court demonstrates "disinclination to invoke the remedial purpose ca-
non in environmental cases" which is "striking when contrasted with the correspond-
ing interpretive practices of the federal district and appellate courts." Watson, supra
note 65, at 261.
295. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1880.
296. For a pre-Bestfoods endorsement of a facility-oriented approach such as this,
see McKane, supra note 42, who states:
It is insufficiently shallow to analyze whether a parent corporation is the
operator of a subsidiary. To ensure that a PRP parent corporation is a liable
party, a court should confirm that the parent is active in the daily manage-
ment of the facility, not the overall management of the subsidiary. An anal-
ysis true to CERCLA's language requires that a parent corporation be the
operator of the facility before it can be held liable.
Id. at 1676.
297. Andrea Foster, High Court's Liability Ruling Is a Mired Blessing, Chem.
Week, June 17, 1998, at 8, 8 (calling the Bestfoods verdict "a mixed blessing for both
the chemical industry and federal environmental enforcement" and noting that the
Chemical Manufacturers' Association "has not taken a position in the case because
some of its members would fare well under the decision and others would not"). For
a similarly ambivalent view on the ruling, see Parent Companies Aren't Completely
Shielded, Nat'l LJ., June 22, 1998, at B17 (calling the ruling "a middle-of-the-road
approach that creates a difficult burden of proof for government lawyers but does not
automatically shield a parent company from financial responsibility in disputes over
clean-up liability").
298. See Linda Greenhouse, Right of States to Ertradite Fugitives is Upheld, N.Y.
Times, June 9, 1998, at A18, (characterizing Bestfoods decision as "a victory for Fed-
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others reported that it would make recovery of cleanup costs more
difficult. 99
The provision allowing indirect liability through veil-piercing is con-
sistent with long-standing principles of state law and requires little dis-
cussion. It will continue to allow the courts to assess damages against
parent corporations who abuse the corporate form. However, the
provision for direct liability is the Court's most important contribu-
tion. It places the attention where it should be: on the connection
between parent companies and contaminated sites, not on the artifi-
cial corporate connections between parents and subsidiaries. Relat-
edly, this approach follows the contours of CERCLA's words, which
confer liability on the "owner or operator" of a "facility," and not on
the more attenuated "owner or operator of one who owns or operates
a facility." This is more in keeping with CERCLA's primary concern:
garnering cleanup costs from all those involved in the operations of
the sites that have generated remediation bills which would otherwise
be footed by American taxpayers. The decision also discouraged the
scenario in which the parent may place ownership of a facility in a
thinly capitalized, weak subsidiary and then manage the site for its
eral environmental enforcement"); High Court Holds Parent Liable for Unit's Pollu-
tion, Engineering News-Rec., June 15, 1998, at 7 (reporting that Lois J. Schiffer,
Assistant Attorney General for the Environment, "praised the decision"); see also
Statement by Lois J. Schiffer, D.O.J. Envtl. & Nat. Resources News Release, June 8,
1998 (describing the Bestfoods decision as "reaffirm[ing] the principle that polluters
should pay for the messes they make and not leave their cleanup bills for the Ameri-
can taxpayers to pick up. With this decision, the United States will continue to be
able to hold accountable those who degrade our environment and endanger the pub-
lic health"), available in 1998 WL 305676.
299. See, e.g., Laurie Asseo, U.S. Actions Under Superfund Limited, Legal Intelli-
gencer, June 9, 1998, at 7 (declaring that through Bestfoods decision, "[tihe Supreme
Court yesterday made it harder for the federal government to force companies to pay
for cleaning up hazardous waste disposed at sites owned by subsidiaries"); Steven
Brostoff, Top Court Limits Parent's Superfund Liability, Nat'l Underwriter Prop. &
Casualty-Risk & Benefits Mgmt., June 22, 1998, at 32,32 ("The U.S. [E.P.A.] cannot
impose superfund liability on the parent company of a potentially responsible party in
violation of state common law principles of corporate law, the U.S. Supreme Court
has ruled."); Sean Connaughton, Ruling May Keep Environmental Suits from Scaling
the Great Corporate Wall, J. Com., July 8, 1998, at 2B, 2B (describing Bestfoods as "a
major step in restoring the protection inherent in the corporate structure."); Marcia
Coyle, Companies Get Relief on Superfund, Nat'l L.J., June 22, 1998, at B1 ("[T]he
court takes a good degree of care in trying to explain it's going to be difficult to show
factually that a parent corporation should be held directly liable as an operator."
(quoting Professor Michael Healy)); Edward Felsenthal, High Court Grants Relief to
Firms in Cleanup Lawsuits, Wall St. J., June 9, 1998, at B10 (claiming that Bestfoods
decision "grant[s] relief to companies facing liability in environmental cleanup law-
suits"); Kenneth J. Warren, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Superfilnd Liability for Par-
ent Corp. in Bestfoods, Legal Intelligencer, July 16, 1998, at 7 ("The court's specific
focus on control over environmental activities at the facility.., will lead many parent
corporations to breathe a sign of relief. Bestfoods may result in noticeable limitations
on CERCLA's reach over parent corporations.").
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own benefit, ducking behind the corporate veil should anything go
wrong.3o
Even as the Bestfoods decision launches the law's evolution in the
right direction, provides some needed uniformity in this area,31° and
promises to play a significant role in developing the law in the field, 30
it is plagued with three interrelated problems which demand a legisla-
tive solution. The remainder of this article explores these problems
and offers a legislative proposal to resolve them.
V. THE AFTERMATH OF BESTFOODS. QUESTIONS UNANSWERED
AND PROBLEMS REMAINING FOR LEGISLATIVE REPAIR
The three problems left unresolved by the court's opinion should
come as no surprise. These problems are: (1) whether state or federal
law should govern indirect liability via veil-piercing; (2) how "opera-
tor" should be defined for purposes of assessing direct liability; and
(3) how the definition of "operator" may be best applied. They repre-
sent complexities that have long plagued the lower courts as they at-
tempted to grapple with this issue. The fact that the Supreme Court
itself was unable or unwilling to resolve these questions argues well
for the need for a legislative solution. A Congressional solution is
needed because only legislation 30 3 vill be able to address the problem
with the level of detail necessary to eliminate the confusion that arises
from piecemeal judicial pronouncements on these intricate ques-
tions.3" Allocating liability requires full discussion of practical and
300. In some jurisdictions, this might be grounds for veil-piercing; in other jurisdic-
tions it might not be. However, a direct liability rule such as the one the Court cre-
ated would eliminate this artificial distinction.
301. See Connaughton, supra note 299 (crediting Bestfoods decision as one that
"clarifies corporate liability under [CERCLA], and by analogy the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990"); Warren, supra note 299, at 7 ("Bestfoods resolved the conflict among the
circuits in defining the standard for operator liability.").
302. The importance of the decision was quickly noted when the ruling was an-
nounced. See Steve Lash, Judicial Court Limits Liability of Parent Companies in CER-
CLA Litigation, Hazardous Waste News, June 15, 1998 ("The nature of the
[Bestfoods] ruling has more far-reaching implications for other classes of corporate
activities, including cleanup of hazardous waste and liability concerns of the remedia-
tion contractors." (quoting Dan Steinway, Esq.)), available in 1998 WL 10239831; see
also Greenhouse, supra note 277 (calling Bestfoods "an important interpretation of
the Federal Superfund law on environmental cleanups").
303. See Mounteer & Myers, supra note 16 ("[Tlhis is not an area in which Con-
gress should acquiesce to judicial interpretations, and... Congress should not let pass
the opportunity to provide clearer guidance that can curtail this type of wasteful
litigation.").
304. See Allen, supra note 42, at 75 ("[A] solution which grants a great deal of
discretion to the courts or to the EPA disserves CERCLA's settlement goal. There-
fore, the only plausible solution is a statutory amendment to clarify the scope of liabil-
ity."); Cooper, supra note 239, at 228 ("Differing judicial interpretations of CERCLA
liability for parent corporations will likely invite Congressional intervention."); Hottel
& Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 178 ("[C]ommentators have suggested that Congress
amend CERCLA to provide clear direction on the limits of owner and operator liabil-
174 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
financial issues, not merely legal implications?0 5 These are fact inten-
sive, empirically studied issues which are better handled by the legisla-
ture than by the courts.30 6 This is particularly true in a highly
politicized area' ° 7 such as this which involves a reworking of the tradi-
tional common law rule on limited liability.30 8 Thus, although the
Supreme Court's ruling goes a great distance in clarifying some of the
underlying issues under the current CERCLA scheme, 0 9 there re-
mains much work for Congress in addressing three problems that en-
dure after Bestfoods. To date, although CERCLA reform has been
ity for shareholders and parent corporations."); Noonan, supra note 42, at 735 ("Con-
gress must clarify the scope of parent liability under CERCLA."); Mounteer &
Myers, supra note 16 ("[C]ontinued judicial pronouncements on owner/operator lia-
bility will only lead to greater confusion.").
305. Sisk & Anderson, supra note 65, at 574 ("Congress, and not the courts, 'can
study the societal and economic impacts that would result from the imposition of
[CERCLA] liability on additional parties."' (quoting Kathryn A. Barnard, EPA's Pol-
icy of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 6 Stan. Envtl. L. Rev. 78, 102
(1986-87)).
306. See Mitchell, supra note 42, at 70 ("[M]any CERCLA courts have failed to
acknowledge their constitutional limits. Congress, not the federal judiciary, writes
statutes, and does so while acting against the backdrop of the common-law
tradition.").
307. Indeed, even supporters of Bestfoods acknowledge that the politics surround-
ing hazardous waste will complicate the issue. See Connaughton, supra note 299, at 2B
("[I]t is doubtful that the Bestfoods case will be the final word.... There is simply too
much emotion and commotion surrounding environmental cases for courts to permit
deep-pocketed companies to walk away from a polluted site.").
308. See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 65, at 575 ("Congress, and not the courts,
should make the policy determination whether to create far-reaching exceptions to
the traditional rule of non-liability for asset purchasers."); Brown, supra note 22, at
842 ("Resistance to a Congressional amendment would no doubt come from corpora-
tions. Corporations would argue that a Congressional amendment would alter the
traditional corporate law notion of limited liability because it would provide for par-
ent liability beyond the amount the parent invested in the subsidiary corporation.");
Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 488-89 ("[T]hrowing away decades of past precedent
... is surely usurping legislative power. The decision that it is no longer necessary to
pierce the corporate veil, or obey past precedent ... should come not from the judi-
cial branch, but from a thoroughly debated congressional mandate changing CER-
CLA's statutory language.").
309. Kass & McCarroll, supra note 214 (describing Bestfoods as having "brought
some precision and balance to the task of determining under what circumstances a
corporate parent may be charged with liability as an operator"); Lash, supra note 302
(asserting that Bestfoods provides direction to lower courts).
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addressed by the 105th Congress,310 none of the proposed amend-
ments offer a solution to these issues.31 1
A. The Indirect "Owner" Liability Problem:
Veil-Piercing Standards
The Supreme Court acknowledged that its decision failed to estab-
lish whether federal or state veil-piercing standards should govern
traditional, indirect parental liability. Because the parties to the litiga-
tion had not raised the issue, the Court ducked the question. Perhaps
the Court felt justifiably constrained to remain silent as this question
was not in dispute. The Court's silence, however, means that an im-
portant ambiguity continues to exist. Whether the interest in defer-
ring to state corporate law outweighs the government's and parties'
interest in uniformity is a difficult question with serious ramifications.
The Supreme Court's silence on this issue requires Congressional gui-
dance as to whether state or federal veil-piercing should be the gov-
erning rule and, if a federal standard applies, what the contours of that
federal standard should be. Congressional rule-making should ad-
dress these issues after a full study of the differences among existing
judicial tests and an analysis of the ramifications that different ap-
proaches may have on the assessment of liability.
B. The Direct "Operator" Liability Standard:
Definitional Problems
More problematic than the ambiguity as to veil-piercing law is the
Supreme Court's failure to delineate what types of "relationships" be-
tween parent and subsidiary would justify labeling the parent as the
310. Congress entered discussions on Superfund reform somewhat optimistically.
See Superfuid Negotiators Express Optimism, Cong. Green Sheets, Aug. 5th, 1997, at
18 ("Despite some initial indications of difficulty in House Committee talks, negotia-
tors on both sides of the Hill and at the Environmental Protection Agency express
optimism at prospects for Superfund reform in the 105th Congress."). Such reform
has not occurred, however, due to conflicts over liability issues, Brownfields redevel-
opment concerns, and fiscal debates. Some have noted Congress's relative inaction in
the environmental arena, sparking concern over Congress's ability to handle the
range of environmental perspectives and problems with which it is faced. See Fortm:
Whatever Happenned to Congress?, Envtl. Forum, May/June 1998, at 36, 36.43 (pro-
viding various perspectives on Congress's role).
311. The 105th Congress is considering a number of legislative proposals to
reauthorize or reform CERCLA and Superfund. The two most oft-cited bills that
Congress has considered are: S.8, 105th Cong. (1998); and, H.R. 2727, 105th Cong.(1998). In addition, a number of other Senate bills-such as S. 1497, 105th Cong.
(1998), S. 18, 105th Cong. (1998), and S. 1317, 105th Cong. (1998)-and House bills-
such as H.R. 873, 105th Cong. (1998), H.R. 990, 105th Cong. (1998), H.R. 1120, 105th
Cong. (1998), H.R. 1195, 105th Cong. (1998), H.R. 1206, 105th Cong. (1998), H.R.
1392, 105th Cong. (1998), H.R. 2750, 105th Cong. (1998), H.R. 3000, 105th Cong.
(1998), H.R. 3262, 105th Cong. (1998), H.R. 3595, 105th Cong. (1998), and H.R. 4227,
105th Cong. (1998)-also propose changes to various aspects of CERCLA. Yet, none
of these bills address the issue of parent liability.
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direct "operator" of its subsidiary's facility.312 The Supreme Court
openly acknowledged the "difficulty [that] comes in defining actions
sufficient to constitute direct parental 'operation,"' 313 a difficulty ex-
acerbated by the "uselessness of CERCLA's definition of a facility's
'operator .. ..,"314 The "uselessness" that the Court bemoaned stems
from CERCLA's definition of an "owner or operator" of a facility as
"any person owning or operating such facility."31 5 The obvious circu-
larity of this definition forced the Court to define "operate" by refer-
ence to popular dictionaries.316 While not an unprecedented source
for definitional authority,317 this approach does not provide a specific,
technical and tailored definition of the range of activities that may
give rise to a parent's unwanted reclassification as an "operator" of a
facility.318
Using broad language susceptible to varying interpretations, the
Court attempted to offer some guidance in this area:
[U]nder CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who directs the
workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility. To
sharpen the definition for purposes of CERCLA's concern with en-
vironmental contamination, an operator must manage, direct, or
conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, opera-
tions having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous wastes,
or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.
319
This definition is problematic in two important ways which the
Court itself acknowledged. Verbs such as "manage," "direct," and
"conduct" include a variety of activities. A range of practices may be
subsumed under these broad categories, and there is very little gui-
dance as to which or what combination of them might trigger liability.
312. This difficulty mirrors the problem previously encountered by lower courts
when they attempted to depart from traditional veil-piercing and adopt standards of
direct liability. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 42, at 110 ("The judiciary's failure to iden-
tify particular activities justifying imposition of direct liability under CERCLA has
made articulating a defensible approach to parent corporation liability difficult.").
313. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998).
314. Id.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994).
316. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887 (reviewing definitions of "operate" derived
from popular dictionaries).
317. See id. Indeed, the Court cited its own precedent in Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995), to justify such reliance. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1187.
318. Not surprisingly, this was one of the most difficult issues probed at the
Bestfoods oral arguments. See Justices Hear Arguments on "Operator" Liability for
Parent Corporations, Mealey's Litig. Reps.: Superfund, April 6, 1998, at 3. Justice
Antonin Scalia, in his attempts to clarify the definitional issue, stated:
What is magic about the word "operate"? I don't know what there is about
the word that makes it different from any other statute. I worry that any
standard we apply to this statute ought to be applied to any statute. We
normally think that if the subsidiary is operating it, the parent is not operat-
ing it, absent some veil-piercing situation.
Id. (quoting from oral argument in Bestfoods, (No. 97-454)).
319. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887.
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On the other hand, extremely detailed guidance is not practical given
the wide variety of corporate management practices and the inability
of a court to create a one-size-fits-all rule applicable as a fool proof
handbook on corporate governance and organization.
The Court acknowledged that when CERCLA used the term "oper-
ate," it "obviously meant something more than mere mechanical acti-
vation of pumps and valves."32 The Court proffered that operation
involves "exercise of direction over the facility's activities."'32 Im-
plicit in this, however, is the conduct that falls between "mechanic[s]"
and "direction." Unfortunately, the Court made no foray into that
realm, and, thus, its opinion offers little concrete definition of the
scope of permissible involvement.
Another problem that the court also acknowledged exacerbates this
definitional difficulty. Parents will, by definition and law, always have
some involvement in the affairs of their subsidiaries-involvement
that will, at least indirectly, affect the facilities owned by those subsidi-
aries. Thus, in making a parent directly liable as an "operator," it is
crucial to distinguish "the normal relationship between parent and
subsidiary"3 from the more involved relationship that would
recharacterize a parent as an "operator." As the Court itself admit-
ted, it is a "critical question" 3" to determine whether the parent's in-
volvement at the relevant facility was normal or "eccentric." 324 The
Court offered no guidance on this issue, and this is the primary factual
question remanded for district court review.325
Hence, the second major problem with the Bestfoods decision is
that the Court's provisions for direct parental liability suffer from am-
biguity that the Court itself recognized but did not remedy. This in-
definiteness is problematic in that it offers little guidance to parent
companies who seek clarity as to the scope of their potential liability.
Litigation can be expected in the wake of this ambiguous definition
because CERCLA liability is a high stakes proposition.3 26 The ambi-
guity provides an incentive for litigation,327 for both the regulators
320. Id at 1889.
321. Id
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id
325. See id. at 1890. Specifically, the district court is charged with reviewing the
facts surrounding the parents' control of the contaminated facility through the activity
of its employees. See id. This deference to the lower court in making this difficult
decision has, in fact, been praised. See Kass & McCarroll, supra note 214 ("Justice
Souter's opinion is ... noteworthy for its sensible and proper deference to the fact-
finding role of the trial court.").
326. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (discussing far-reaching conse-
quence of CERCLA liability).
327. See Hottel & Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 181 (commenting, pre-Bestfoods, that
"[i]ncreased certainty in this area would bring about a much needed state of affairs:
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and the regulated, to convince district courts to adopt favorable
interpretations.328
Thus, the second question left open by the Supreme Court is how to
define "operator" in a clear, effective way. This substantial ambiguity
demands legislative intervention.329
C. The Direct "Operator" Liability Standard: Incentive Problems
The Court failed to weigh a third problem that arose in its scheme
for assessing direct liability. The Court correctly analyzed parental
liability in light of the parent's connection to the contaminated facility
rather than its connection to the subsidiary itself. This standard is use-
ful because it disregards artificially created barriers erected by use of a
particular corporate form. It looks, instead, to the actual activity of
the parent vis-A-vis the physical facility in question. The Court's ap-
proach more closely follows CERCLA's language330 and uses a func-
tional test to assign liability. This also advances CERCLA's remedial
goals by extending liability to a group of parents who, under a strict
veil-piercing model, might not be available to fund a clean-up.
This actual control test, however, might have a significant impact on
parental willingness to become involved in the operation of their sub-
sidiaries' facilities. Currently, the Court's rule penalizes parents who
operate facilities at which contamination occurs. The rule, though,
says nothing to the parents who should have or could have prevented
contamination of their subsidiaries' facilities but ducked liability by
distancing themselves from such operations. 331 To the extent that
Bestfoods, like direct liability cases before it, based liability on the
level of the parent's involvement in the environmental affairs of its
subsidiary, the decision gives parents strong incentives to disassociate
themselves from the activities of their subsidiaries.332 As long as the
decreased CERCLA litigation and more settlement of disputes, so that society can
direct resources to cleaning up contaminated sites").
328. But see Brostaff, supra note 299, at 32 (reporting the sentiment that the "deci-
sion should help stave off new litigation" (quoting John Arlington, Esq.)).
329. See Kass & McCarroll, supra note 214 ("[D]etermining direct operator liability
of a parent is still a very difficult exercise.").
330. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
331. See McKane, supra note 42, at 1681-82 (describing problems that arise with
parent corporations that are willfully ignorant).
332. Although most of the commentary in this area was written pre-Bestfoods, the
same parental involvement concerns that were raised in a direct liability scheme fo-
cusing on the parent-subsidiary relationship can be applied to the assessment of such
liability in the parent-facility context as established in Bestfoods. For discussions of
the ways in which direct liability rules may put parent corporations in an unenviable
Catch-22 situation when making decisions about involvement in their subsidiaries'
facilities, see Cooper, supra note 239, at 228 ("In theory, imposing liability is intended
to encourage parent corporations to pay more attention to the environmental compli-
ance of their subsidiaries. In effect, however, fear of CERCLA liability under a con-
trol theory may actually force parent corporations to distance themselves from their
subsidiaries' affairs."); Menell, supra note 9, at 409 ("[T]he doctrine of limited liability
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default rule remains unchanged-no liability for parents who do not
"operate" a subsidiary's facility but liability for those that do-the
prudent and logical advice for a parent corporation is to shun all un-
necessary involvement with their subsidiaries' facilities.33' This rule
biases investment decisions in favor of projects that pose excessive environmental
risks."); Newton, supra note 84, at 314 ("Corporate shareholders, officers, and lenders
encounter a threat of personal liability under CERCLA which they would not face
under tort law or traditional corporate law doctrine. These entities may develop a
hands-off approach to operations connected to hazardous sites in order to distance
themselves from potentially great liability under the Act." (citing Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1544 (W.D. Mich. 1989)); id. at 336 ("Most case law
continues to discourage beneficial involvement by those with the opportunity to par-
ticipate in hazardous waste decisions. Current standards for CERCLA liability pro-
mote the ignorance of shareholders, corporate officers, and lenders concerning
environmental operations and discourage involvement in corporate environmental
decision making."); Snook, supra note 83, at 438 ("[I]n environmental cases, courts
reward shareholder/directors for their complete noninvolvement with company mat-
ters. .. ."); Brown, supra note 22, at 847 (describing need to "prevent parent corpora-
tions from escaping liability by shielding themselves from any knowledge about their
subsidiary's disposal practices"); Chandler & Grosser, supra note 42, at 23 (fearing
that expanded liability "encourages corporate owners to focus on insulating them-
selves from the corporation's actions rather than taking steps to avoid polluting the
environment"); Crawley, supra note 1, at 243 ("The scope of the parent's involvement
in the acts of the subsidiary is a key factor in determining whether to hold the parent
corporation liable under a voluntary assumption of duty."); King, supra note 42, at
151 ("[A]Ithough the parent may be able to take some actions to abate the contami-
nation, it cannot because its further participation in the subsidiary's environmental
problems will exacerbate any defense the parent may have against liability. Instead,
the parent will seek to prevent liability, or mitigate its impact, through restructuring
its relationship with the subsidiary .... ); McKane, supra note 42, at 1664 ("[A]n
exercise of control approach also creates perverse incentives that impede the accom-
plishment of CERCLA's goals .... [A] parent corporation is more likely to be held
liable if it pays more attention to its subsidiary's activities.... This trigger of liability
discourages a parent from exercising supervision over a subsidiary, especially in envi-
ronmental matters."); Rallison, supra note 76, at 623 ("Although extending share-
holder liability may better serve CERCLA's remedial purpose ... it may also,
through unfair application, thwart the prospective purpose by tacitly encouraging
minimal disposal or clean-up efforts."); Wolfer, supra note 42, at 999 ("[l]t may be
desirable to hold a parent liable for the subsidiary's polluting acts if it becomes so
involved in the subsidiary's daily operations that it was in fact an operator within the
meaning of CERCLA. The opposing argument is that this will encourage a hands-off
approach to operating a subsidiary."); Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 29-30 ("[A]ny
exercise of control by the parent over a subsidiary's environmental compliance or
waste disposal activities significantly enhances the risk of parental liability, as does the
existence of procedures allowing a parent to approve or reject specific expenditures
related to waste disposal or other environmental matters ....").
333. A number of commentators have, in pre-Bestfoods assessments, offered de-
tailed advice on how a cautious parent should distance itself from its subsidiary and
ensure that its relationship will be sufficiently aloof to avoid liability. These strate-
gies, by and large, were written to advise parents on how to avoid liability when that
liability focused on the corporate relationship between parent and subsidiary rather
than on the functional relationship between parent and facility that is established in
Bestfoods. Nevertheless, the analogy is apt, and the advice is surprisingly consistent.
For example, Menell, supra note 9, states:
By adequately capitalizing the subsidiary, avoiding direct oversight of opera-
tions (especially hazardous waste decisions), ensuring proper record-keeping,
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not siphoning excessive funds from the subsidiary, and observing the corpo-
rate formalities of the subsidiary, the parent corporation would have a
strong claim to protection from creditors of the subsidiary corporation under
traditional veil-piercing doctrine.
Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added). Further, Worden, supra note 42, states:
[I]t is imperative that the parent minimize its exercise of control over those
affairs of the subsidiary which invite CERCLA scrutiny. The parent should
ensure that decisions regarding environmentally sensitive disposals and re-
leases are made by the subsidiary's officers or board .... The parent should
allow the subsidiary discretion when hiring or appointing those ... who will
make lower level decisions regarding the subsidiary's environmental con-
duct. The subsidiary ... should be vested with the authority to determine
the location of any such environmentally sensitive releases, and should be
allowed discretion to choose the manner [of disposal].... The parent should
avoid the temptation of forcing the subsidiary to request final approval of all
significant expenditures by the subsidiary for environmental purposes.
... [W]hen environmental clean-up becomes a concern, the parent should
entrust the subsidiary to determine the manner in which to contain the haz-
ardous or contaminated material. When it comes to coordinating the clean-
up efforts with government officials, the contact should be made by the
subsidiary.
Id. at 87. Similar guidance may be found in Snook, supra note 83, at 441. Snook
advises shareholders of a closely held corporation to do the following in an effort to
avoid CERCLA liability:
1. Avoid involvement with disposal decisions.
2. Do not use one's position as a shareholder to coerce the officers or direc-
tors of the company into making decisions, particularly with respect to haz-
ardous waste disposal.
3. To the extent possible, obtain excess personal liability or other insurance
that will cover environmental liability.
4. If state law permits, attempt to obtain indemnification from the corpora-
tion for any acts undertaken on the corporation's behalf as an officer or
director.
Id. Such expanded liability may also influence the nature of the advice that corporate
attorneys are now required to give their corporate clients.
IT]he recent expansion of environmental liability requires corporate lawyers
to broaden the range of factors that they consider in rendering legal advice
on corporate structure. The expansion of environmental liability requires
corporate lawyers to take an active role in devising strategies to prevent and
reduce environmental risks .... [B]oth professional and social responsibili-
ties require corporate lawyers to look beyond traditional risk-shielding strat-
egies in order to more effectively serve the interests of their clients and
communities.
Menell, supra note 9, at 401-02. However, Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 31, suggests
some potentially "safe" oversight that a parent might choose to exercise without risk-
ing liability:
A broadly-worded policy statement emphasizing the parent's commitment to
environmentally sound practices may reflect favorably on the parent in liti-
gation and is itself unlikely to be the basis of liability, so long as the policy's
implementation is left to the subsidiaries. ...
It is also useful to require that each subsidiary include a discussion regard-
ing its compliance with environmental regulations in its regular reporting to
its parent. While a court could draw inferences of control from this-or any
other-reporting requirement, that risk is outweighed by the value of such a
reporting requirement both as a means of focusing the subsidiary's attention
on the importance of environmental matters and demonstrating to the sub-
sidiary that the issue is important to the parent.
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might also induce parents to shed subsidiaries that pose financial
risk-a move that may have negative consequences for fiscal and envi-
ronmental responsibility.134 The Bestfoods court did little to address
this problem.
It would be over-simplistic to assume that Bestfood's expansion of
liability to parents operating subsidiaries' facilities will, automatically
or necessarily, lead to parental irresponsibility or raise the specter of
under-funded, irresponsible subsidiaries stumbling blindly from one
environmental crisis to another. Thus, before proceeding, it is essen-
tial to take a realistic look at five factors that will either prevent the
much-feared parental irresponsibility or mitigate its effects even with
an expanded rule allowing direct assessment of parental liability:
1. A parent corporation owns its subsidiary, either in whole or in
part. Thus, it has a natural financial interest in seeing its subsidi-
ary avoid the environmental wrongs that could, potentially, bank-
rupt the subsidiary and cost the parent its investment in the
subsidiary and its expectation of future earnings generated by the
subsidiary. This self-interest, if nothing else, should encourage a
parent to make efforts to prevent its subsidiary from incurring the
debilitating expense of CERCLA liability. If the parent corpora-
tion can-through advice, intervention or interaction-prevent an
environmental incident at its subsidiary's facility, it has a financial
incentive to do so regardless of the CERCLA rule.335
Id
334. See Farmer, supra note 42, at 804 ("[Plolicy-makers should reject adopting an
unlimited parent corporation liability approach because of the potential for negative
effects on the American economy and corporate structure. One particularly compel-
ling reason is the likelihood that industries with potentially high environmental liabili-
ties would splinter into smaller, less financially responsible firms."); Rallison, supra
note 76, at 620 ("[E]xpanding CERCLA's strict liability to shareholders may actually
encourage some shareholders to act irresponsibly. For example, a corporate share-
holder may well find that divestment, an impossibility for some corporations, is the
only way it can fully insure against liability.").
335. For example, Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42, suggest that to further the
goal of risk reduction, parent corporations should: "[1] institute procedures for moni-
toring on a regular basis the environmental activities of its subsidiaries .... [2]
[E]nsure the implementation of prudent hazardous substance handling procedures at
the subsidiary level .... [3] [R]equire environmental audits at the subsidiary level
before allowing a subsidiary to close any business acquisition or real estate transac-
tion." Id. at 468-69. This advice differs from that discussed earlier in this Article, see
supra note 332, which dealt with ways in which the parent can avoid responsibility for
contamination. The approach here tries to reduce the likelihood that such contamina-
tion will occur. As noted in King, supra note 42, at 152, protecting the parent's invest-
ment can be an effective vehicle for private monitoring of the subsidiary. Id.; see also
Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 31 ("Extensive control over a subsidiary's environmental
affairs can, of course, improve a subsidiary's environmental compliance and perhaps
prevent contamination that could require remediation."). For a similar assessment of
the parent's incentive to reduce the likelihood of harm, even at the cost of increasing
its likelihood of liability should such harm occur, see Oswald, Corporate Parent Lia-
bility, supra note 42, stating:
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The hard choice-or potential "lose-lose situation" 336-parents
face is between getting involved and thereby reducing the chances
of contamination versus adopting a hands-off approach which may
increase the chances of contamination, but which reduces the par-
ent's likelihood of responsibility.337 Regardless of which choice is
made, it should be noted that the parent corporation has a finan-
cial self-interest in avoiding a CERCLA claim arising at one of its
subsidiary's sites. This self-interest may motivate environmental
responsibility.
2. In a large, publicly-held corporation with huge subsidiaries, it may
be manageable for the subsidiary company to conduct the func-
tions necessary for maintaining effective environmental compli-
ance. A large subsidiary may itself have the necessary resources
for a full program of aggressive environmental compliance. While
this may not be true in a smaller corporate family with poorer
subsidiaries, in a large corporate enterprise the subsidiaries may
more effectively manage their own environmental affairs as they
are more familiar with their own needs. Thus, the subsidiary may
often be the party that can best fulfill CERCLA's objectives,
which include: "creating incentives for safe behavior by those
parties who possess the greatest knowledge about the risks associ-
ated with their wastes and who are in the best position to control
disposal decisions. '338 In situations such as these, a parent's dis-
tance from its subsidiary will not, by definition, always have a dev-
Of course, the best way to minimize the liability of the parent corporation is
to minimize the liability of the subsidiary. Even if the parent is successful in
avoiding liability itself, it nonetheless has a substantial investment in the sub-
sidiary which it undoubtedly wishes to protect. By instituting sound risk
management procedures at the subsidiary level, the parent can reduce the
likelihood that either it or its subsidiary will be held liable under the envi-
ronmental statutes.
Id. at 265. Menell, supra note 9, states: "[L]awyers recommending the adoption of
risk-insulating corporate structures may be ignoring, distracting attention from, or
miscounting important benefits of organizational restructurings that internalize envi-
ronmental risks. Changes in corporate structures and employee incentives that in-
crease oversight of environmental risks will reduce the expected costs of accidents
and regulatory compliance." Id. at 411-12.
336. Dadswell, Jr., supra note 42, at 487.
337. It is the upstreaming of these liabilities that may prove to be too expensive.
For a more optimistic "spin" on this potential, see Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 42,
at 468 ("[A] parent can acknowledge the possibility of direct liability and seek to
reduce the risk that hazardous waste disposal practices of its subsidiary could give rise
to CERCLA liability for both entities."); Crawley, supra note 1, at 262 ("[L]iability
may provide an incentive for corporations to voluntarily assume a greater role in pro-
tecting the environment."); id. at 263 ("Faced with potential liability for the environ-
mental transgressions of its subsidiaries, a parent corporation may choose to
implement a centralized program of environmental compliance designed to discover
and correct hazards before injury or harm occurs.").
338. Newton, supra note 84, at 338. But see Crawley, supra note 1, at 260 ("[A]
parent corporation likely may possess knowledge and experience superior to that of
its subsidiaries.").
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astating impact on the subsidiary's ability to maintain an effective
hazardous waste disposal program.
3. If a parent corporation owns all the stock in a subsidiary-or,
even a majority of the stock-it will have substantial control over
the selection and removal of the subsidiary's management through
the legitimate exercise of its voting rights. This should provide
some incentive for the management of the subsidiary to be careful
about environmental affairs.33 9 Thus, in a sense, the liability rule
chosen will not affect the manner in which parent corporations
may exercise control via voting and will offer incentives for the
subsidiary's management to behave in an environmentally respon-
sible way.34°
4. To the extent that a parent corporation and its subsidiary are
closely connected in the minds of the public, a serious environ-
mental misadventure at a subsidiary's facility may reflect poorly
on the parent. This will be true in terms of public relations costs,
negative publicity, backlash from investors, and other collateral
consequences of connection to a contaminated site owned by a
subsidiary. To have an impact on the parent, such an incident
would have to be large enough to inspire public attention, and the
parent's connection to the subsidiary would have to be well-publi-
cized. In addition, this will most likely apply only to large compa-
nies with a public identity. However, this may be an indirect
"check" on the most egregious forms of misbehavior," a check
unaffected by technical issues of legal liability.
5. Finally, any rule that expands liability may be a positive incentive
for corporations to develop new methods or technology for reduc-
ing the hazards of wastes or decreasing the generation of such
wastes. Because this new ruling expands liability, it may make
those in the position to incur new liability more likely to contrib-
339. See McKane, supra note 42, at 1646 ("Limited liability even reduces the parent
corporation's incentive to participate in management.... It does not, however, re-
duce the quality of the subsidiary's decisionmaking because the managers of a subsidi-
ary still have a strong incentive to perform well. If the subsidiary performs poorly,
some managers may lose their jobs.").
340. In addition, the subsidiary's management may fear that poor performance by
the subsidiary will have an impact on their job security, thus increasing incentives for
sound management.
341. For an example-albeit not a CERCLA example-of a classic environmental
case in which the sins of a subsidiary were visited on its parents in the venue of public
opinion, see Blumberg, supra note 42, at 334. Blumberg provides the following de-
scription of the notorious Exxon Valdez incident:
The Exxon Valdez environmental disaster resulted from the negligence of a
tanker subsidiary of an integrated international oil company. With public
indignation at a very high level, Exxon, the parent corporation, was con-
cerned with the impact of the catastrophe on consumer attitudes. Accord-
ingly, the parent corporation did not choose to contest its liability for the
negligence of its subsidiary.
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ute to solutions to the hazardous waste problem. Although not
guaranteed to happen, this potential beneficial side effect of a
more expansive liability rule should not be overlooked. This ex-
panded liability may be responsible for "promoting incentives for
new ideas and trends in safe disposal. 342
Hence, the negative impact that the Court's holding may have on a
parent's involvement in the subsidiary's environmental activities must
be viewed in the context of other incentives that do favor parental
involvement. It is true that the direct liability rule adopted by the
Court in Bestfoods runs the risk of placing parent corporations be-
tween the proverbial Scylla of incurring CERCLA liability and the
Charybdis of surrendering beneficial oversight of their subsidiary's ac-
tivities. At the same time, however, the impact of the rule may be less
problematic when the multiplicity of factors motivating corporate be-
havior are considered.
Therefore, as Congress attempts to solve this problem it should
avoid the temptation to follow either extreme view in the debate. It
should not eliminate direct liability in the hope that this is the only
way to encourage fearless parental assistance to subsidiaries. On the
other hand, Congress should also avoid indiscriminate expansion of
liability. A more balanced view is needed.
Assessing CERCLA liability against parents is so complex because
of an additional intractable problem: CERCLA's goal is fundamen-
tally different from that of all other major environmental statutes. It
is remedial rather than regulatory. 43 This dichotomy is problematic
342. Stevens, supra note 60, at 574. For an analogous argument in the context of
expanded liability for individual corporate officers, see Cronk & Huddleston II, supra
note 97, at 688-89 ("The most environmentally favorable route that corporate officers
could take in response to personal liability is the route leading to technological ad-
vances in waste disposal. . . . Personal liability may very well be the mother of
reform.").
343. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985) (rec-
ognizing that "CERCLA is not a regulatory standard-setting statute such as the Clean
Air Act.... Rather, [under CERCLA] the government generally undertakes pollu-
tion abatement, and polluters pay for such abatement through tax and reimbursement
liability."); see also Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Anal-
ogy to Products Liability & an Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 897, 900 (1992)
("RCRA is designed to address and regulate the primary behavior of those currently
and prospectively involved in the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, and
disposal of hazardous wastes. By contrast, the liability provisions of CERCLA are
predominantly retrospective and compensatory in nature."); Lynda J. Oswald, Bifur-
cation of the Owner & Operator Analysis Under CERCLA: Finding Order in the
Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 223, 229 (1994) (explaining that "CER-
CLA is a remedial statute... [that was] designed primarily to rectify environmental
problems posed by hazardous waste produced and abandoned in the past, rather than
operating prospectively to prevent future problems."); Oswald, supra note 6, at 585-86
("CERCLA is a remedial statute, designed to rectify the problems presented by haz-
ardous substances produced and abandoned in the past."); Oswald, Corporate Parent
Liability, supra note 42, at 244 ("CERCLA is a remedial statute, designed to rectify
environmental problems posed by hazardous waste produced and abandoned in the
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because it creates a scheme in which the interests of CERCLA may be
at odds with those found in other statutes. To date, CERCLA, and
the allocation of parental liability under it, has not been addressed in
context with a view to how CERCLA should be interpreted to ad-
vance the goals of the entire scheme of environmental regulation.
Most environmental regulatory3" statutes are proactive and seek to
prevent environmental harm from taking place. The vast majority of
environmental statutes are premised on the notion that their function
is to provide incentives for corporations to conduct themselves in en-
vironmentally responsible ways. Thus, these statutes can mandate de-
tailed regulation of the ways in which parents or subsidiaries act
precisely because they are designed to govern actions-present and
future. Through relatively sophisticated and complex regulatory
schemes, most environmental statutes set discharge standards, estab-
lish monitoring requirements, mandate record keeping, provide for
penalties, and create complex sets of regulations governing the con-
duct of potential polluters.345 The philosophy behind these statutes,
past. Liability under CERCLA, therefore, can be retroactive."); Oswald & Schipani,
supra note 42, at 264 ("RCRA's major failing, in Congress' eyes, was its prospective
outlook. RCRA addresses problems created by the current and future production
and storage of hazardous substances, but applies to past sites only to the extent that
they pose an imminent hazard."); Wallace, Jr., supra note 42, at 840 n.2 ("RCRA
provides prospective regulation of hazardous substances production, treatment, stor-
age, transport, and disposal; thus it applies only to substances disposal facilities in
operation. CERCLA, on the other hand, focuses on remedial and response activities
for substances generated and stored in the past."); Watson, supra note 65, at 286
("CERCLA is not only more remedial than most legislative enactments, it is arguably
the most remedial... since its controlling focus is to remedy the harmful effects of
previously disposed hazardous wastes . . ."); Steven M. Wheeler & Edward Z. Fox,
Avoiding Environmental Liabilities: A Priner for Business, 23 Ariz. St. L. 483, 488
(1991) ("CERCLA focuses on sites polluted from past actions as contrasted with
RCRA's emphasis on present hazardous waste management activities."); William
Scott Biel, Comment, Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers' Personal
Liability for Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage,
140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 241,262 (1991) ("The purpose of CERCLA is to ensure compensa-
tion of the government and private groups for the cost of hazardous waste cleanup,
not to punish decision-makers for past actions that violate current standards."); David
C. Clarke, Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Ap-
proach, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1300, 1300 (1990) ("CERCLA is a primarily remedial
statute.. . ."); Heidelberg, supra note 42, at 857 ("Unlike much of the environmental
legislation passed in the previous decade, CERCLA is not primarily a regulatory pro-
gram."); Poston, supra note 10, at 217 ("Most statutes operate prospectively. CER-
CLA, however, was enacted for the express purpose of addressing hazards caused by
past waste disposal practices.").
344. For purposes of this argument, the environmental statutes that may be consid-
ered "regulatory" include, but are not limited to the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996), the Federal Vater Pollution Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992
(1994 & Supp. II 1996), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp.
1996). In addition, many states have their own regulatory statutes that mimic these in
structure and mission.
345. The government's enforcement efforts have become significantly more aggres-
sive in recent years. For an overview of the E.P.A.'s 1996 enforcement initiatives, see
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and the enforcement efforts made pursuant to them, is that environ-
mental harm is often preventable. These statutes encourage (or,
viewed more negatively, coerce) regulated entities to take those ac-
tions that will best preserve environmental integrity. 346
Thus, if CERCLA were a regulatory statute, the difficult task would
be to define a regulatory allocation of parental responsibility that
would reduce the likelihood of environmental harm, mandate that ap-
proach, and assess penalties for noncompliance. Careful study and re-
view should clarify what type of corporate organization and conduct
best improve the environment, and the statute could be tailored to
foster such conduct.3 47 This conduct might include undergoing envi-
ronmental audits,348 hiring environmental consultants, providing em-
ployee training on environmental issues, offering incentives for
environmentally safe practices, instituting penalties for employee
carelessness, adopting corporate policies and guidelines for waste
management, institutionalizing commitment to safe disposal of haz-
ardous wastes, recycling wherever possible, and coordinating compli-
ance efforts within units of a corporate entity.349
Cheryl Hogue, Record $76.7 Million in Criminal Fines Leads EPA Accomplishments
for F' 1996, BNA Daily Env't Rep., Feb. 26, 1997, at D2 (reporting that E.P.A. initi-
ated 548 criminal cases in fiscal year 1996, filed 1186 administrative actions, took 1280
civil judicial actions, and conducted about 18,000 inspections).
346. See Valerie Ann Zondorak, A New Face in Corporate Environmental Respon-
sibility: The Valdez Principles, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1991) ("Environ-
mental laws and regulations force corporations to maintain a minimum level of
environmental responsibility. The threat of civil and criminal penalties ... is strong
incentive to meet federal and state standards . . ").
347. The prevailing view today seems to encourage fairly extensive oversight of
environmental practices. For example, Wheeler & Fox, supra note 343, state:
Because virtually nothing can be discharged into the environment without
some type of permit or detailed reporting and monitoring requirements, the
only way to minimize environmental risk is to first identify the specific busi-
ness activities that are regulated and then carefully evaluate the require-
ments and implications of the applicable regulatory programs.
Id. at 496; see also Oswald, Corporate Parent Liability, supra note 42, at 265 (encour-
aging "instituting procedures for periodic monitoring of environmental activities of
the subsidiary, implementing of sound environmental practices at the subsidiary level,
and requiring environmental audits before the subsidiary completes any business ac-
quisition or real estate transaction"); Noonan, supra note 42, at 751 (arguing that
"threat of liability should encourage parent corporations exerting managerial control
over their subsidiaries to implement safer, more effective procedures").
348. See Crawley, supra note 1, at 226-27 ("American businesses have shifted from
viewing environmental expenditures first as an 'expensive annoyance' to viewing
them as a normal 'cost of doing business,' and finally to viewing them as an 'essential
component' of a healthy corporate image. The best approach to minimizing environ-
mental risk involves an aggressive compliance program .... Often the best step in
such a program is the environmental audit."). For an early analysis of the benefits,
both environmental and business, of conducting environmental audits, see Courtney
M. Price & Allen J. Danzig, Environmental Auditing: Developing a "Preventive
Medicine" Approach to Environmental Compliance, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1189 (1986).
349. Analyses of the advantages of compliance efforts and the many and varied
ways corporate entities may increase compliance are beyond the scope of this Article.
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Alas, the task is not so straightforward when CERCLA is the stat-
ute at issue. Unlike most regulatory schemes, CERCLA's goal is not
to regulate ongoing or future conduct but to remedy past problems.
This fundamental distinction between CERCLA's goals and the goals
of other environmental statutes has not been addressed by the courts
in their analysis of parent liability.
In the vast majority of instances, CERCLA cases grapple with pa-
rental liability for past conduct.3 50 Thus, to the extent that CERCLA
looks backwards, it offers no opportunity for parents to change their
behavior based on the liability rule chosen. It is primarily the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), not CERCLA,
that controls ongoing disposal conduct. Some provisions of CERCLA
influence present conduct,"' and that influence should not be under-
estimated.352 As a general matter, however, CERCLA focuses on ret-
roactive liability rather than incentives to improve present conduct.353
350. See Hearings on H.R. 3000, supra note 36 (statement of Carol M. Browner,
Administrator, U.S. Env't Protection Agency) ("We estimate that over 90% of all
waste at National Priority List (NPL) sites is attributable to pre-1987 activity . ..
351. See Rallison, supra note 76, at 587-88. Rallison writes:
CERCLA aims to clean up existing hazardous waste sites. CERCLA's ef-
fect, however, is not merely remedial. Its liability provisions, in conjunction
with those of RCRA, provide significant incentives to current and future
waste producers, transporters, and disposal site owners and operators to
control the hazardous wastes they produce, transport, dispose of, or store.
CERCLA, therefore, works both to clean up existing hazardous waste sites
and discourage the irresponsible disposal of such waste in the future.
Id
352. For a thoughtful discussion and analogy to tort law as to how rules governing
past conduct may influence ongoing conduct, see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analy-
sis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1986), who states:
Although behavior prior to the rule change [in tort law] cannot be altered
after the fact, transition policy can nonetheless influence such behavior ex
ante .... [Flirms making initial construction and product design decisions
will have made earnings projections that took into account expected liabili-
ties .... Transition policy that exempts or otherwise gives relief to past
investments confers ... immunity. Thus, when the risk of tort liability de-
pends in important ways on the evolution of tort law.., the expectation that
future evolution in the law will be made applicable to harms arising... prior
to the announcement of new rules will have a desirable effect on behavior.
Id at 599-600.
353. See Green, supra note 343, at 901 ("To be sure, CERCLA does have a residual
deterrent role .... To the extent that RCRA and other statutes fail to control com-
pletely current disposal of hazardous substances, CERCLA liability, like tort liability,
should play a deterrent role .... Yet.... virtually all of CERCLA's current applica-
tion is to activity that occurred before it was enacted and which therefore could not
have been deterred by the statute."); Healy, supra note 42, at 85 ("Congress thus
intended to impose a new standard of care for hazardous substance disposal activities,
without addressing in detail the fact that this standard would be applied retroactively
in many cases."); Oswald, supra note 6, at 603 n.94 ("[Tlhe deterrent effect of strict
liability under CERCLA is limited by the retroactive nature of CERCLA liability.");
Hood, supra note 17, at 135 ("The chief culprit is the argument that strict liability for
parents will prevent them from organizing undercapitalized subsidiary corporations
for the purpose of engaging in environmentally risky activity. Considering that the
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This means that CERCLA's ability to affect current and future con-
duct has its limitations. 4 The task of creating rules that influence
current and future conduct should thus be undertaken primarily in the
other environmental statutes.
As a result, when legislating the parental liability rule for CER-
CLA, the issue of the incentive effects may be less significant than in
the context of regulatory statutes. While CERCLA's function is re-
medial, a rule must be designed that will advance the remedial goals
by making it relatively simple to hold responsible parents liable.
CERCLA requires a full search for parties who may be able to pay for
a cleanup that is in accord with solid principles. At the same time,
however, this remedial purpose must be advanced in such a manner
that does not encourage conduct which undermines the regulatory ef-
forts of other statutes. Thus, the approach that Congress takes to allo-
cate liability must concern itself with a number of potentially
conflicting goals in answering the third of the questions left unan-
swered after Bestfoods. The legislative approach outlined in the re-
mainder of this Article attempts to advance these goals, while
recognizing that they may be fundamentally at odds.355
VI. LEGISLATIVE ANSWERS TO THE BESTFOODS QUESTIONS
In crafting a legislative response to Bestfoods, the central goal is to
answer the three specific issues left unanswered by the Court's ruling:
(1) whether state or federal law should govern indirect liability via
veil-piercing; (2) how "operator" should be defined for purposes of
assessing direct liability; and (3) how the definition of "operator" may
shareholder conduct at issue in CERCLA cases is usually well in the past, this argu-
ment for strict liability falters.").
354. See Jerry Taylor, Salting the Earth: The Case for Repealing Superfund, Regula-
tion, 1995, at 53. Taylor states:
[I]t has been suggested that the very brutality of Superfund liability has
served as a vital deterrent to potential polluters. That ignores the fact, how-
ever, that Superfund focuses on past actions. The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act already dictates in minute detail the management of haz-
ardous wastes from cradle to grave and stipulates its own onerous set of
cleanup requirements for those that step out of line. Thus, Superfund proba-
bly does little to influence present corporate behavior.
Id. at 59.
355. For an earlier attempt to establish goals for a direct liability policy, see Aro-
novsky & Fuller, supra note 42, in which the authors state:
[A] parent corporation or an individual shareholder should be directly liable
as an "operator" under CERCLA... if that investor (1) has the capacity to
control the hazardous waste practices of a corporation, (2) has exercised the
means of such control, and (3) either has knowledge of the hazardous waste
practices of the corporation or has reason to know of those practices. This
standard is consistent with the language of CERCLA, promotes sound pub-
lic policy, and protects appropriate objectives of the doctrine of limited
liability.
Id. at 461.
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be best applied. However, it is also important to view these issues in
the context of other reforms to CERCLA's liability scheme since such
reforms may well affect how these solutions will play out.3 56 For ex-
ample, if the retroactive liability principle should be undone, the ques-
tion of incentive will become more important as fewer CERCLA
cases will involve conduct that took place long before the statute.
Likewise, if the joint and several liability scheme is altered, the
amount that might be recoverable from parents of relatively small
contributors will be less. This may make parents less fearful of risking
intervention in the affairs of subsidiaries because the stakes will be
lower. Thus, while this legislative proposal deals solely with parental
liability questions, the actual impact of the proposals may change
should any other changes in the liability landscape occur.35
The legislative response outlined below has two parts. The first ad-
dresses the question of indirect liability and the veil-piercing concern
left unanswered. The second grapples with the two far more complex
questions involving direct liability and its application .35  Before dis-
cussing the specifics of the proposal, it is important to begin with a
series of broad principles to guide legislative action in this area.
Although there are many worthwhile goals that might be valuable to
pursue, six principles are particularly crucial. These principles
include:
1. Ensuring that the liability scheme selected does not conflict with
(and, where possible, supports) the goals of other environmental
statutes which attempt to influence conduct by forward-looking
regulation.
2. Requiring parents who had culpable pasts vis- -vis their subsidiar-
ies to pay for the damage done by their subsidiaries' facilities,
while at the same time respecting traditional corporate law limits
on liability as much as possible.
3. Reviewing CERCLA to assess its potential prospective impact
and tailoring a prospective liability scheme based on that impact.
356. See Superfund Reauthorization Bills Wrestle with Municipal Liability, CRS Re-
ports, Solid Waste Report, March 19, 1998 (identifying liability issues as primary area
of contention in CERCLA reform efforts), available in 1998 WL 10097354.
357. Silecchia, supra note 49, identifies the potential issues for debate in CERCLA
reauthorization as:
retroactive liability; alterations of the "joint and several liability" scheme;
liability exemptions for some small polluters; Brownfield's redevelopment
initiatives; administrative reforms to reduce Superfund transaction and liti-
gation costs; insurance liability debates; caps on sites added to the NPL; lim-
its on the amount of wildlife restoration awards against PRPs; significant
federalism questions governing the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states in handling Superfund matters; and the ever-present
budgetary debates, to name but a few.
Id at 389-90.
358. See Oswald, supra note 343, at 227.
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4. Retaining a focus on the actions of the parent corporation in the
actual operation of the facility rather than on its formal legal or
financial relationship to the subsidiary.
5. Ensuring that the ability of the government to find funds to clean
up hazardous waste sites is not unduly hampered by overly restric-
tive liability rules that shield responsible parties who should be
assisting in cleanups.
6. Clarifying the corporate activity that could give rise to liability so
that parent corporations and the government are clear as to the
applicable standards, and, thus, unnecessary litigation can be
reduced.
It is in light of these six principles that Congress should do its work.
A. Creating a Sound Standard for Indirect "Owner" Liability
The first task for Congress is to clarify the veil-piercing standard
that should apply to assessing vicarious liability against a parent cor-
poration. Clearly, veil-piercing should continue to be available as a
way to assess liability against parents, albeit derivatively. There is
nothing in the nature of hazardous waste clean-up that makes it so
different from other liabilities that veil-piercing would be an inappro-
priate remedy should a parent abuse the corporate form.359 The cen-
tral question is whether that standard should be a federal or state one.
The interest in uniformity is strong,360 and courts that adopt a fed-
eral standard raise justifiable concerns about ensuring consistency and
guarding against forum-shopping, inequity, and outcomes that may
vary based not on liability but merely on geographic location. Never-
theless, Congress should endorse traditional state veil-piercing stan-
dards rather than the adaptation of a federal standard.361
The primary reason behind this conclusion is that using state stan-
dards respects the traditional notion that CERCLA does not displace
the common law, it incorporates it.362 Adopting a state standard re-
spects this underlying presumption of CERCLA. Also, applying state
veil-piercing law best respects the expectations of parents and subsidi-
aries who rely on a long tradition of state law as the applicable rule.
359. See Oswald, supra note 343, at 281-82 ("Neither the Act's statutory language
nor public policy considerations dictate that piercing in the CERCLA context should
differ from piercing in any other context .... Rather, the question should be whether
the parent would be held liable for any liability of the subsidiary, whether environ-
mental in nature or not.").
360. See supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text. But see Richard G. Dennis,
Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders Under CERCLA: The Case for
Adopting State Law, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 1367, 1446-47 (1991) (arguing against reading
intent for uniformity into CERCLA's legislative history).
361. See Dennis, supra note 360, at 1512 (providing an argument in support of using
a state standard).
362. See id. at 1447 (describing congressional intent to defer to state law on a
number of still open issues).
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These parties make decisions and take risks on the basis of expecta-
tions generated by state law. To the extent possible, these expecta-
tions should be honored.
In addition, state common law in this area is far better developed
than its federal counterpart. A well-developed body of law is essential
for ensuring that there is clarity and straightforward understanding of
the parameters of permissible parental conduct. Common law on this
issues in the states has had decades to develop. Federal common law,
by contrast, is much less developed, which fosters precisely the ambi-
guity and uncertainty that is likely to lead to inconsistent outcomes
and further litigation.363
While the interest in uniformity should not be disregarded, and
while a state-specific approach may, concededly, give rise to some oc-
casions in which inconsistent outcomes will result, this risk is accepta-
ble. The variations that result from differing state veil-piercing
standards may well be replaced by the variations resulting from differ-
ing circuit standards as separate circuits try to create a body of federal
veil-piercing law.31' Such a process would take years to become as
well-articulated as state standards, resulting in much variety, particu-
larly in the early years. The notion that a federal common law will be
applied consistently is overly optimistic. Hence, if there is to be varia-
tion, it should, at the very least, respect expectations and provide a
greater level of predictability.
More importantly, many of the cases and commentators advocating
a federal standard out of concern over state-to-state inconsistency
were operating under the presumption that there might be only one
avenue of assessing liability-the indirect, vicarious way. If veil-pierc-
ing were the only way under which a parent could be held liable, then
the need for uniformity would be greater. Bestfoods and this legisla-
tive proposal, however, envision a second alternative-a uniform fed-
eral standard for direct "operator" liability. This federal statute, if
enacted, is likely to become the primary means of imposing parental
liability. This will operate against a backdrop of state veil-piercing
standards that will act only as a supplement to direct liability, but is
unlikely to serve as the primary tool for recovery against parents.
The language of CERCLA, therefore, should be amended to clarify
that when derivative veil-piercing is the basis of a parent's liability, it
should be done in accord with established principles of state law.
Congressional clarification of this might prompt various states to
study and reevaluate their veil-piercing standards. This is well within
the states' prerogative. However, the contours of veil-piercing law
363. Id. at 1510 ("[Njew federal rules of liability would create a tremendous
amount of confusion and uncertainty .... ").
364. Id. at 1466 ("[Tlhe search for a uniform rule of piercing the corporate veil
under CERCLA is likely to be frustrated by the diversity of the twelve circuit courts,
as well as by the equitable nature of the remedy.").
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should remain within the control of the states, leaving federal law to
grapple with its proper role: establishing a sound standard for direct
liability.
B. Creating a Sound Standard for Direct "Operator" Liability
In articulating the way in which a parent corporation may be liable
as the "operator" of a facility, the legislature must first craft a clear
definition of what it means for a parent to "operate" a facility and
then determine how to apply that definition in a way that is consistent
with CERCLA's remedial goals and with the environmental improve-
ment goals of the regulatory statutes.
The first task is outlining a definition of "operating" that provides
sufficient clarity and retains the Bestfoods focus on the relationship
between the parent and the facility rather than the one between the
parent and the subsidiary. Ideally, the test should be a functional one
that determines who controlled the operations of the affected site by
assessing the central features of "operate" and clearly delineating
them in the statute.
Fortunately, Congress is not without guidance in creating a more
detailed definition. Rather, Congress can borrow from recent amend-
ments it made to CERCLA which clarified the scope of lender liabil-
ity. The debate surrounding the extent to which lenders should be
liable for the hazardous wastes found on sites they held was a fierce
one. Like the debate over parental liability, courts were not able to
resolve that debate effectively without legislative intervention. 36s
Although the intricacies of that debate are beyond the scope of this
365. The notorious decision in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550,
1557-59 (11th Cir. 1991), which created the confusing "capacity to influence" test for
lenders, helped bring the dispute to a head and forced non-judicial intervention. First,
the EPA attempted to respond to Fleet Factors by issuing a final rule. National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under CER-
CLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,345-46 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). This
attempted to offer some standards that offered a bit of protection to lenders and se-
cured creditors. Id. at 18,344. This was an unsuccessful effort, however, and in Kelley
v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C. Circuit vacated the EPA's rule. Id. at
1109. It found, in essence, that the EPA had usurped the role of the courts by ruling
on CERCLA liability issues. Id. at 1107-08. The court also found that the EPA was
venturing into Congressional turf by impermissibly promulgating a "quasi-legislative
effort to implement the statute." Id. at 1108. Following this loss, the EPA reissued the
rule. However, rather than calling it a rule, the EPA released it in the form of a
September 22, 1995, "Policy Memorandum," that stated the enforcement policy that
the EPA and DOJ intended to pursue in this area when they exercised their discre-
tion. Nonetheless, this offered still-tenuous and uncomprehensive guidance, and it led
to the tender liability amendments discussed in the text that follows. For further dis-
cussion of this legislative-administrative-judicial wrangling, see Ben A. Hagood, Jr.,
Congress Clarifies Lender Liability for Polluted Property, 8 S.C. Law. 24, 24-27 (1997);
Joseph M. Macchione, Comment, Lender Liability Under CERCLA in Light of the
Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996:
Does the Act Spell Lender Relief or Continued Heartburn?, 16 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech.
J. 81, 83-92 (1997).
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Article,366 what resulted from it were the lender liability amendments,
formally known as the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and De-
posit Insurance Protection Act.367 In these amendments, Congress
defines what it means for a lender to "participate in management" of
a facility.36 Although the interests of lenders and parents are differ-
ent, the analogy is apt.36 9 In addition, while "participate in manage-
ment" is semantically different from "operate," the definition used for
"participate in management" in the lender liability context is quite
helpful in defining what it means to "operate" in the parental sense.
Specifically, Congress should include the following language-
taken directly from the lender liability standard-and establish that
for a parent to be considered an operator, it must be a parent who:
a. Is "actually participating in the management or operational affairs
of [the] vessel or facility;"37 AND EITHER
b. "[E]xercises decision making control over the environmental
compliance related to the vessel or facility, such that the person
has undertaken responsibility for the hazardous substance han-
dling or disposal practices related to the vessel or facility;" 371 OR
c. "[E]xercises control at a level comparable to that of a manager of
the vessel or facility, such that the person has assumed or mani-
fested responsibility-
[i] for the overall management of the vessel or facility encom-
passing day-to-day decision making with respect to environ-
mental compliance;
366. A full discussion of recent developments in the Lender Liability Amendments
can be found in Hottel & Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 170-73. The lender liability
amendments are discussed more fully in Macchione, supra note 365; Lawrence J.
Sheh, Comment, Lender Liability and the Corporate Veil: An Analysis of Lenders as
Shareholders Under CERCLA, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 687 (1998).
367. These lender liability amendments were part of the Omnibus Consolidatated
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1995) (codified at
various sections throughout U.S.C.).
368. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F) (Supp. II 1996).
369. Indeed, this comparison has been drawn before. See Sheh, supra note 366, at
710-11 (describing similarities between liability concerns of shareholders and corpo-
rate parents and lenders). Sheh explains that:
[A]n investigation into "owner" liability for lenders is similar to conducting
the test for piercing the corporate veil with respect to shareholders and par-
ent companies .... Thus, imposing liability on lenders under an -owmer"
theory is necessarily similar to piercing the corporate veil based on mere
ownership of an interest in the corporation.
Id. at 712.
370. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(i)(I).
371. Id. § 9601(20)(F)(ii)(I).
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[ii] over all or substantially all of the operational functions372 . . .
of the vessel or facility other than the function of environmen-
tal compliance. 3 73
This borrowed definition has several features to recommend it.
First, and most importantly, it is more specific than the Bestfoods defi-
nition of operation and, thus, offers greater guidance to the regulated
community by outlining a specific set of activities that constitute "op-
eration." While no definition can foresee all potential activities at a
facility, this one delineates a number of activities in more detail than
Bestfoods. This will be helpful to the regulated community as well as
to the courts that may be called upon to work with this definition.
The focus on the facility places the emphasis where it should be. It
forces courts to inquire into the actual process of environmental deci-
sion making. This is consistent with Bestfoods' and CERCLA's focus
on environmental protection and not on semantic or technical ques-
tions of corporate form. Thus, a corporate parent who, in fact, oper-
ates will not be able to claim otherwise just because-in theory-it
and its subsidiary are legally separate.
In addition, although parents and lenders have differing interests
and roles, there is a distinct advantage in using one definition for both.
Having a consistent definition for "operation" and "management" for
both classes may foster faster development of a consistent body of
case law as both lenders and parents seek to clarify ambiguities. This
will advance the goal of predictability and consistency as cases begin
to build on each other from a solid foundation that will not require
courts or parties to draw complex analogies between differing
provisions.
The definition is not a perfect one. It will take time for the precise
meaning of the definition to become apparent since the language still
372. "Operational function" is further defined as including "a function such as that
of a facility or plant manager, operations manager, chief operating officer, or chief
executive officer." Id. § 9601(20)(G)(v).
373. Id. § 9601(20)(F)(ii)(II). In the text of the statute, Congress explicitly drew a
distinction between the "operational functions" of a facility and the "financial or ad-
ministrative functions" of the facility. Compare id. § 9601(20)(G)(v) (defining "Oper-
ational function" as one of a "facility or plant manager, operations manager, chief
operating officer, or chief executive officer"), with id. § 9601(20)(G)(ii) (defining "Fi-
nancial or administrative function" as one of a "credit manager, accounts payable
officer, personnel manager, comptroller, or chief financial officer, or a similar func-
tion"). Congress stated that the latter would not constitute participation in manage-
ment. Congress should retain this distinction so that the focus continues to be a
functional focus on activities rather than on the more attenuated issues of finance or
administration. To some extent, the three types of functions-activities, finance, and
administration-are intertwined. For example, a parent who controls financial func-
tions and allocates no budgetary authority for environmental compliance efforts has
affected the functioning or malfunctioning of the operational functions. However,
this is not particularly problematic since the first option-decision making with re-
spect to environmental compliance-would cover that circumstance.
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remains necessarily broad.374 In addition, it is also necessary to clarify
the way in which the terms "manage" and "operate" may differ"15 and
to work toward consistency so that the two definitions are uniform.37 6
Furthermore, Congress must determine whether there should be ex-
clusions from the definition. The Lender Liability Act specifies par-
ticular types of parental intervention that do not constitute
participation in management. 3 " Many of those exclusions do not
neatly apply to the parental context where the issue of operation is
simpler. In the context of parental liability, the definition of opera-
tion should exclude two types of activities from the law governing
what it means for a parent to "operate." The two activities that
374. This ambiguity has been criticized by those critiquing the lender relief legisla-
tion. See Macchione, supra note 365, at 106 (stating that this definition "may prove
marginally useful. Because the list provides only extreme examples of 'participation,'
its usefulness is questionable at best").
375. A review of dictionary definitions for "manage" and "operate" indicates some
differences in the way in which those two terms are commonly understood, as well as
some circularity. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1372 (1986) (de-
fining "manage" as "to control and direct" and "to direct or carry on business or
affairs, supervise, administer"); id. at 1580-81 (defining "operate" as "exert power or
influence" and "to manage and put or keep in operation whether with personal effort
or not").
376. Anticipating this problem, Macchione, supra note 365, writes:
Another foreseeable problem with the list is its use of ecumenical terms and
phrases such as control "comparable to that of a manager" or overall man-
agement "encompassing day-to-day decision-making" or "assumed or mani-
fested responsibility" over "substantially all" operational functions. Use of
such language brings to light numerous questions.
Id at 106 (footnotes omitted).
377. Specifically, the new lender laibility provision of CERCLA provides:
[The term "participate in management" does not include-
(I) holding a security interest or abandoning or releasing a security
interest;
(II) including in the terms of an extension of credit, or in a contract or
security agreement relating to the extension, a covenant, warranty, or
other term or condition that relates to environmental compliance;
(III) monitoring or enforcing the terms and conditions of the extension of
credit or security interest;
(IV) monitoring or undertaking 1 or more inspections...
(V) requiring a response action or other lawful means of addressing the
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance... ;
(VI) providing financial or other advice or counseling in an effort to miti-
gate, prevent, or cure default or diminution in the value of the vessel
or facility;
(VII) restructuring, renegotiating, or otherwise agreeing to alter the terms
and conditions of the extension of credit or security interest... ;
(VIII) exercising other remedies that may be available under applicable law
for the breach of a term or condition of the extension of credit.. ;
or
(IX) conducting a response action under section 9607(d) of this title ....
if the actions do not rise to the level of participating in management (within
the meaning of clauses (i) and (ii)).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv) (Supp. II 1996).
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should not constitute "operation" and, thus, not create parental liabil-
ity are:
(1) any activities at the facility in question that were solely in re-
sponse to an emergency that threatened human health or the environ-
ment as long as that response was undertaken in accord with
applicable laws; or
(2) receiving information or reports from the facility that were dis-
closures required as a matter of law.
These two exceptions ensure that a parent will not be deemed as
operating a facility merely as a result of intervening to prevent a seri-
ous harm or as a result of conducting any minimal monitoring re-
quired by environmental, corporate, or securities laws. These
exclusions may require occasional refinement, but they should only
include activities that involve lawfully conducted emergency actions or
actions that fulfill legal supervisory obligations.
This proposed definition fleshes out the vague rubric proposed by
the Supreme Court so that the contours of "operation" in the parental
capacity become clearer. The more difficult part of the challenge
comes in legislating how this definition should be applied so that it
achieves the set of six legislative goals outlined above. 78
Adopting the "operate" definition outlined above will expand lia-
bility beyond the veil-piercing rule. Without unduly expanding corpo-
rate liability, it will allow courts to reach into parental pockets where
veil-piercing might not. This furthers the remedial goals of CERCLA.
At the same time, however, the definition should not be applied in a
way that creates a negative incentive for current or future environ-
mental behavior. The only way to achieve these potentially inconsis-
tent goals is to apply the definition differently when the liability
involves past conduct versus when it applies to present or future
conduct.
When the litigation concerns activities that occurred solely in the
past, there is little concern for incentives. The goal in past-action
cases should be to apportion liability in a way to achieve a goal that is
solely remedial. The definition outlined above can be applied to past
conduct by simply looking at the parent's relationship to the subsidi-
ary at the time of the activity in question. If the parent played a role
that met the definition of operator at the time of contamination, then
it should be liable as such. If its actions did not rise to that level, then
it should not be liable unless and until the alternative veil-piercing
standard is met. There are many advantages of applying the definition
in this way. Primarily, it is consistent with CERCLA's goals. If a par-
ent operated a subsidiary's facility, then it should be liable for the
clean up. The definition of operate is not so draconian as to capture
378. See supra pp. 189-90.
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innocent actors-it requires fairly substantial involvement at a level
parents are not likely to achieve inadvertently
The proposed definition may undermine some parents' liability ex-
pectations to the extent they relied on a strict veil-piercing standard.
Yet, a functional analysis that solely examines the parents' conduct
would require even the most indignant parent to acknowledge-pri-
vately, if not on the record-that the conduct in which it engaged did
meet the lay definition of operation. To the extent that there is an
element of shattered expectations in this definition, it is less so than
the change in expectations caused by the retroactive nature of CER-
CLA as a whole. The nature of a remedial statute and the principle
that one's past deeds can result in liability that was not previously
apparent are both concepts with which the regulated community
should be familiar.
In solely addressing past conduct, the question of incentives is irrel-
evant. Hence, the definition can be freely applied in reviewing past
conduct to discern the nature of the parent-facility relationship with-
out worrying that the definition will provide incentives for misconduct
or a "hands-off" approach. Certainly, the older the conduct, the
harder it will be to undertake the factual inquiry needed to determine
the true nature of the parent-facility relationship. Evidentiary ques-
tions aside, applying this rule to past conduct requires a straightfor-
ward review of conduct that can no longer be modified.
The more difficult issue is the application of the rule to continuing
conduct, since in such situations the issue of incentives is more impor-
tant. First, the effective date of the new definition must be ascer-
tained. Second, the legislature must be willing to follow a different
definition for conduct that occurs on or after that date. Persuading
Congress may be difficult because it will mark a departure from CER-
CLA's general scheme that regards past, present and future conduct
in the same light. However, once Congress is willing to make that
distinction, the next task is to discern how to apply the definition of
"operator" to the conduct of parents on or after the effective date of
the new rule. The basic structure of the definition should be main-
tained, but with several modifications to ensure that it will not unduly
encourage parents to adopt a hands-off approach. As explained
above,3 79 there are factors that will mitigate or neutralize the impact
of any liability rule on parental conduct. In addition, other regulatory
statutes-primarily RCRA-are available to regulate the ongoing op-
eration of facilities.3"
379. See supra pp. 181-84.
380. For a fuller discussion, see Geltmnan, supra note 42, at 408-12 (analyzing share-
holder liability for hazardous waste disposal under CERCLA, RCRA, state statutes,
contractual theories, securities laws, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization Act).
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However, to the extent that current and future conduct will be af-
fected by this new definition, Congress should apply the same defini-
tion and supplement it with a statutory "carrot" and "stick" to
encourage parental intervention. 8' The "carrot" could be a system,
used in other environmental enforcement contexts, in which the par-
ent who voluntarily engaged in oversight of a subsidiary's facility
would be treated more leniently in the event of an environmental inci-
dent.382 Reduced penalties for violations that become apparent as a
result of voluntarily undertaken conduct exist in many other areas of
environmental enforcement. 83 There, it is recognized that engaging
in environmentally beneficial conduct not otherwise required-for ex-
ample, conducting audits, or voluntarily reporting oneself-can have
negative consequences on a corporation which may cause the corpora-
tion to avoid such conduct. Thus, in making decisions to prosecute 38 4
381. The task here is to strike that delicate balance that will result in the exact
amount of parental oversight that is optimal. For a discussion of the difficulty in do-
ing so, see Dent, Jr., supra note 61, at 178 ("To absolve those who are negligent gives
rise to too many accidents and excessive engagement in risky activities. To impose
liability on those who are prudent, however, promotes excessive caution, underutiliza-
tion of desirable activities, and inadequate spreading of costs. The proper goal is
reasonable prudence.").
382. See generally Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure:
Developing Sound Policies for Environmental Compliance Programs, 7 Fordham
Envtl. L.J. 583 (1996) (discussing various ways in which voluntary compliance efforts
yield legal benefits to those who make them); Sean J. Bellew & Daniel T. Surtz, Com-
ment, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A Corporate Guide to Avoiding
Liability, 8 Vill. Envtl L.J. 205 (1997) (explaining corporate options for reducing the
risk and consequences of violations).
383. See, e.g., infra note 384 (discussing EPA and Department of Justice ("DOJ")
policies that recommend reduced penalties in certain circumstances); see also supra
note 382 (citing sources that discuss the effects of voluntary compliance efforts).
384. For example, the EPA issued a policy outlining the favorable light in which it
would view efforts at voluntary self-policing when making decisions as to which cases
to recommend for prosecution. See EPA, Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Fed. Reg.
66,706 (1995). The final policy statement established that the EPA will "generally not
recommend criminal prosecution" of those who police themselves "through an envi-
ronmental audit" in which they discover a violation or through "an objective, docu-
mented, systematic procedure or practice reflecting the regulated entity's due
diligence in preventing, detecting, and correcting violations." Id. at 66,711. Similarly,
the DOJ policy establishes that a DOJ decision to prosecute may be mitigated if the
target can answer the following questions affirmatively:
Was there a strong institutional policy to comply with all environmental re-
quirements? Had safeguards beyond those required by existing law been
developed and implemented to prevent noncompliance from occurring?
Were there regular procedures, including internal or external compliance
and management audits, to evaluate, detect, prevent and remedy circum-
stances like those that led to the noncompliance? Were there procedures
and safeguards to ensure the integrity of any audit conducted? Did the audit
evaluate all sources of pollution (i.e., all media) including the possibility of
cross-media transfers of pollutants? Were the auditor's recommendations
implemented in a timely fashion? Were adequate resources committed to
the auditing program and to implementing its recommendations? Was envi-
ronmental compliance a standard by which employee and corporate depart-
mental performance was judged?
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or sentence,385 these voluntary actions are given some weight in miti-
gating consequences.386 Similarly, while a parent may not be required
to manage its subsidiary's facilities, it should be encouraged by the
"carrot" that will mitigate its CERCLA liability should there be a
mishap.
The problem with incorporating such a reward into the statute is
that it would introduce an element of fault into the statute which
otherwise imposes strict liability. Eliminating strict liability has often
been proposed as a potential CERCLA reform. Until that is done,
however, parents who meet the new statutory definition of "operator"
should not be treated differently from other responsible parties. Thus,
this proposal does not suggest that reduced liability for parents be a
formalized carrot. Rather, it should be a factor that the EPA consid-
ers in negotiating CERCLA settlements with parents who voluntarily
undertook the beneficial environmental management of their subsidi-
aries' facilities.
Another option is to use a "stick" to prod parents into overseeing
their subsidiaries' environmental management programs. This "stick"
would require parents to engage in oversight and penalize them if they
did not. This has the benefit of eliminating blind eyes and placing the
earnest overseer and the negligent parent on equal footing. As noted
in the judicial context, "a liability rule which imposes an affirmative
duty upon parent corporations to take reasonable steps to ensure that
their subsidiaries have the financial resources to cover their environ-
mental liabilities is a preferable alternative legal regime for deciding
these claims. 38 Such a rule would increase parental oversight and
actively involve parents in the management of their subsidiaries as
DOJ, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in
the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Viola-
tor 4-5 (July 1, 1991) (on file with the author). Thus, both the EPA and DOJ have
seen fit to reward those who voluntarily do more than the minimum compliance
required.
385. See, eg., Advisory Working Group on Environmental Offenses: Proposed
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations Convicted of Environmental Offenses
(1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). The Environmental Offenses, a draft
of sanction proposals prepared for submission to the United States Sentencing Com-
mission, would provide for mitigation of sentencing for those who engage in volun-
tary: "(1) Line Management Attention to Compliance; (2) Integration of
Environmental Policies, Standards and Procedures; (3) Auditing. Monitoring, Report-
ing, and Tracking Systems; (4) Regulatory Expertise, Training and Evaluation; (5)
Incentives for Compliance; (6) Disciplinary Procedures; (7) Continued Evaluation
and Improvement; and (8) Additional Innovative Approaches." Id. § 9D1.l(a).
Although only a proposal, this also reflects the desire to offer "carrots" to those who
act beyond the minimum requirement.
386. In the civil context, voluntary, non-required compliance efforts can yield sig-
nificant benefits in the reduction of civil penalties. See, e.g., Incentives for Self-Polic-
ing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg.
66,706, 66,707-08 (1995) (describing penalty reductions for those with voluntary com-
pliance or audit plans in place).
387. Farmer, supra note 42, at 772 (footnote omitted).
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they would gain no advantage by remaining aloof. However, using
such a "stick" ignores the legal principle behind separation of parents
and subsidiaries.
The "carrot" of informal mitigation should accompany a second
smaller carrot: a "safe harbor"of specific environmental oversight ac-
tivities that will not constitute management.3 88 These oversight activi-
ties should be limited and arrived at only after studying what practices
are most likely to result in good conduct by the subsidiary. These may
include: parents asking their subsidiaries to report on their facilities'
operations each year; or, requiring that the parent sponsor a training
program for the facility's environmental managers. Whatever these
activities are, they should be listed as a "safe harbor" in the statute or
its accompanying regulations so that a responsible parent knows that
it may engage in a range of specific, environmentally-oriented prac-
tices and not be defined as an "operator" for liability purposes.
The smaller "stick" should be a set of rules that require a minimum
amount of oversight by the parent, with a penalty assessed against the
parent for failing to do so. This minimal oversight may be as simple as
requiring the subsidiary to certify to the parent annually that it is in
compliance with environmental regulations. This is not an intrusive
requirement, and it would mandate at least some parental involve-
ment in the affairs of its subsidiaries and perhaps motivate the parent
to engage in further supervision if it discovers problems. Further-
more, even a minimal scheme of parental accountability may motivate
the subsidiary's managers to exercise a higher degree of environmen-
tal responsibility over its facilities.
In summary, this legislative proposal would ask Congress to build
on the Bestfoods ruling to clarify and moderate parental liability rules.
Although indirect veil-piercing liability would not be contemplated as
the primary means of assessing liability, Congress should, to the ex-
tent courts do employ such a liability standard, clarify what state com-
mon law governs.
Direct liability is contemplated as the primary avenue through
which parents will be liable for their subsidiary's facilities. Congress
should retain the Bestfoods focus on the parent-facility relationship
rather than the parent-subsidiary one. This approach should be clari-
fied by expanding and elaborating on the definition of what it means
for a parent to "operate" a facility. This can be accomplished by
adopting the definition of "management" currently found in the
Lender Liability Amendments. Armed with this definition, courts can
then assess parental liability for past conduct by measuring the past
parent-facility relationship and holding a parent liable if its past in-
388. This differs from the two exceptions outlined in the definition of operation
because these "safe harbors" specifically encourage compliance and include discrete
activities. The two exclusions-responses to emergencies or making legally required
disclosures-are not voluntary acts that parents must be encouraged to do.
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volvement meets this newly defined standard. To the extent that a
responsible parent is facing potential liability for current or future
conduct, courts should use this same definition with two modifica-
tions. First, immunize certain environmentally beneficial oversight ac-
tivities from the definition. Second, require a minimal level of
parental oversight, with penalties for noncompliance. Although this
does not guarantee a resolution to all of the competing interests in-
volved, this approach will go further toward reconciling the competing
interests than the current law does. Equally important, it will do so
with legislation rather than with the less appropriate and in-suited ju-
dicial pronouncement. Congress must, in the near future, address
CERCLA reauthorization and grapple with the issue of parental
liability.3
89
CONCLUSION
The "mists of metaphor" are difficult to navigate. Courts have tried
to negotiate the complex issue of parental liability through those mists
with much confusion and little success. The Supreme Court's recent
pronouncement in Bestfoods helped clarify the issue of CERCLA pa-
rental liability.319 It offered a good starting point for further clarifica-
tion in that complex area where environmental policy and corporate
jurisprudence collide. The Bestfoods decision also offers guidance to
those grappling with a number of related and no less intricate
problems.39' Congressional modification, however, is needed to build
389. But see Hottel & Jeffcoat, supra note 36, at 178 ("Members of Congress have
recently sponsored several pieces of legislation to amend and reauthorize CERCLA.
However, none of these bills provide any significant clarification of the circumstances
in which a parent corporation or a shareholder can be deemed liable as a CERCLA
owner or operator." (footnote omitted)).
390. The decision has been recognized as "an important, and overdue, step in help-
ing the courts-and environmental counsel-focus at last on the relevant issues in this
complex field." Kass & McCarroll, supra note 214.
391. Any legal development has repercussions that influence the progress of the
law in areas not originally contemplated. This is particularly true, however, with
Bestfoods, as it implicated decision-making in several other areas.
For example, in its decision in Donaley v. Bogle, 129 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 1997),
vacated and remanded sub non. Donahey v. Livingstone, 118 S. Ct. 2317 (1998), the
Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a sole shareholder of a corporation could
be liable under CERCLA absent circumstances warranting veil-piercing. See id. at
843. The Sixth Circuit initially ruled that the defendant sole shareholder would not be
liable "[b]ecause there are no facts present that would justify such veil-piercing .... "
Id. This decision, however, was vacated and remanded to be decided in light of the
standard articulated in Bestfoods which will, presumably, require a broader reading of
potential liability.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Truck Components Inc. v. Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d
1057 (7th Cir. 1998), barred the attempt of a subsidiary to hold its parent liable for the
pollution caused by the subsidiary. This complex issue can only benefit from clarifica-
tion of the relative responsibilities of parents and subsidiaries.
Another recent decision, East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Department of Com-
merce, 142 F.3d 479, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1998), dealt with the difficult issue of "opera-
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on that effort and provide further guidance to future travelers through
the "mists of metaphor."
tor" liability for the federal government, and the degree to which it may be held liable
as an operator or arranger for contaminated sites with which it was allegedly con-
nected. There, the court grappled with many of the same definitional questions that
are involved in the parental liability context. See id. at 484-85. Thus, again, a sound
rule and some careful guidance would assist in the resolution of related disputes in-
volving the federal government.
Bestfoods has already been relied on by other courts in different contexts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., No. 98-1243, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18159, at
*10 (8th Cir. Aug. 6, 1998) (discussing liability, under the Americans with Disability
Act, for violations at a hotel owned by a subsidiary); United States v. Dell'Aquilla,
No. 96-5761, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 17846, at *7 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 1998) (discussing
application of Bestfoods to Clean Air Act cases).
Other questions also have the potential to be affected by continued development of
the law in the parent-subsidiary context. For example, the applicability of limited
liability in the context of other business forms is still questionable and could benefit
from further development of the law. In addition, the liabilities of the predecessors,
successors, and fiduciaries are also in need of further development. Although these
particular issues are beyond the scope of this Article, they illustrate, in part, the po-
tential impact of Bestfoods in the further development of law in this area, and the
need for further clarification of those areas in which the Bestfoods opinion is
undeveloped.
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